

China's Aid Engagements in South-South
Cooperation: Towards Developing a New Theory of
Sino-Zimbabwe Aid Relations


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Abstract

China's global weight cannot be overemphasised. Its military power and its political and economic ambitions are strong enough to make China an unavoidable actor in the global political economy. China's ambition has seen it spread its influence into Africa, raising alarm regarding its objectives and the impact of its existence in the region. China's tactic in Africa appears to contradict the traditional North-South approach to foreign aid and international relations, based on China's stated non-interference and non-conditionality principles. China has increased its presence in Zimbabwe at a time when donors from the west have been withdrawing their support, citing human rights abuses by the Zimbabwean government. Questions have been raised about the intentions behind China's benevolence, as well as the nature of its assistance to Zimbabwe.

Scholars have approached Sino-Africa relations through the lenses of multiple disciplines. Various theoretical approaches have been applied, with hegemony, realism, liberalism, economic nationalism, and constructivism being the dominant theories in Sino-Africa-related literature. These theories form the theoretical framework of this study, which employs a qualitative methodology borrowing ideas from the Straussian grounded-theory approach. Data was gathered using a triangulation of semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. Twenty-five participants drawn from government departments, civil society, NGOs, and political parties were interviewed. The study answered questions on the political, humanitarian, and economic drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, the nature of the aid, and Zimbabweans' perceptions of the aid.

The political drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe are informed by China's geopolitical strategy, which uses external assistance as a foreign-policy instrument to

create a conducive external environment that enables China to extend its global influence, attract voting allies at the United Nations Security Council, recompense nations that adhere to the One China Policy, and maintain historical links. Additionally, China uses aid to advance its economic interests (such as acquiring minerals), market its exports, technology, and loans, and create employment for Chinese nationals. Zimbabwe's political and economic situation acts as a pull factor for the aid.

This study's analysis culminates in the development of a theoretical framework proposing that, whilst China uses aid to advance its economic and political agendas, the extent to which those interests are met depends on the interests of the host country. In other words, the situation in the host country acts as an enabling variable for China to advance its geopolitical and geoeconomics goals. The framework argues that the implicit, entrenched, and diplomatic conditionalities attached to the aid shows China's sinister motives underlying Sino-Zimbabwe relations. Further, the framework postulates that host nations are active partners in the engagements, and they welcome China's influence with an intention to realise their own goals. To explain why China appears to be the main beneficiary of the engagements, the framework contends that host nations lack the capacity to engage on an equal basis with China and do not have clearly spelt-out strategies on how to fully reap rewards from their relations with China.

Zimbabwe's desperate need to access foreign financing, to find a protector against undue and unwelcome Western influence, to save its ailing public education and health sectors, and to suppress domestic dissent have pushed Harare to deliberately target Beijing through the "Look East Policy" and, in desperation, to give China a free cheque. Zimbabweans perceive that China has a neo-colonial mentality, and that Chinese aid is

causing high-level corruption as well as helping the regime in Harare to shrink democratic space. Chinese aid in Zimbabwe mainly targets the security sector, showing that both China and Zimbabwe are more interested in advancing their political motives than Zimbabwe's economic interests

This study contributes to theory by using foreign aid to demonstrate China's intentions and conduct in aid host countries and by investigating the role of the host countries in permitting China to accomplish its interests. The theory developed in this study can also be used to explain the extent to which China is able to adapt its external policy to match the conditions and interests of the host nation; thus, the main theoretical contribution of this study is strengthening the existing global South development assistance model.

Results from this study will help both Zimbabwe's government and citizens view the China-Zimbabwe relations from each other's perspective. In this regard, the government can use the results of the study to influence citizens' perceptions of the aid, and the citizens can use them to gain awareness of the nature, magnitude, and form of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe.

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“When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, we were like them that dream. Then was our mouth filled with laughter, and our tongue with singing then said they among the heathen, The Lord hath done great things for them. The Lord hath done great things for us; whereof we are glad.” (Psalms 126:1-3)

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Declaration

I, Henry Munashe Jaji, declare that this thesis:

1. Contains no material which has been accepted for the award to candidate of any other degree or diploma, except where due reference is made in the text of the examinable outcome.
2. To the best of the candidate's knowledge, contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due referencing is made in the text of the examinable outcome.
3. Where the work is based on joint research publications, discloses the relative contributions of the respective workers or authors.
4. The thesis was edited by professional editors. The editing addressed only style and grammar and not its substantive content.
5. This thesis has met all the requirements of the ethics approval from Swinburne University of Technology under reference number: 20190350-3269.

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List of Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRODAD	African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
AU	African Union
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BOT	Build, operate, and transfer
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CADC	Chinese Agricultural Demonstration Centre
CBD	China Development Bank
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIF	China International Fund
CIMG	China International Mining Group
CNTC	China National Tobacco Company
CSOs	Civil society organisations
CDOT	Community-development organisation trust
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
ESAP	Economic structural-adjustment program
EIA	Environmental impact assessment
EU	European Union
EXD	External debt
FCI	Foreign capital inflows
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	Highly indebted poor countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IR	International relations
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LEDRIZ	Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe
MDC-A	Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance
MDGs	Millennium development goals
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoHCC	Ministry of Health and Child Care
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSC	North-South cooperation
OA	Official assistance
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPSE	Phnom Penh-Sihanoukivile Expressway
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSC	South-South cooperation
SSEZ	Sihanoukivile Special Economic Zone
STERP	Short Term Emergency Recovery Program
TNDP	Transitional National Development Plan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

UNICEF	United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USITC	United Nations States International Trade Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WW2	World War 2
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZEPARU	Zimbabwe Economic Analysis and Research Unit
Zim Asset	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social Transformation
ZIMCDD	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation
ZIMSCO	Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company
ZimStat	Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The field of international aid theory and the political world order have seen significant transformations in the new millennium. China's aid engagements in the South-South dialogue are expanding, and indications are that China's foreign policy is also changing (Thompson, 2020). This is a structural manifestation of the new aid world order that is affecting the relationship between traditional aid donors and the global aid architecture through increases in the amount of the aid and the geographical scope of the aid beneficiaries (Rosser, 2020). China has experienced rapid growth by adopting a developmental path they have termed "crossing the river by feeling the stones". This approach has sparked wide global debate, particularly regarding China's deliberate focus on Africa. International-relations scholars have reached a consensus regarding China being an emerging global power, but its motive in Africa has remained controversial (Taylor, 2004, 2006, 2019b; Dreher et al., 2019; Strange et al., 2017).

This study adds to the ongoing discussion on the significant role of aid in economic development. Because the subject has been debated extensively, particularly with regards to the effectiveness of aid for economic growth, this work dwells more on why China has decided to give aid to Zimbabwe when all other superpowers are turning their backs on the sub-Saharan country. First, this study analyses the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, looking at the overlapping similarities between China's going-out strategy and Zimbabwe's "Zimbabwe is Open for Business" slogan. Second, previous scholars have concentrated on the effect of aid on economic development at a macro level, looking at macroeconomic aggregates like the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Quazi, 2005;

Loxley and Sackey, 2008; Kargbo, 2012). This study provides a fine-grain analysis of the nature and sectoral allocation of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, drawing on citizens' perceptions to predict the effect of Chinese aid. This chapter gives a brief description of the study, explains the study context, identifies the relevant research gap, presents the problem statement, and summarises the theoretical underpinnings that have guided the study. It also explains the study aims and objectives and the study significance, gives a brief literature review, and outlines the organisation of the thesis.

1.2 Study description

This study is an epistemological investigation of an understanding of Chinese aid engagements with Zimbabwe. It investigates the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and the nature of the aid, looking at the sectoral allocation of the aid as well as the conditionalities attached to it. The study is a qualitative analysis that has borrowed ideas from the Straussian grounded-theory approach to investigate the phenomenon based on the data. The primary data of the study was obtained through semi-structured interviews supported by documentary analysis. International-relations theories of realism, hegemony, and economic nationalism formed the theoretical framework of this study and guided the construction of the interview questions.

1.3. Context of the study

The foreign-aid nexus has been shifting from traditional North-South cooperation to South-South corporation (Quadir, 2013). The North-South approach to foreign aid emerged as an attempt by Western superpowers to address lagging social conditions in their colonies (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014). The North-South approach was then

institutionalised through the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944), which led to the formation of the IMF and World Bank as conduits of foreign aid (Gosovic, 2016). The South-South approach refers to developing countries, also referred to as countries of the global South, providing aid to each other (Dussel, 2013).

Like the traditional North-South approach, South-South cooperation started during the 1950s, where countries in the global South, particularly China, provided support to their neighbours and African countries with the stated aim of helping them fight colonialism (Chin, 2012). Several research articles have been written providing a historical and comparative analysis of South-South cooperation and North-South cooperation (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013; Mulakala, 2016; Piefer, 2014). The amount of research has grown over the years, with strong interest in critiquing both approaches and their influence on the global economy (Chisholm and Steiner-Khamsi, 2009; Chandiwana and Ornbjerg, 2003; Mulakala, 2016; Tortora, 2011).

In North-South cooperation, low-income countries receive donor aid with policy conditions attached to cooperation efforts (Betts, 2008). These conditions are related to governance, institutional and regulatory frameworks to push for trade liberalisation, and the development of a robust private sector (White and Morrissey, 1997). South-South cooperation is seen by its proponents as mutually beneficial, with no conditions attached to the support (Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2010). North-South approach is largely driven by America and Europe, while the South-South approach is largely led by China and India (Ross and Chan, 2002).

South-South cooperation is largely based on the exchange of technical ideas rather than the provision of financial assistance, as with North-South cooperation

(Gosovic, 2016), in which the objectives of the North are distinctly commercial or related to foreign policy (Into Africa, 2005). The growth of the Chinese economy over the last decades has led to China being the major contributor to South-South cooperation after the traditional (North-South) approach to stimulating economic growth in developing countries failed, mainly due to policy prescriptions by the Bretton Woods institutions, which left most of them in debt traps (Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2010). The failure of the North-South approach has led most developing countries to view South-South cooperation as a better approach (Mulakala, 2016).

China's aid to developing countries is largely targeted towards infrastructure development in sectors such as power generation, airports, and road construction, among others (Ray et al., 2015). China's own continuing development, combined with the stagnation of traditional aid to developing countries, has made these developing countries more responsive to new forms of finance from Asia (Modi, 2011).

Whilst North-South cooperation is based on the West's dominance in prioritising projects, setting agendas, and providing resources to address global challenges, China's aid policy is underpinned by the principles of equality and mutual benefit; respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries and no imposition of political conditions; self-reliance; and substantial results (Bräutigam, 2011a).

South-South cooperation has invited a reaction from the West and other proponents of the traditional model, which argue that China is undermining the efforts and success of North-South cooperation in reducing corruption and improving governance (Welle-Strand and Kjøllesdal, 2010). The argument is that China ignores human rights

and environmental considerations in its relationships with Africa and other countries (Shelton, 2005).

China's rise in South-South cooperation coincided with Zimbabwe's foreign-policy refocus, where Zimbabwe sought to shift its foreign policy from engaging with Western countries to concentrating on the east, specifically targeting China, Japan, and India (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018). This study investigates linkages between China's external aid engagements in Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe's economic developmental process. The study uses Zimbabwe as a case study, a nation characterised by persistent political and economic crises coupled with a multidimensional past that is marked by a long history of Chinese involvement.

China's aid programs in developing countries are regarded as "undemocratic, non-transparent, rogue and toxic" (Naim, 2007). It is very difficult to accurately measure the value of Chinese aid to Africa, as China does not publish its aid figures; thus, to an extent China's aid is overstated compared to traditional donors (Samy, 2010).

Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender (2013) looks at how SSC has had an impact on the traditional aid approach to Africa. In their paper they argue that NSC is "pro poor" that is vulnerable communities in the South while SSC is developmental to the whole community. Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender's (2013) study was based on a comprehensive analysis of 50 Sino-African, Chinese, and Western policy documents from the year 2000, and on interviews with elite stakeholders directly involved in the China-Africa relations. They found major differences between the respective approaches of the West and China to aid (Table 1).

Table 1.1: Differences between traditional and Chinese aid

Chinese aid	Western/traditional aid
Provided through specific projects	Comes through broad programs or policies
Comes through in kind, such as provision of labour for construction	Provision of finance
Mainly focused on large infrastructure, such as power plants	Focuses on reduction of poverty and inequality, and support for governance and institutional capacity
Targets global order rather than specific groups, and focuses on the whole population	Pro-poor interventions targeting social services for vulnerable groups
Non-conditionality of aid provision; non-political interference	Conditionality of aid – democracy and governance conditions

Source: Adapted from Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender (2013)

Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender (2013) also looked at the impact of China's approach to Western welfare and policy ideas, finding that China is becoming influential in both its national and international aid approaches, and that interviewees in the study largely agreed that South-South cooperation produced a more balanced or acceptable order to both provider and recipient countries. The study also distinguished between software and hardware elements of development, highlighting that Chinese aid has largely been hard infrastructure, but noting its movement towards the software side through capacity-building (Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender, 2013).

Lagerkvist (2009) focused on China's approach to Africa, comparing authoritarian flexibility with democracy by exploring the principle of non-interference and the effectiveness of mutuality, equality, and reciprocity in South-South cooperation. Lagerkvist acknowledged that China's global influence is growing significantly. Thus,

China's external aid influence in South-South cooperation has received praise from those development scholars who view China's presence in Africa as a beneficial growth prospect for African financial systems (Van der Wath, 2004; Alden, 2005; Lagerkvist, 2009; Yin and Vaschetto; 2011), and criticism from those who see it as a threat to Africa's development (Taylor, 2004; Carlsson et al., 2010; Wang, 2012; Elu and Price, 2010; Chemingui and Bchir, 2010).

1.4. Literature review

In recent decades, strengthening Sino-African relations have attracted much debate among policymakers and academics. The debate revolves around the pace at which bilateral engagements are developing, the increasing impact of China in the international market, the diminished status of Western countries as top donors in Africa, and China's external policy (Hogwe et al., 2017). Chinese foreign policy is grounded in broad policy guidelines such as adhering to the principle of sovereignty, refraining from meddling in domestic matters of other nations, and providing non-conditional aid (Chinese Government, 2006). Critics of the policy have argued that it presents an opportunity for China to exploit the natural resources of African nations (Edinger and Pistorius, 2011). Chinese foreign policy is viewed as contrary to Western countries' foreign policy, which emphasises the importance of good governance, respect for human rights, and prudent economic management as key ingredients for accessing aid, loans, and grants.

According to Van Dijk (2009), China's approach in Africa is anchored upon eight distinct goals:

- Secure China's access to raw materials, including agricultural products.

- Establish markets for Chinese commodities and services.
- Acquire agricultural land.
- Facilitate migration of Chinese nationals from China to Africa.
- Build diplomatic alliances with African regimes.
- Present an alternative to the Western development model.
- Substitute for Western aid; and
- Emphasise advances in China's global hegemony agenda.

Drawing from these policy goals on aid engagements and China's objectives, this study seeks to answer the following questions: What are the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?; What is the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?; and What are the perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding Chinese aid? There is no agreement among scholars on the efficiency of China's participation in Africa, as scholars and policy-makers have divergent views (Van Dijk, 2009). Their lack of agreement can be attributed in turn to the lack of transparency in the reporting of Chinese aid (Carmody, 2011; Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019), different data sources and research methodologies, difficulties in differentiating between Chinese investment and aid transactions, and the perceptions of individual scholars. Those such as Botha (2006) and Tull (2006) state that China's foreign policy towards Africa is based on reciprocal benefit, collaboration, and contribution. They argue that Sino-African dealings are based on trade, investment, aid, and development programs that seek to transform the fortunes of the continent. As a result, China has helped Africa over the past decades to develop modern infrastructure and to develop sectors such as agriculture, telecommunication, and health.

In contrast, scholars such as Goldstein et al. (2008) and Alvarenga Rodrigues (2008) have scrutinised the Sino-African relationship, finding that the relationship is exploitative and cannot be taken as a substitute for the Western model (Goldstein et al., 2008). These scholars have disputed the notion that China's "going-out" strategy towards Africa is based on reciprocal assistance, collaboration, and participation (Alvarenga Rodrigues, 2008). They have cited the skewed balance of trade between China and African countries. China imports raw materials from Africa at low cost and exports value-added goods at a premium. The influx of cheap manufactured goods from China is also undermining the development of local industries and employment creation. For example, Hogwe and Banda (2017) noted that during the decade prior to 2010, South Africa suffered the loss of 77,000 jobs due to the influx of Chinese goods that made local industries uncompetitive. In addition, some scholars are of the view that China engages with corrupt nations and regimes that violate human rights. The researcher is of the view that corruption and human-rights abuses are increasing income inequalities in many Africa countries.

A number of studies have assessed the effectiveness of China's engagements with Africa and whether the China aid model is an option for African countries. Alvarenga Rodrigues (2008) conducted a study on China's commercial participation in Mozambique and its chances for development. The study found that China was obligating the country with financial deals that deprived it of its raw materials, such as timber, coal, and gas. The findings of Alvarenga Rodrigues (2008) are strongly linked to the IMF's (2003) report stating that Angola secured a US\$15 billion soft loan from China in 2002 for several ventures, and that oil was used to pay off the credit. Similarly, Mukwezera (2013) wrote

that the Export-Import Bank of China gave Zimbabwe a loan amounting to US\$340 million to purchase agricultural equipment and assist in the country's mechanisation program. The loan was repaid over a period of five years with agricultural products such as tobacco. The researcher is of the opinion that African countries are losing potential revenue and exporting jobs through exporting raw commodities.

Mai and Wilhelm (2012) conducted a study in 54 African countries to examine the impact of China's aid to African countries over the past 50 years. The objective of the study was to demystify the new "colonialism" tag that some scholars and Western countries were attaching to China. They argued that China's involvement over the past 50 years had helped the continent to develop, as Africa had made progress in politics, trade and economy, public health, education, and technology (Mai and Wilhelm, 2012). The study's findings seemed to contradict the earlier findings of Alvarenga Rodrigues (2008), who argued that the repayment of loans with commodities was undermining the development of Africa. The researcher is of the opinion that the progress being alluded to by Mai and Wilhelm (2012) is subjective and questionable. It is difficult to measure and ascribe progress to China's involvement in Africa owing to data limitations (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019); moreover, Mai and Wilhelm (2012) overlooked the emerging influence of other countries such as India and Russia over recent decades. In addition, some African countries, such as South Sudan and Somalia, are still considered lower-income economies and are in political crisis.

China's aid engagements in Zimbabwe have been on the rise over the past decades (Gukurume, 2019). This rise can be attributable to Zimbabwe's Look East Policy, instituted in 2003 following the imposition of sanctions by Western countries. As a result, China-Zimbabwe engagements have spread across all sectors of the economy, with the mining and energy sectors being the major sectors of interest to Chinese investors. Zimbabwe has also benefited from China's assistance in the form of grants, food handouts, scholarships, medical supplies, and agricultural equipment (Government of Zimbabwe, 2018). However, there are some difficulties in distinguishing aid from investment (Hogwe et al., 2017).

There have been few systematic overviews of China's aid engagement in Zimbabwe. Research on Chinese involvement in Zimbabwe has focused on analysing investment and aid simultaneously, due to the difficulty in distinguishing them in the data (Hogwe and Banda, 2017), the sustainability of Zimbabwe's debt to China (AFRODAD, 2019); labour relations in Chinese companies (Makoshori, 2012), and the impact of Chinese activities on the environment in Zimbabwe (Chidavaenzi, 2013). Hogwe and Banda (2017) studied China's role in African development, focusing on Zimbabwe. They grouped Sino-Zimbabwe relations into past and contemporary phases, stating that past interactions were characterised by unity against colonialism, while modern-day relations are more socio-economic. The study used secondary data to analyse China's involvement in Zimbabwe. The study found that China's involvement helped Zimbabwe to raise capital to build infrastructure. For example, Chinese aid was used to build a hospital in Mahusekwa, the National Defence University in Harare, the Golden Peacock Hotel in Mutare, and the Tile Manufacturing Company in Norton, among other major

projects. However, these projects were built primarily with materials imported from China, rather than procured from local industries. Hogwe and Banda (2017) further noted that the Chinese companies involved in investment and aid were also accused of violating environmental, labour, and tax laws in Zimbabwe. These accusations lend support to Goldstein et al.'s (2006) and Alvarenga Rodrigues's (2008) assertions that China's involvement in Africa can be considered exploitative, and a form of "new colonialism".

Hogwe and Banda (2017) provide some insights into the development literature on China's aid engagement with Zimbabwe, identifying the opportunities and the challenges in this relationship. However, the study failed to distinguish between investment and aid; hence, the results of the study should be treated with caution. The current study therefore seeks to fill this gap by focusing mainly on the nature and drivers of China's aid to Zimbabwe and its bearing on Zimbabwe's growth.

Makoshori (2012) studied labour relations in Chinese firms operating in Zimbabwe using primary data from interviews and questionnaires. Makoshori (2012) found that hard labour, long hours, failure to pay for overtime and disrespect of holidays were prevalent at Chinese companies. In addition, the companies employed Chinese nationals for the top jobs despite the abundance of suitable candidates in Zimbabwe. In a related study on the impact of Chinese investment, Chidavaenzi (2013) found that Chinese companies were also violating environmental laws in Zimbabwe. The study cited the construction of a shopping mall on wetlands in Harare and the environmental degradation caused by Chinese mining companies. The researcher is of the view that the violation of labour and

environmental laws by Chinese companies has mainly been attributable to Zimbabwean authorities' reluctance to enforce the laws.

The Africa Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD, 2019) conducted a quantitative study over the period 2005 to 2019 to analyse the China-Zimbabwe relationship, focusing on the effect of Chinese debt and development in Zimbabwe. The study highlighted that China had huge interests in projects in the energy, water, mining, and communication sectors that were being financed through loans from the Export-Import Bank of China. As result, the Chinese share in Zimbabwe's stock of debt stood at 34% in 2018, a significant share of the country's foreign debt. The study concluded that Chinese loans were increasing Zimbabwe's debt burden and affecting Zimbabwe's growth trajectory. The study recommended that transparency and prudence were needed in the management of the country's debt.

This review of the literature shows that most studies face some difficulties in distinguishing aid from investment; hence, they analyse investment and aid as intertwined. Studies conducted in Zimbabwe have mainly focussed on the sustainability of Chinese debt in Zimbabwe and the compliance of Chinese firms with Zimbabwean environmental laws. Therefore, this study seeks to fill the gap in the literature by specifically distinguishing China's investment in and aid to Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2020. In addition, this study was informed by a clear understanding of the realities of Zimbabwe's culture, politics, and values, thereby giving an entirely Zimbabwean viewpoint to the debate. This is in line with the recommendations by de Haan (2010) that

researchers who study China's aid cooperation in the South must have an in-depth understanding of the developmental trajectory of the host nations.

1.5. Problem statement

Previous literature bemoaned the lack of transparency in the reporting of Chinese aid data by both China and the host nations (Carmody, 2011; Dreher et al., 2019; Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019). The influx of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe comes at a time when citizens' representatives, opposition political parties, and civil society have been complaining that the government has not been consulting all stakeholders on issues to do with Sino-Zimbabwe aid relations (Karekwaivanane, 2017; Gukurume, 2019; Hove et al., 2014). The opaqueness of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean government's inability to engage all stakeholders in Sino-Zimbabwe aid relations may result in citizens failing to fully understanding the nature and magnitude of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, and therefore be reluctant to fully participate in projects funded by Chinese aid.

Therefore, the main research problem identified in this study is:

How does the degree of transparency in the distribution, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe affect citizens' capacity to view and participate in projects funded by Chinese aid?

An in-depth study is therefore needed to unpack the nature, purpose, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and provide insights that will inform both policy and stakeholders' actions.

This main research problem was addressed using three questions:

1. What are the main features of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?


2. What are the key drivers of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe?
3. What are Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid?

To answer these questions, the study used a qualitative methodology composed of semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. This research focuses on how and why China has chosen Zimbabwe from among many other developing countries in the global South, a phenomenon that is socially constructed; thus, qualitative research is appropriate. In addition, the fact that this research will also conduct a micro-level analysis of the perceptions of individual Zimbabweans on the nature and drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe implies that the researcher needs to gain insights into the phenomena in their natural settings, and through an enquiry that is wholly natural, rather than highly technical or scientific (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). The complexity of the phenomena due to their natural social settings and construction does not allow them to be measured using scientific methods (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006).

1.6. Theoretical underpinnings

International-relations theories assist in explaining how nations relate to each other in international systems. Like the current study, previous research has attempted to place China's going-out approach within the lens of existing theories like hegemony, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, depending on the researcher's unit of analysis. These same theoretical underpinnings also guide this study (Figure 1.1). These theories as they relate to China's aid approach in Zimbabwe are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.12.

Figure 1.1: Theoretical underpinnings of China's going-out approach



1.7. Research aim and objectives

The aim of this research was to develop a theory that clearly explains China's overall foreign-aid strategy in Zimbabwe. The problem identified by this research –that the lack of transparency in the distribution, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe may affect citizens' capacity to participate in projects funded by Chinese aid, implies that if citizens fail to clearly understand why and how China is providing aid to Zimbabwe, as well as how much Chinese aid is coming to Zimbabwe, they will not fully benefit from the aid and will not effectively participate in making the aid a success.

Therefore, a theory that clearly explains China's aid relationship with Zimbabwe will help both citizens and the government to have a shared understanding. The study has the following specific objectives:

Objective 1: To explore the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe

Some scholars (for example, Alden et al., 2008; Hanauer and Morris, 2014; Zhimin, 2005) explain the drivers of China's external aid engagements through the lens of the economic nationalism theory, arguing that China's drive into Africa is needs-based: that is, to self-enrich through mineral exploitation to satisfy China's need for raw materials to supply its rising economy, to forge strategic partnerships, and to create new markets for Chinese products.

Scholars like Chin (2012), Dollar (2016), and Johnston and Rudyak (2017) argue that China's assistance is a product of its global development and has nothing to do with self-interest. This shows that there has not been a consensus among scholars on what is motivating China's aid to Africa. This research addressed this deficit.

Objective 2: To explore the main features and nature of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe

With the foreign-aid nexus shifting from North-South to the South-South cooperation, there is need for researchers to be able to differentiate between the features and nature of the two approaches to foreign aid (Mulakala, 2016). This research addresses this deficit by providing an intense assessment of the main features of Chinese aid to Africa.

Objective 3. To unpack Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe

The rapid increase of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe coupled with an influx of Chinese nationals into the country has resulted in narratives from a government perspective regarding China's role being in Zimbabwe (Mano, 2016). These narratives lack a citizens' viewpoint. This study explores the perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding Chinese aid.

1.7. Study significance and contribution

This study has developed a theoretical framework that clearly explains China's overall foreign-aid strategy in Zimbabwe, providing evidence regarding the nature and drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe; this framework will either support or respond to the various positions in the ongoing discourse about China's aid engagements in Zimbabwe. The study has also presented recommendations that will inform policymakers on how to enhance the effectiveness of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Lastly, the study has provided analysis that can help local Zimbabweans understand the nature and effectiveness of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, which will go a long way in improving aid programs as people can then start to actively participate in the programs.

This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides contemporary views regarding the ongoing debate on Sino-Zimbabwean relations. Second, it gives an evidence-based qualitative analysis that considers the historical, political, social, and cultural dimensions of China's aid engagements in Zimbabwe. Lastly, and most importantly, in the absence of clear theories that explain the China-led South-South aid dialog, it provides a theory that explains South-South foreign-aid relations by giving empirical evidence on the motives of the donor as well as the role played by the aid-recipient country to advance the donor's interests.

1.8. Organisation of the thesis

The thesis is presented in nine chapters.

Chapter One

Chapter One introduces the topic of the study, describes the study, explains the study context, and gives a brief literature review that identifies the research gap. It then describes the research aim, objectives, questions, significance, and contributions. Finally, it presents the overall structure of the thesis.

Chapter Two

Chapter Two interrogates China's use of external aid in the South Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East to pursue its global interests. The chapter then draws on the case of China's involvement in Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular. First, it examines China's aid policy, detailing its background from the 1950s before the Asian-African Conference in Bandung to the present-day reform and open-door policy. In addition, the chapter details the history of Sino-African relations, exploring the nature of the relationship and its implications for the continent as well as the West's reaction to it. The chapter examines the specific Sino-Zimbabwean relationship, touching on how China's non-interference policy shapes it. The chapter examines China's Belt and Road Initiative, explaining Zimbabwe's role in the initiative, as well as its geopolitical and geoeconomics implications. The chapter also gives a theoretical explanation of China's behaviour in Africa, touching on theories including the global hegemony theory, Sen's capabilities approach theory, and several theories of international relations and global political economics.

Chapter Three

This chapter explores foreign aid as an instrument of economic development, starting by defining aid from the viewpoint of traditional donors and from China's perspective. It then investigates the history of foreign aid from the Marshall Plan to the expansion of foreign aid in the South-South dialogue. The chapter explains the concept of aid dependency in the South, the impact of external assistance on governance and on economic growth, the geopolitics of foreign aid, and fiscal responses to aid.

Chapter Four

Chapter Four details Zimbabwe's economic developmental context, giving a brief history of the Zimbabwean economy from the 1970s to the current economic crisis. The chapter also explores Zimbabwe's foreign-aid and foreign-debt trends, as well relations with donors, creditors, and development-assistance partners. In addition, the chapter explores Zimbabwe's socio-economic development, looking at indicators like poverty, health, and education. The chapter also looks at Zimbabwe's geopolitics, the effects of sanctions on the economy, and Zimbabwe's Look East Policy.

Chapter Five

This chapter presents the study's methodology, explaining the study design and the methods used to gather and analyse data, as well as detailing the principles of Straussian grounded theory employed for this study. The chapter ends by discussing the ethical considerations in this research.

Chapter Six

Chapter Six, the first chapter to present the study's results, documents participants' views regarding the drivers of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe. The chapter uses literature and

supporting evidence to make sense of participants' views. It explains how economic and political motives drive China's aid to Zimbabwe. The chapter identifies China's need for minerals, as well as its need to create a market for its exports, create employment for its workforce, and market its loans as the main economic push drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. On political push drivers, the chapter identifies China's need for voting allies in international forums like the UNSC as well as its need to maintain historical ties. The chapter concludes by discussing the pull factors that characterise Zimbabwe's political and economic interests, as enshrined in the Look East Policy, which Zimbabwe used to attract China's attention as it searched for fresh external funding; protection from international pressure, especially at the United Nations General Assembly; and support to suppress domestic dissent.

Chapter Seven

Chapter Seven, the second results chapter, documents participants' views regarding the nature and characteristics of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and concludes by presenting the theory that emerged from the study. The chapter explains that Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is disbursed as concessional loans, interest-free loans, grants, and donations. It also explains the implicit, entrenched, and diplomatic conditionalities that are attached to Chinese aid. The chapter identifies that most Chinese aid takes the form of projects, rather than monetary disbursements, denying Zimbabwe much-needed external funds. Zimbabweans' perceptions regarding Chinese aid are generally negative, with participants stressing that China has a neo-colonialist agenda in Zimbabwe, that China is aiding corruption among the elite, and that China is assisting the Zimbabwean government in shrinking the democratic space in Zimbabwe. The theoretical framework

that emerged from the study proposes that Chinese aid is predatory, and that whilst China has economic interests, the extent to which those interests are met is dependent on the interests of the host nation. The framework argues that the political and economic interests and characteristics of the host nation enables China's activities in that country. Specifically, the framework argues that Zimbabwe had a policy designed to deliberately attract China's engagement, and that Zimbabwe's interests enable China to advance its own agendas in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Eight

Chapter Eight discusses the views and data presented and analysed in Chapters Six and Seven. The chapter is arranged according to the three research questions that guided this study. It concludes by explaining how the study addressed the research problem and discussing how the theoretical framework developed will be used to enhance knowledge of the international relations.

Chapter Nine

Chapter Nine concludes the study, presenting implications, limitations, recommendations, and scope for further study. The chapter also includes my reflection on the study, and will be examining the broad question: What is behind China's going-out strategy in the global South?

1.9 Chapter summary

This chapter has introduced this thesis, outlining the study, the context in which it was conducted, the gap in the literature it aims to fill, its research problem, its theoretical underpinnings, its significance, and the research questions, aims, and objectives. It has

also presented the organisation of the rest of the thesis. The next chapter is the first literature-review chapter, outlining in greater detail the theoretical underpinnings that guided the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: AID AS A TOOL IN CHINA'S HANDS

2.1. Introduction

Foreign direct investments, aid, and loans, together with other related geopolitical and socio-economic strategies, have been a contentious issue since the inception of the neo-colonialism debate (Mohey-ud-Din, 2007). Rich and advanced nations have since World War I used financial resources to interact and engage with emerging and less-developed nations, particularly on the African continent (Tait et al., 2015). Over time, an increasing number of developing countries have received increasing amounts of resources from developed countries (Swaroop and Devarajan, 1999). This chapter explores China's use of external assistance to pursue its global interests. The chapter will focus on Sino-African engagements by examining Chinese foreign policy in Africa with regard to aid and loans to Zimbabwe. The chapter will conclude by exploring the theoretical underpinnings that guided the study.

2.2. China's aid policy

China has in recent years shifted from being an aid beneficiary to an aid benefactor (Kilby and Dreher, 2010). However, the absence of detailed official statistics has prevented the international community from understanding how, where, and why China is spending billions of dollars in other countries (Large, 2008). Interestingly, China does not consider itself a giver in South-South cooperation, but rather, a companion (Davies, 2007).

China's choices on foreign policy are derived from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence viz; mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence(Dodge, 2004). These principles were originally developed in 1954, when China, as a Communist country, was trying to reach out to non-Communist Asian partners (Li and Zheng, 2009, Xue, 2014). The principles have since played a pivotal role in international economics, as they propose an alternative world order (Large, 2008). China, thus, advocates for a multi-polarity system that stresses the unfringeable sovereignty of all states, with each state running its own system as it sees fit (Tiewa, 2012). Thus, the core idea behind China's five principles of foreign policy is that no country has a right to meddle with the sovereignty of another state (Xue, 2014).

2.2.1 China in the South Pacific

The South Pacific comprises 14 sovereign nations and seven territories (Pryke, 2020). The South Pacific is a unique region in terms of its geographic location, with unique economic development challenges arising from the remoteness of the area, high population growth rates, overcrowding, and regular and persistent natural disasters compounded by the effects of climate change (Zhang, 2007). These developmental changes have led to the South Pacific largely dependent on aid, which has traditionally been provided by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (Yang, 2009). China's going-out strategy has seen an increase in Chinese investments, grants, and loans, with questions being raised about its agenda and ambition, and the risks it poses to the region (Pryke, 2020).

In 2006 China showed interest in forming ties with the region through the establishment of the China-Pacific Islands Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, and in 2014 the cooperation was elevated to a strategic partnership (Zhang, 2017). Most of the nations in the region have been very receptive to external support for development (Yang, 2009). After Australia reduced its aid to the region, China provided an alternative, with the South Pacific Aid Map showing that in 2016 and 2017 China committed US\$2.72 billion and US\$4.78 billion, respectively (Pryke, 2020). Though traditional donors like Australia and the US are still ahead of China with respect to aid in the region, the difference in the aid from the two sources is that traditional donors' aid is focused on governance matters, whereas the countries have an immediate need for aid that supports economic development and climate action, on which China tends to focus.

The Lowy Institute of Research put Chinese aid to Pacific nations post-2006 at US\$1.5 billion, with this aid being provided in form of grants and loans (Zhang, 2007). Just as in Africa and other regions, China's aid approach is in the form of concessional loans for infrastructural projects, with Chinese state-owned enterprises winning tenders for the projects (Oh, 2020). The form and ways China has been providing loans tend to create a risk of debt-trapping the borrowing countries, an accusation that China refutes, claiming that they use their historical ties with the region to maintain friendly cooperation and are not driven by economic interests. It is argued that China uses aid to outmanoeuvre Taiwan in securing diplomatic relationships in the region (Lanteigne, 2012); this seems to be one of the reasons that the Solomon Islands and Kiribati cut ties with Taiwan in 2019 in favour of ties with Beijing (Analytica). Taiwan is now left with only four allies in the region, and the nations that have switched their allegiance from Taiwan to

China tend to receive considerable aid (Zhang, 2019). Zhang (2017) examines three aspects of China's use of aid in the Pacific Islands as a means of diplomacy, arguing that a core Chinese interest in the Pacific is its One China Policy, which has pushed it to increase visits, diplomacy, and economic leveraging of the diplomatic relations it has forged. China also uses its principle of non-interference in domestic matters to entice nations to opt for its aid (Kabutaulaka, 2010).

China tends to use aid as a means of bargaining for votes at the United Nations, with Vanuatu's Minister of Foreign Affairs admitting in an interview in 2020 with Gareth Harvey that Vanuatu receives loans from China in return for voting along with China at the UN (McCormack, 2020). In this respect, China can be viewed as using aid to pursue and achieve its geopolitical goal of being a global leader, with influence across all regions. Australia views China's interests in and aid to the region as driven by its desire to maintain a military presence in the region (60 Minutes Australia, 2020). The Pacific nations argue that they view the Chinese presence solely as good for their economic development, insisting that the region is non-aligned and has no interest in conflicts between Australia and China regarding the region (Jha).

Indeed, far from being alarmed, the Pacific Island nations are appreciative of the tug-of-war between Australia and China in the region, as it tends to work to their advantage in terms of external support. Australia sees China's efforts as seeking dominance and military hegemony in the region, an argument that has merit; for example, the *New York Times* of 16 October 2019 suggested that China is leasing the entire Island of Tulgi from the Solomon Islands. The newspaper indicated that the purpose of this is to establish a military base. The opaqueness of arrangements between China and nations

in the South Pacific has often led to suggestions that China is using aid to gain hegemonic power in the region based on economic development through infrastructural financing, and, in the long run, debt-trapping the region's nations (Harvey, 2019).

China argues that although its influence in the region could be increasing, it has no specific interests other than its global trade with developing countries that need loans and grants for infrastructural support and the economic development associated with it (Pan et al., 2019) For Australia and the West, China's dominance in the region poses a security risk in the long run, as China will use its aid leverage to establish military bases that have potential security implications for Australia and the US. The increase in China's dominance has also attracted the attention of opposition politicians in the region, with the opposition in Fiji arguing that the region is selling its soul for current benefits by continuing to receive loans and grants from China (Salem, 2020).

China and Chinese companies in the South Pacific region tend to create relationships with elites, resulting in some form of a state capture and the introduction of corruption, thereby weakening the host nation's institutions. Chinese loans and grants are used to influence politically exposed people in the region, entrenching systematic corruption and patronage systems that affect the institutional fibre in Pacific Island nations (Analytica, 2019). With the region already subject to numerous developmental problems and funding challenges, the nations are likely to become more desperate due to the impact of COVID-19, and China is more likely to take advantage of the situation. The region is forecast to contract by 10%, and its nations may be tempted to stimulate economic growth through becoming trapped in debt. China already has diplomatic relations with eight nations in the region, and according to the Lowy Institute of


International Policy, it is likely to be the third-largest donor in the territory after Australia and the US (Kassam, 2020).

China's engagement in the South Pacific is also pushed by the private sector in search of profits. This is especially so for the small-to-medium enterprises that are being crowded out in China by state-owned enterprises. The Chinese domestic growth model is also reaching saturation for local firms; thus, there is a need to establish new markets and business environments.

China's stance in the South Pacific seems to have attracted a response from Australia, with both the Liberal-National coalition and the opposition Labor Party issuing statements reaffirming Australia's position in the South Pacific. Julie Bishop, Australia's former Foreign Minister, announced that Australia would remain the "partner of choice" in the region, and Bill Shorten, former leader of the Labor Party, stressed that his party had plans to set up an Infrastructure Investment Bank in the Pacific in line with the "partner of choice" mantra (Taylor, 2020).

Media reports suggest that aggressive Chinese lending in the South Pacific is costly to already-poor countries, and a threat to the West, suggesting that the strategy is an intentional part of China's "debt-trap diplomacy" (Fox and Dornan, 2018). These reports point to Tonga's debt levels as well as Sri Lanka's Hambantota port as examples of China's aggressive lending (Fox and Dornan, 2018). Questions have been raised as to whether countries in the South Pacific are at a greater threat of debt entrapment now than ever. Data from the IMF and Asian Development Bank, as extracted from Fox and Dornan (2018), show that countries in the region have been experiencing high debt distress in recent years.


Figure 2.1: Pacific Island countries' debt-distress ratings, 2008-2017



Source: IMF/Asian Development Bank, extracted from Fox and Dorman (2018)


Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that countries in the South Pacific region do indeed have debt problems. China is the major bilateral creditor in all of the countries in the region, but Chinese loans account for half of the total loans acquired by each country except Tonga (Fox and Dornan, 2018). Twelve percent of Pacific nations' total debt has been extended by China: that is, US\$1.3 billion of the total amount of US\$11.2 billion (Figure 2.3). The figures include Australia, which does not lend bilaterally with countries in the region. Moreover, the debt given to Fiji and Papua Guinea constitutes 88% of the total external debt extended to the region, with the rest of the countries having more domestic debt than foreign debt (Fox and Dornan, 2018),

Figure 2.2: Debt distress ratings by country (2018)



Source: IMF/Asian Development Bank, extracted from Fox and Dorman (2018)

Figure 2.3: Pacific countries' national debt by lender



Source: IMF/Asian Development Bank (2018), extracted from Fox and Dorman (2018)

Chinese lending constitutes more than 30% of debts in Tonga, Vanuatu, and Samoa (Figure 2.3). Multilateral lending is greater than Chinese lending in Samoa, and the government of Vanuatu has put an end to Chinese lending, leaving only Tonga at risk of a debt trap from China (Fox and Dornan, 2018). The media outcry about China's debt-

trap diplomacy in the South Pacific region is not substantiated by evidence. To counter the narrative, China should do more to clear its image in the territory.

2.2.2. China in Africa

The geopolitical traditions and linkages between China and Africa have been used to ideologically justify and legitimise China's commercially driven engagements in Africa (Haggard and Huang, 2008). Both China and Africa were victims of colonisation, as noted in 2006, by China's then-leader Wen Jiabao (Tait et al., 2015). Thus, the historical mutuality emanating from common experiences of imperialism is used to justify China's involvements in Africa (Tait et al., 2015).


In the 1950s, Beijing helped various African countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi who were fighting colonization, and this has provided a foundation for the Sino-Africa relations (Mohan and Lampert, 2013). The relationship has evolved over the years, and in 1971 at a United Nations (UN) summit where a decision had to be made on the government that was to represent China between the People's Republic of China (PRC) government and the Republic of China (ROC) government (Tait et al., 2015).

Most African countries voted with the United States of America against the Peoples' Republic of China because during the time America was channeling a lot of resources into Africa in the form of loans and aid (Tait et al., 2015). This was different compared to the voting pattern at a 2007 UN summit where the summit had to deliberate on human rights abuses in North Korea, most African nations voted with China (Tait et al., 2015). This is evidence that in the four decades between these votes; African political connections have transformed in favor of China because the Western countries had

started to reduce aid that was channeled through African governments favoring to channel aid through Non-Governmental Organizations (Wako, 2018).

The nations of Africa no longer feel that they must acquiesce to the wishes of the US government, as most are now aligned with China (Wako, 2011), which continues to inject large amounts of money into the region (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Tait et al. (2015) contend that China is literally buying allies through aid, grants, and loans. At the heart of Sino-African relations are Chinese-funded Infrastructure developments financed through loans from the Export-Import Bank of China (Alden et al., 2008).


Figure 2.4:A Comparison of loans by China and the US to Africa, 2003-2015



Source: China Annual Central Government Budget (Various Years), AidData, Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative, and various publications

Whilst both Chinese and American investments in Africa have grown over the years, Chinese investments have been increasing more significantly, particularly since 2011 (Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5: A comparison of foreign aid from China and the US to Africa, 2000-2018



Source: China Annual Central Government Budget (Various Years), AidData, Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative, and various publications

China's support for Africa has been expanding whilst America's aid to Africa has generally remained the same on average (Figure 2.2). China has funded the construction of a \$3.2 billion railway line in Kenya tracking 300 kilometers from Nairobi, the political capital, to Mombasa, the tourism capital, in just four hours and thirty minutes, less time than the fastest train journey from Philadelphia to Boston (Stahl, 2017). In Guinea, the Chinese government has constructed a dam worth \$526 million to alleviate power shortages and generate income through selling the excess capacity (Ademola et al., 2016). Another example is the Addis Ababa railway line, worth in excess of \$475 million, designed to curb the country's crippling traffic challenges (Hackenesch, 2013). There are many other such projects across the African continent.


However, these loans are not free; they were funded by the Export-Import Bank of China at an interest of 2% to 3% – 12 times higher than the interest rates Japanese loans, which range between 0.25% and 0.75%, according to the Australian Business Insider of

7 March 2018. Whilst other development institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, European Investment Bank, and Asian Development Bank, view large African infrastructural projects as less attractive and highly risky, the Export-Import Bank of China accepts the risk and hence provides funding for such projects (Harneit-Sievers et al., 2010). Assuming corporation between China and Africa, the Export-Import Bank of China will give free or concessional credit to Africa for project construction. These credits are deemed a type of external assistance because where the loans are given under such conditions, China does not anticipate inflation-adjusted repayments because of the low interest being charged as well as the high risk of default (Hackenesch, 2013).

Political economists have always argued that China has a political goal behind its interests in Africa (Bodomo, 2009). These political economists argue that since China is losing economic momentum as growth rates fall, it is expected that they move from industrialising to being industrialised. In contrast, Africa is the world's least economically advanced area, underdevelopment makes fast growth easy (Hackenesch, 2013). Thus, by participating in African mineral extraction and agriculture, China benefits from African growth by fueling the Chinese industries that require minerals and food. Africa also has cheap labor (Harneit-Sievers et al., 2010). Economic advancement in China has driven a significant portion of its populace into the middle class, thereby increasing employment costs across the country; thus, China is no longer competitive in terms of lower-skilled and low-cost manufacturing work (Ademola et al., 2016). As a result, Chinese companies are operating in African nations, which have some of the lowest employment costs in the world (Hackenesch, 2013).

China is also now the main trading associate with the countries of Africa considered as a group (Gamora et al., 2009). Despite China having a vastly larger population than the US, both countries trade an almost similar value of goods worldwide each year (Taylor, 2006): on average, \$3.95 trillion and \$3.88 trillion worth of goods globally each year, respectively (Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2017). In 2016, Africa and the US traded goods worth \$48 billion, whereas \$128 billion worth of goods were traded between China and Africa over the same period (Figure 2.3). This indicates China’s high level of political and economic involvement in Africa.

Figure 2.6: Trade trends of China and the US with Africa, 2002-2016



Source: United States International Trade Commission (USITC) Data Web/USDOC, Bloomberg, China Annual Central Government Budget (Various Years), and various publications

China’s approach is similar to the colonial strategy that sought to create a structure of authority over the colonised in order to benefit from resources and labour (Kilby and Dreher, 2010). China has demonstrably been using its aid to Africa to influence world politics (Mason, 2017). Empirical evidence shows that countries that recognise Taiwan as a sovereign country independent of China receive on average 2.7 fewer Chinese

infrastructure projects per year (Kilby and Dreher, 2010), while countries that vote with China frequently at the UNSC receive on average funding for 1.8 more projects per year from China. Development economists have also asserted that foreign aid to developing countries is often granted for diplomatic rather than commercial purposes (Kilby and Dreher, 2010). In addition, Naim (2007) has argued that China's international aid can be described as "rogue", as China only focuses on her own national interests when providing aid, disregarding the economic needs of recipient nations.

Naim (2007) further asserts that China is only interested in having access to natural resources and the prestige of international alliances, in contrast to the efforts of Western donors to promote good governance and reduce abuses of citizens' rights in developing states using donor conditionalities. The Chinese government deems its growth-finance program to be a national secret (Dreher et al., 2016). Given that there is a lack of official data, no empirical study can definitively argue that Chinese aid is "rogue"; however, the concept of "rogue aid" will be further explored in this study.

2.3. Background of China's aid program

China does not consider herself a donor but rather a partner in South-South cooperation (Davies, 2007). This idea of being a partner rather than a donor is exemplified by China's first initiative to provide developmental assistance to a neighboring country – Russia – in 1950 (Watanabe, 2013). China signed its first concessional loan in February 1950, after the Sino-Soviet treaty (Watanabe, 2013). The loan was worth US\$300 million at 1% interest disbursed over five years. This marked the beginning of China's foreign aid policy, in which the Chinese government sought to both give and receive aid (Adu-Gyamerah, 2014). This is in contrast with the view given by

several development economists, who usually refer to China as an emerging or new external-assistance donor (Murakami and Hernández, 2018; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). China has been giving assistance for longer than most of the traditional donors (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017). Johnston and Rudyak (2017, p. 31) write:

China's aid model has been uniquely shaped by its experience as an aid recipient, particularly its exposure to concessional loans from the Soviet Union from the 1950s until the Sino–Soviet split in the early 1960s, and also loans from Japan from the late 1970s, followed by aid from Western donors from the 1980s.

The next section will discuss China's aid policy by considering its four distinct phases.

2.3.1. Phase 1: Prior to and in the aftermath of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 (1950-1969)

For the duration of this phase China extended aid mainly to its neighboring countries, along with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and selected African states, which were assisted through funding for their independence movements (Bartke, 1989). At this stage China's external support was mainly driven by political and ideological issues and consisted of zero-interest credits and grants (Davis, 2007).

In the 1950s, China's planned economy was influenced by the Soviet Union, which exposed China to the tangled concessional loaning that became one of China's foreign-aid principles (Davis, 2007). China first aided the rebuilding of post-war North Korea in 1953, and in 1956, China began giving aid to non-communist countries such as Cambodia, Nepal, and Egypt (Bartke, 1989). The number of recipients of Chinese aid

increased after the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, where China started providing aid to African states (Bartke, 1989). It is notable that China at this stage associated its initial external support policy with the Soviet Union's aid model, which was founded on the principle of common respect for individual countries' authority as well as a linkage between economic and political independence (Watanabe, 2013).

These links are a cornerstone of China's aid policy today, appearing in both its official aid documents and its foreign-aid white papers (Rudyak, 2014). After Joseph Stalin's death in the early 1960s and the Sino-Soviet split, China had a double burden of continuing with the projects it had initially undertaken with the assistance of the Soviet Union as well as repaying loans. This cemented China's position that aid should only be used to achieve economic self-reliance (Chen, 2010).

2.3.2. Phase 2: Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Opening Up" economic reform policy (1970-1989)

During the "Reform and Opening Up" period of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China began to carry out projects in South America, with the quantity of assistance extended increasing steeply (Chen, 2010). China used assistance to lobby for backing by African states in its bid to find a replacement for Taiwan on the UNSC in 1971 (Dreher et al., 2016). China started pursuing more-pragmatic foreign and aid policies, opening its doors to Western countries from 1976 after the death of Mao Zedong (Chen, 2011).

Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up policy opened the Chinese economy to massive overseas direct financing as well as global trade (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015). In this phase, China's aid allocation was being influenced more by economic considerations. Although Chinese aid continued to be offered as interest-free, long-term loans, conditions

became more restrictive, although they were still favorable to China's donor recipients in the 1980s (Dreher et al., 2008). With the reform and opening, China signed concessional loans with Japan in 1979, followed by development aid. China joined the World Bank in April 1980 (Davis, 2007). In this phase, China placed greater emphasis on projects that benefited its reform and modernisation agenda (Shi et al., 1989). Simultaneously, a change in China's local policy was also shaping its attitude towards external assistance. China transformed its ministries into state-owned enterprises in the 1980s (Li et al., 2014). This resulted in foreign assistance becoming a function of many aggressive forces, but the firms that were executing aid projects retained the approach of state officialdom and the communication networks of their previous parent ministries (Chen, 2010).

2.3.3. Phase 3: The aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 (1990-2010)

The Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 marked the beginning of the third phase, in which China began to actively seek diplomatic support. This, in turn, increased its foreign aid substantially, mainly to African and Latin American countries (Brautigam, 2010). The aid policy was a comparatively cheap approach for China to repay nations that had supported it throughout the 1989 crisis (Taylor, 1998). Brautigam 2009 argued that in this phase, China reinforced its checkbook diplomacy with the 1995 aid reform, which introduced market-oriented values and emphasised the relationships between investment, trade, and aid. In this phase, China's aid endeavors started taking an entirely distinct approach, which spilled into the fourth phase (Kobayashi, 2008).

China's overseas assistance increasingly became a critical part of its international trade approach, resulting in China merging aid with trade and investments (Wang and

Jin, 2013). This view on foreign aid by China was aided by two key macroeconomic changes in Africa as well as in China. The reform and opening of China's economy resulted in rapid growth, and by mid-1990s industrialisation in China had progressed tremendously, with machinery and electronics exports exceeding those of clothing and textiles (Lin et al., 2003). In turn, China became the major processing centre for the global forestry industry (Buckingham, 2016; Lin and Wang, 2014). China's consequent increased demand for oil, minerals, and timber allowed it to identify fresh markets for Chinese products among the suppliers of the raw materials it needed (Pannell, 2008).


The ending of the 1994 apartheid regime in South Africa permitted South Africa to focus on regional economic development. This was accompanied by increased macroeconomic stability in most of the sub-Saharan African countries (Adem, 2012). A string of crucial accords on trade and economic cooperation set the groundwork for the rapid establishment of economic ties between China and the African region (Shinn, 2014; Venkataraman and Gofie, 2015).

This saw a new aid strategy emerging, and at the centre of which was the need to increase foreign financing to developing countries. This was achieved by offering new forms of financing, such as subsidised-interest preferential loans and joint ventures, in addition to interest-free loans and grants (Dreher and Fuchs, 2016). This saw China's external assistance expanding to Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries. In 2006 at the Beijing Conference of the FOCAC, China declared a "new strategic partnership" where China would increase foreign aid to Africa to achieve "a target of mutual benefit and a win-win situation" (Ministry of Finance 2007, p. 416). This phase is often referred to as the turning point in Africa-Chinese relations (Johnston, 2016).

2.3.4. Phase 4: Reform and opening of Chinese foreign aid (2010-2018)

Development economists such as Taylor (2004) and Dreher et al. (2017) have controversially debated the implications of China's aid as a substitute for traditional development aid. This debate emanated from the interlocking of trade and investment in China's approach of providing aid free from political interference and measurable transparency conditions (Mawdsley, 2012). Responding to the criticisms China released its initial comprehensive, English-language white paper on overseas assistance in 2011 (SCIO, 2011a). The white paper articulated China's aid activities, foreign policy, and distribution and management of foreign aid. While it did not make available data on bilateral support (Provost, 2011), it did provide data on aid per region, which showed that Africa alone received in excess of 50% of China's foreign aid (Figure 4.4).

Figure 2.7: China's foreign aid by recipient region



Source: SCIO (2014) as adopted by Johnson and Rudyak (2017)

In general, these aid-based investments were meant to ensure that China's foreign-aid policy could meet international expectations for the behavior of a responsible

donor (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016). The complex entanglements between varied financial instruments and financing vessels made it difficult to determine whether China's foreign aid could be governed in line with international foreign-aid standards (Bräutigam, 2011a).

2.4. The history of Sino-African relations

Concerns about the implications of China's external aid, trade, investment, and foreign policy have been raised in the past few years following China's rapidly increasing impact in the African region (Ademola et al., 2016). This section will discuss and examine the China-Africa relationship, exploring the challenges and opportunities of the association. According to Morgan (2018), at the centre of the Sino-African engagement debate is the question of why a developing country with citizens considerably poorer than those in traditional donor nations would provide aid. Some scholars have argued that China is using aid to capitalise on its development model, which is anchored in building new markets and fostering economic development (Davies, 2010; Davies et al., 2008; Kilby and Dreher, 2010), whilst others have argued that China's foreign aid is voracious mineral-snatching coupled with an unscrupulous chase of political objectives (Dreher et al., 2008; Halper, 2010).

Morgan (2018) argued that scholars like Dreher et al. (2008), Giry (2004), and Halper (2010) based their arguments on rational material interests, neglecting both China's donor experience acquired over a period more than six decades and its relationship with African states that dates to the colonial era. His argument was also echoed by Chinese scholars like Jianbo and Hongwu (2007), who asserted that China's

assistance to Africa is based on genuineness and a win-win approach premised on fostered consensual relationships and permanent friendship.

China's second white paper on foreign aid revealed that between 2010 and 2012, US\$14.41 billion was apportioned to China's foreign aid, with 51.8% of it given to African nations (Zhang, 2014). China's assistance to Africa concentrates on projects that involve infrastructure, trade, poverty alleviation, and welfare (Donglin, 2017). Donglin (2017) showed that the African public views China's assistance to the African region in a positive way in general, although the perception varies with countries as well as levels of education, social class, gender, and the degree of media exposure for the assistance. Donglin (2017) concluded that economic development is positively correlated with positive public opinion on China's assistance to the African continent.

2.5. The nature of Chinese involvement in Africa and its implications for the region.

The implications of China's involvement in sub-Saharan Africa have been a cause of debate among development scholars. Scholars like Van der Wath (2004) and Alden (2005) view China's presence in Africa as beneficial and as offering the prospect of growth for African markets. Van der Wath (2004) argued that in areas where African states have a comparative benefit, as with mining in South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, enhanced trade with China will be advantageous for those nations' financial systems. Alden (2005 p. 6), showed evidence that where Chinese investments have been coupled with the transfer of skills and technology to Africa, the recipient African nations have seen immense economic growth and development. However, some scholars (Taylor, 2004; Dreher et al., 2019b) view China's existence on the African continent as a threat to the

region's advancement. China-Africa trade is unbalanced, with China being the greater beneficiary (Taylor, 2004). In addition, the incursion of Chinese manufactured goods into African markets has posed direct and unfair competition to African manufacturing industries (Draper, 2006). China's non-interference policy and respect for domestic sovereignty, where China does not engage with neo-liberal values of democracy, human rights, and good governance, allows China to do business with autocratic and despotic African regimes. As a result, China has faced criticisms for funding and supporting conflicts on the continent through arms exports to volatile regions (Taylor, 2004). These criticisms highlight China's ambivalent position in the global system: it propagates its image as a super power, yet fails to perform responsibilities concomitant with superpower status (Kim, 1997). This study seeks to focus on the effect of China's five values of external policy on the nature and implications of its aid relationships with Africa.

China's involvement with the African continent indicates the dilemma of how to marry China's superpower status with its economic and political interests. There is an intrinsic conflict between global expectations that China will play a leading role in promoting peace, security, and respect for human rights and the nature of China's dealings and engagements in Africa (Taylor, 2004).

Most regimes in Africa have been widely condemned by the international community for abusing human rights as well as instigating political corruption, among other draconian governance cultures. Despite this, China continues to engage with the leaders of these African states (Draper, 2006).

The continent is endowed with vast mineral resources, and hence is economically significant to China, as it provides cheap and readily available raw materials, minerals,

and energy. Zimbabwe and Zambia, for example, are rich in minerals like gold, platinum, copper, diamonds, and iron ore, which are important to China's growing manufacturing industry. China has interests in Sudan as a source of energy security, and is now Sudan's main manufacturing and trade partner (Shichor, 2005). The discovery of an oil field in Lake Albert in Uganda has cemented China's strategic interests in that country (Obwona et al., 2007).

Moreover, the continent presents the potential for a strategic and significant political advantage for China with regards to its quest to secure support in the multilateral arena. This relationship, if used to China's advantage, will see Beijing cheaply securing its interests in the WTO as well as other multilateral venues (Alden, 2005, p. 143).

As the impacts of this involvement become more visible, there is need for increased empirical research about both the challenges and the benefits to African states that obtain assistance from China. The presence of China in Africa has varying implications that can be classified as the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.

2.5.1. The Good: An opportunity for Africa to grow economically

China's involvement in the African region provides an undisputed prospect for Africa to develop. Africa, which has a strategic and comparative advantage in areas like mining, tourism, and raw materials (Van der Wath, 2004), can profit from improved trade opportunities with China. Exporting agricultural products to China is another way Africa can benefit from engagements with China (Draper, 2006).

Chinese infrastructural projects in Africa are also going a long way in developing the continent. These investments are coming at an opportune time, as the continent is

facing low investments from the West (Alden, 2005). They also involve the transfer of skills and technologies. Additionally, Chinese agricultural technology will increase productivity in Africa, thereby reducing hunger and creating jobs (Shelton, 2001). With improved infrastructure, Africa will be able to attract more international investment.

2.5.2. The Bad: Unbalanced trade

Concerns have been raised about the nature of trade between China and Africa, which have been characterised as unbalanced (Wilson, 2008). Chinese exporters have the capacity to crowd out African retailers, resulting in loss of jobs (Draper, 2006). In some cases, Chinese firms can take advantage of economies of scale to submit bids that will be below cost, to crowd local firms out of the market (Shinn and Eisenman, 2005).

China's non-interference policy poses a threat to Africa, as it has allowed Chinese funds to be used to fund African autocratic regimes' human-rights abuses (Giry, 2004). For instance, China perpetuated and financed the Sudanese civil war by supplying weapons to Sudan in exchange for oil (Taylor, 2004). In most of the undemocratic and despotic regimes in Africa, corruption is rife and Chinese engagement only benefits the elites (Taylor, 2004).

2.5.3. The Ugly: The second colonisation of Africa?

Many Africans are skeptical about Sino-African relations, with some likening China's motives to those that drove the Western countries to scramble for Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012). There are claims that China has been colonising Africa anew by trapping its nations in debt (*Lusaka Times*, 2018). In addition, unlike the first colonisation by Western powers, which was formally debated and endorsed at the Berlin Conference of 1884, China is colonising

clandestinely, deceptively, and informally. Whilst the European powers sought to first control African politics, China seeks instead to control African economies (Matingwina, 2020). The motivation remains the same: to gain access to Africa's vast minerals, take advantage of Africa's cheap labour, expand markets for their products, find a home for their citizens through immigration, and implement a long-term plan to amass geopolitical power and control (Taylor, 2007).

In an article published by the *Financial Times* on 13 March 2013, Lamido Sanusi, Governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, accused China of trying to colonise Africa by extracting raw materials and selling processed ones back to African nations. In an article published by the *Lusaka Times* on 16 July 2018, Kalima Nkonde argued that the influx of Chinese nationals into Zambia would soon pose a security and sovereignty threat. According to an article by Howard French, published on the Quartz website on 10 June 2014, more than 1 million Chinese have migrated to Africa. African governments claim that the Chinese immigrants are working for Chinese state-owned enterprises, and will return to China after their projects are completed. Evidence on the ground shows that the majority of them are coming on their own, as either private contractors or entrepreneurs, with interests in mining, agriculture, and manufacturing (Postel, 2017).

There have been reports in countries like Zimbabwe where these nationals have been maltreating locals as well as poaching game (Jong, 2019). In Zambia concerns are being raised that the influx of Chinese nationals is affecting locals through loss of employment opportunities, environment degradation, and racism (Kragelund, 2014). The general consensus among Africans is that foreign direct investment (FDI) should reduce

unemployment in the host country, but Chinese nationals in Africa are taking menial jobs like street vending, depriving locals of such employment (Benfratello et al., 2019).

The Chinese government, through its state-owned enterprises, such as the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, China Henan Cooperation, Sino Hydro Corporation, and China Jiangxi International, have invested heavily in African countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Uganda (Yan et al., 2019). Chinese outbound FDI is structured differently from its inbound FDI (Ali et al., 2005). Foreign enterprises wishing to invest in China are required to enter joint ventures with local Chinese companies; however, Chinese companies investing in Africa do not have that requirement. Moreover, they bring their own skilled and unskilled workers, rather than hiring locally (Davies, 2010). The Harvard Business Review (Li et al, 2021) stated that the government of China has more stringent conditions on inbound FDI, where technology transfer is mandatory. The journal claimed that China forces foreign companies to share their technologies with Chinese state-owned enterprises as a prerequisite to operate in the country. In other words, whilst Chinese foreign policy is based on the desire to obtain minerals, its industrial policy is being driven by shifting technology origination to China (Postel, 2017).

Concerns have been raised about African nations' level of indebtedness to China (Ofstad and Tjønneland, 2019). The problem is not only that these African countries are borrowing, but that they are borrowing from one source, eliminating diversity in their loan books (Alden and Jiang, 2019). Zambia, for example, is currently battling with Chinese loans and is on the verge of losing key assets, according to Africa Confidential (Ofstad and Tjønneland, 2019). In their report published on the 3rd of September 2018, titled, "Bonds, Bills, and Ever Bigger Debts", Africa Confidential wrote that the Zambia National

Broadcasting Corporation was already being controlled by the Chinese, and that the state electricity company, ZESCO, was on the verge of being taken over due to loan defaults.

The United States Senate on 3 August 2018 wrote to Steve Mnuchin, the US Secretary of the Treasury, urging the US to stop the IMF from bailing out countries entangled in a Chinese debt trap. The letter reinforced earlier remarks by Christine Lagarde, the IMF Managing Director, who referred to Africa's indebtedness to China as a crisis of accelerating emerging-country debts to China. The Senate accused China of predatory lending through infrastructure-development funding as part of "debt trap diplomacy", which they said was an essential component of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The IMF and the US view the BRI as a debt strategy first, and then as a national asset takeover strategy (Starr, 2019).

Where China is engaged in so-called shoddy deals, blame should be apportioned to the leaders of the host country (Bader and Hackenesch, 2019). There are a number of examples where Chinese engagements in Africa are benefiting both China and the host country, especially build, operate, and transfer (BOT) initiatives (Friedrichs, 2019). China and Ethiopia, for example, have a BOT initiative where China has built a railroad and is operating it for six years whilst training Ethiopians on railroad management; it is then to be transferred to Ethiopia. Such a deal is based on mutual benefit and cannot be classified as colonisation (Tesfaye, 2018).

2.6. The West's response to China's participation in the African region

The Sino-Africa relationship is being followed keenly and has generated a sense of panic among Western leaders (Nolan, 2018). Prior to the 2018 Forum on China-Africa

Cooperation (FOCAC), the UK and Germany, among other Western countries hastened to solidify their relations with their African colonies, with the UK seen to be warming up to the Zimbabwean ruling party by extending a \$100 million aid facility; the *Financial Times* of May 16, 2018, headlined, “UK breaks lending drought for Zimbabwe with \$100 million loan”. This was the first time the UK had been seen openly supporting Zimbabwe since Zimbabwe’s infamous Fast Track Land Reform Program of 2000 (Mararike, 2019).

The British government also sent its then-Prime Minister, Theresa May, to Senegal and South Africa. The UK was trying to forge new trade partnership deals mainly with Commonwealth partners in anticipation of Brexit. According to the BBC’s web site, the UK was offering \$4 billion investment – far less than the \$60 billion being offered by China – but May addressed this by emphasising that the UK would concentrate on the quality of the investment, rather than the quantity.

In August 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted African leaders from Angola and Niger in a bid to strengthen economic engagements. Nearly simultaneously, the German Development Minister Gerd Muller visited Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Chad. In his meetings with Zimbabwean authorities, as reported by the Zimbabwe state media, he delivered a message that Germany was opening its arms to Africa, pledging lines of credit as well as deepened bilateral relations. Whilst the Zimbabwean authorities viewed the gestures by the British and the Germans as warming up to the new regime in Zimbabwe, the timing of the engagements were suspicious, as they seemed to be an attempt to counter the Sino-African summit that was due in a month’s time (Deyassa and Policy, 2019).

Ever since the colonisation of Africa in the eighteenth century, the economic connection between the Western colonial powers and Africa has been exploitative and one-sided (Simudzi, 2018). This connection is in stark contrast to the loans that the US extended to Germany under the Marshall Plan and the loans that are extended to African countries. In the case of the Marshall Plan, aid was provided to foster development and profit the targeted economies. With regards to the aid being provided to African countries, the recipient countries have not benefited from the loans, but rather have become financially dependent, and the penalties for failing to repay the debts exacerbates this dependence (*The Economist*, 2014). China, on the other hand is investing in infrastructure development with significant benefits for the recipient countries.

2.7. China's non-interference approach: A relief to governments under West-imposed sanctions.

In 2005 the Sierra Leone ambassador to Beijing, Sahr Johnny, indicated that Sierra Leone preferred Chinese investments to Western investments because the Chinese had no preconditions or benchmarks for investment (Zafar, 2007). This non-condition approach by China has received widespread attacks. particularly from Western nations argue that their investment conditionalities are meant to fight corruption and human-rights abuses; thus, by not establishing conditions, China is an accomplice to human-rights abuses by autocratic governments (Phnelt and Abel, 2007). The involvement of China in Africa works against West-imposed sanctions on rogue African regimes, as China opens avenues for funding that the sanctions aimed to close (Tull, 2006).

Theories critical to the Western approach argue that it follows a totalitarian and reductionist method in assuming that all countries must follow the same rules (Peet and

Hartwick, 2009) Conditionalities defy the essence of equality between states, and thereby give room for exploitative bilateral relations. In cases where sanctions and military interventions are imposed, they tend to harm ordinary citizens more than the targeted government officials (Peet and Hartwick, 2009). Thus, China's non-interventionist approach makes an impact, as it allows China to be risk-averse and go to places where they are the only realistic funding hope (Tull, 2006)


2.8. Sino-Zimbabwean relations

The relationship between Zimbabwe and China started long before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, when Beijing supported the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party with arms during the Zimbabwean liberation war (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The relationship was reinforced and revived in the early 2000s when the former head of state in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, defended China's role in the Tiananmen Square massacre (Shinn and Eisenman, 2008). This defense coincided with a time when Zimbabwe was facing a backlash and exclusion from the international community, particularly from the West (Mufunda, 2017).

In February 2010, Mugabe celebrated his 86th birthday in the Chinese embassy in Harare, a sign that he valued China's presence in Zimbabwe. In his words during the birthday celebrations, Mugabe said, "We treasure this friendship. It is not the relations that really count, but rather the love, understanding and alliance" (Moyo, 2010). From 2005 to date, China has invested heavily in Zimbabwean industries, emerging as the sole player after other investors have shunned the country due to its prevailing economic and political environment. Despite Zimbabwe's passage of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, which compelled all companies and investments in Zimbabwe to be

at least 51% owned by indigenous Zimbabweans, Chinese multinationals are still allowed to have more than 51% ownership in strategic industries (Moyo, 2010). For example, the Zimbabwe Ministry of Industry and Commerce shows that the Chinese firm Sinosteel owns 92% of ZIMASCO, a chrome-mining company, and that Sino-Cement, which is 100% Chinese-owned, is now the sole producer and distributor of cement in Zimbabwe (Mufunda, 2017). China is also heavily involved in Zimbabwe’s mining sector, with Chinese companies like Jinchuan Nickel Mining Company, Ajin Diamond Mining Company, and Sonagol Gold Mining Company dominating the sector. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of Chinese investments in Zimbabwe by sector.

Figure 2.8: Chinese investments in Zimbabwe by sector




Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, August 2019

Chinese funding in Zimbabwe is primarily allocated to mining, defense, and budgetary support (Figure 2.5). In total, China has to date carried out 270 projects in Zimbabwe worth more than US\$4 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). This figure compares well with other African countries (Figure 4.6), signifying that China’s involvement in Zimbabwe is significant (Chinyedze, 2011).

There are, however, cases where the relationship has been threatened, with Zimbabwe failing to repay loans on time. In 2010, China threatened to stop extending fresh loans to Zimbabwe until previous loans had been repaid (Moyo, 2010). To repay the loans, Zimbabwe resorted to printing bond notes, which led in turn to a massive disintegration of the financial sector (Mufunda, 2017).

Figure 2.9: Top 10 destinations for Chinese investments in Africa by number of projects



Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 2019

2.9. China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched a number of foreign-policy initiatives since assuming office in March 2013 (Ferdinand, 2016). The three most significant are the “new type of Great Power relations” with China’s neighbors and the Belt and Road Initiative (Weidong, 2015). Prior to autumn 2013, when Xi Jinping announced plans to create an “economic belt” linking China with central Asia, eastern Europe, Mongolia, Turkey, Russia, the Balkans, Germany, and the Netherlands, Hu Jintao had announced plans to embark on a new ‘Silk Road’ project, but it had not commenced (Ferdinand,

2016). In the same year, Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of China, announced plans to build a “Maritime Silk Road” linking China with Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Germany, and the Netherlands (Blanchard and Flint, 2017).

The two projects together became known initially as the One Belt, One Road Initiative, and later as the Belt and Road Initiative: a network of modern transcontinental road highways, railway routes, energy pipelines, and port facilities in over 60 countries with a total population exceeding four billion citizens and a combined GDP of more than 33% of world GDP (Ferdinand, 2016). The initiative was adopted as a priority policy blueprint by the Chinese ruling party at the end of 2013 ([cn/china/third_plenary_session/-01/16/content_31212602. htm](http://cn/china/third_plenary_session/-01/16/content_31212602.htm), 2013).

The initiative promises win-win investments as it facilitates the continued growth of the Chinese economy by reconfiguring its external sector (Hillman and Studies, 2018, Weidong, 2015, Huang, 2016), and to date 126 countries have signed on. More than US\$2 trillion dollars have been committed towards the 35-year project by the government of China, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the China Development Bank, making it an expensive and ambitious long-term plan to develop global infrastructure (Shah, 2019). Whilst the Belt and Road Initiative emphasises infrastructure development, it also includes policy dialog, financial support, unconstrained trade, and people-to-people exchange (Huang, 2016).

Figure 2.10: A diagrammatic illustration of the China Belt and Road Initiative




Source: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2016.1224491>

The sea-based Silk Road will extend to countries that have potential to increase trade volumes (Casarini, 2016). The Silk Road Economic Belt concentrates on linking China to Europe, passing through Russia and Central Asia, and the Maritime Silk Road focuses on linking China with Europe through the Indian Ocean and Africa via the South China sea (Wang, 2016b). The initiative establishes six economic corridors (Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.11 The six economic corridors spanning Asia, Europe, and Africa

The Belt and Road Initiative: Six Economic Corridors Spanning Asia, Europe and Africa



Source: <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm>

Table 1.1: The six corridors, their purpose, and countries involved

Corridor	Purpose	Countries involved
New Eurasia Land Economic Corridor	An international railway line stretching from China to the Netherlands. Based on interconnected infrastructure and industrial cooperation (Clarke, 2017).	China, Netherlands, Belarus, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, and Germany
China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor	To link the Silk Road economic belt with the Russia Trans-Eurasian Railway as well as consider Russia's and Mongolia's common demands.	Mongolia, Russia, and China
China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor	To strengthen work and relations with countries like Turkey and Iran (Styan, 2019).	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey.
China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor	To strengthen cooperation with Cambodia and Thailand and establish joint construction mechanisms that facilitate risk and revenue sharing (Clarke, 2017).	Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor	Instrumental for opening up new routes to the Middle East via the Arabian Sea (Casarini, 2016).	China and Pakistan
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor	Envisages a thriving economic belt focusing on energy, transport, and telecommunications (Karim and Islam, 2018).	Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar

The project is based on four principles: harmony and inclusiveness, mutual benefit, cooperation and openness, and market-based operations (cn/china/third_plenary_session/-01/16/content_31212602.htm, 2013). The logic behind the project is similar to the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community after World War II, in that it foresees the construction of shared international infrastructure that will enable cooperative foreign policies and limit the risk of conflict (Ferdinand, 2016). However, this initiative will result in frailer cross-border integration compared to what was intended with the European Coal and Steel Community, as it concentrates on shared infrastructure, disregarding the production structure in each country (Fulton, 2019). It can be referred to as Chinese-style integration because it does not consider developing production facilities that would supply the various countries, thereby making the need to avoid conflicts much stronger (Ferdinand, 2016). Unlike what was envisaged in Europe, the initiative displays more sensitivity to national sovereignty (Ferdinand, 2016, Styan, 2019). As a result of this, some scholars and commentators have defined the Belt and Road Initiative as China's Marshall Plan (Yu, 2017). However, likening the Belt and Road Initiative to the Marshall Plan is not entirely accurate, because apart from building infrastructure, the Marshall Plan also aimed to constrain the expansion and power of the Soviet bloc (Irshad, 2015). However, parallels can be drawn between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan in that, unlike the Marshall plan, which was solely funded by the US, the Belt and Road Initiative will be funded by in excess of 50 cosigners of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Huang et al., 2017).

Critics of the initiative contend that it fuels corruption, creates financial dependencies, harms the environment, and extends Chinese military power (Rolland,

2017). Huang (2016) also contended that the project lacks central coordination mechanisms and faces potential clashes of different political beliefs and ideologies within countries. He also argued that the initiative may cause tensions emanating from the possibility of China exporting its excess capacity.

2.9.1. Economic dimensions

The Belt and Road Initiative is aimed at speeding the development of the western parts of China, which have been sidelined by the eastward, export-led approach of the past 40 years (Ferdinand, 2016). The initiative could also be driven by the Chinese government's hunt for investment prospects for Chinese state-owned companies that have been doing infrastructural projects domestically, but now need to go global, as the domestic economy is now expected to shift from concentrating on investments to concentrating on consumption (Huang, 2016; Huang et al.; 2019, Hurley et al., 2019). Thus, participating in this ambitious project will internationalise the Chinese economy by assisting Chinese state-owned companies to become more internationally competitive, market China's technological expertise in high-speed transportation, and mitigate risks imposed by the rebalancing of the economy (Ferdinand, 2016). The projects can also provide an opportunity for the renminbi to be used in international markets, with the prospect of it being adopted as an international reserve currency in the long run (Hurley et al., 2019).

The initiative also has some potential risks for China. For example, China may be sucked into existing conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia, or might find itself more involved with Islamic finance, which it has ignored to date (Hou, 2019). The initiative will also see the increased presence of China in bordering regions, causing uncertainties

about China's intentions (Ferdinand, 2016). It also poses some risks to Chinese companies that will do business along the belt, in that most of the countries targeted by the initiative do not have a stable rule of law, and in the event that a Chinese company is taken to court in these countries, they are unlikely to get fair treatment (Ferdinand, 2016).

2.9.2. Geopolitical implications

Ferdinand (2016) argues that the Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates China's strategy to compete with the US through economic policies rather than military ones. He also argues that the initiative helps China to divert attention to the West and away from the Pacific, thereby helping China to be more of a global power, and not only an Asian power. The Belt and Road Initiative will likely lead to an improvement of Sino-European relations, with the infrastructure facilitating the easy passage of European exports to China and vice versa (Hou, 2019). Europe can take advantage of the belt and increase trade with countries along the route. This will see China and Europe cooperating to redefine world trade, and Europe's economic ties move more toward China than the US (Ferdinand, 2016). Ferdinand (2016) also stressed that the Belt and Road Initiative summarises China's vision to eschew the hegemonic policies of the US, instead developing a society that respects the sovereignty of other nations and treats them equally irrespective of size.

The Belt and Road Initiative, however, faces the risk that the many countries that China intends to partner with in this project may not respond as positively as China hopes, and thus the success of the projects depends not solely on China's efforts but also the cooperation of other countries (Liu and Lim, 2019). In this regard, China's dream is both optimistic and vulnerable because its success is determined by factors that the Chinese

government cannot control. For the initiative to be successful, the world must share the same vision as China (Ferdinand, 2016).

2.10. Country-specific research

2.10.1. Belt and Road Initiative and the case of Djibouti

Djibouti is a North East African country that has since 2013 received significant investments in railways and ports from China (Styan, 2019). China established its first overseas naval facility in Djibouti in August 2017 (Downs et al., 2017). This makes an interesting statement regarding China's intentions with other strategic ports along the Belt and Road Initiative route (Brewster, 2018). Djibouti is strategic for China for two main reasons: the port is at the intersection of shipping lanes that are a corridor for European oil imports, and Djibouti sits on global telecommunications fibre-optic cable lanes (Styan, 2019).

The political environment in Djibouti also plays a strategic advantageous role for China. The current President, Ismael Guelleh, has been in power since 1999 and runs an autocratic government that has no domestic opposition (Styan, 2018; Styan, 2019) This is to China's advantage because it is easier to implement the Belt and Road Initiative projects with authoritarian leaders who are able to obscure the terms of the projects without much resistance from their citizens (Pekkanen and Pearson, 2018), as opposed to more-open democracies, where a change of government has the potential to reverse or cancel some of these projects (Styan, 2019).

2.10.2. The Belt and Road Initiative and the case of Pakistan

As part of the China-Pakistan economic corridor, Pakistan is poised to benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative, with China pledging to invest US\$46 billion in Pakistan over

the next 11 years (Huang et al., 2017). This is a significant investment, constituting 20% of Pakistan’s annual GDP, and will go a long way toward solving the country’s energy problems and transforming it into a regional economic hub (Stevens, 2015). Figure 2.12 shows the distribution of the US\$46 billion investment.

Figure 2.12: China-Pakistan US\$46 billion investment tree



Source: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710352

The development of Gwadar Port and the surrounding region is of importance to China because it will assist it in controlling the Indian Ocean and part of the Persian Gulf (Irshad, 2015). The proximity of China and Pakistan presents geoeconomics opportunities for both countries, and the corridor will provide China with easy access into the Middle East, a region endowed with vast oil deposits (Cherng, 2013). Pakistan will benefit from infrastructure development as well as improved access to energy (Nilofar et al., 2014).

2.10.3. Cambodia embraces the Belt and Road Initiative

Cambodia, located in Southeast Asia, is a close ally of China, with China directly influencing the Cambodian economy as its biggest investor, importer, donor, and source

of foreign tourists (Kha, 2019). In 2017 China pledged a US\$400 million grant to Cambodia, and the two countries signed 13 Belt and Road Initiative-related agreements ranging from infrastructure maritime cooperation to production and tourism (Chheang, 2017). This shows a deep connection between the two countries that has shaped perceptions and trust between the leaders and elites of the two countries (Kha, 2019). Cambodian politicians perceive China's development as a stepping stone to their own, as well as a shield from Western pressure for political reform (West, 2018).

In this regard, Cambodia has supported the Belt and Road Initiative enthusiastically, regarding it as a catalyst for Cambodia's economic growth strategy; the country is already one of the greatest beneficiaries of the Belt and Road Initiative through the commencement of two major Belt and Road Initiative-linked projects: the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway and the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone. The Special Economic Zone has to date empowered in excess of 20,000 Cambodians in Sihanoukville, most of them of lower socio-economic status (Kha, 2019) The zone has over one hundred factories employing mainly women and youths and the zone also has vocational training centres being operated by the government (Chheang, 2017).

Currently Cambodia has infrastructural deficits on road networks compared to other countries in the region resulting in higher logistical costs for cross-border trading, therefore, the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway will go a long way in refining logistical efficiency (Lim, 2015). The Belt and Road Initiative is in sync with Cambodia's Rectangular Strategy and thus, Cambodia has incorporated the Belt and Road Initiative in their National Logistics Master Plan 2016 (Chheang, 2017).

Cambodia's heavy reliance on Belt and Road Initiative-linked projects confirms the fears of critics who argue that Cambodia is increasing its dependency on China, which has strained Cambodian relations with the US and Europe (Kha, 2019). This has a negative bearing on Cambodia's foreign-policy options. In addition, worries have been raised concerning the quality and transparency of Chinese projects in Cambodia (Hu et al., 2019). The projects are reported as causing environmental degradation; thus, the Belt and Road Initiative has a potential to cause resentment among Cambodian locals (Chheang, 2017). To fully benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative, the Cambodian government needs to achieve an all-stakeholder buy-in for all the Belt and Road Initiative projects (Chheang, 2017).

2.11. The effect of the OBOR initiative on Africa

The historical link between China's Belt and Road Initiative and Africa dates back to the 14th century, when China's maritime fleets reached Africa through Kenya on the east coast; Kenya's historical and current status as a maritime gateway to the continent's other (largely landlocked) countries – specifically, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, and Tanzania – explains its inclusion as a hub of the Belt and Road Initiative (Breuer, 2017). Africa as a whole is poised to benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative because the continent is in dire need of infrastructural development, and the Belt and Road Initiative has the capacity to deliver that (Johnston, 2016). Justin Lin, a former World Bank economist, argued that the Belt and Road Initiative should in future become a “One Belt, One Road, One Continent” initiative.

The Belt and Road Initiative comes at a time when Sino-African relations are at an advanced stage, and almost all African countries – even those that are geographically

separated from the current Belt and Road Initiative route – are jostling to position themselves where they can benefit from it (Muzapu et al., 2018). Delivering a speech at a Belt and Road Initiative conference in Beijing in April 2019, Zimbabwean Minister of Information Monica Mutsvangwa reiterated the need for Zimbabwe to be included in the initiative, arguing that the country has significant mineral opportunities that can benefit China (*The Herald*, 2019). The Belt and Road Initiative will obviously have a direct impact on the eastern coast of Africa, but it will have knock-on effects on the continent as a whole in the long run (Muzapu et al., 2018).

The positive multiplier effect on the rest of Africa that the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to generate can only benefit countries that are strategically positioning themselves. Zimbabwe, for instance, has abundant deposits of coal and iron ore, which are used in the production of steel (Price, 2019). The intensive infrastructure development associated with the Belt and Road Initiative implies an increased demand for iron and steel, and Zimbabwe will likely benefit immensely (Muzapu et al., 2018).

Apart from this indirect benefit, Zimbabwe can also directly benefit from two of the Belt and Road Initiative projects: the Mombasa-Uganda line and the Tazara railway line, which together will connect Kenya with Zambia through Tanzania (Guo, 2019). Since Zimbabwe is already joined to Zambia by rail, the two Belt and Road Initiative projects will effectively join Zimbabwe to Kenya (Muzapu et al., 2018). This would enhance market access for sub-Saharan African countries that are prepared to tap into the Belt and Road Initiative spillovers (Chen, 2016). In this regard, Zimbabwe needs to concentrate on private-public partnerships as well as BOT initiatives that can speed infrastructure development (Shipalana and Parshotam, 2019).

The interconnectivity that is incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to speed Africa's integration into one single bloc, and thereby help member states boost their exports (African Union, 2019). The infrastructure to be developed through the Belt and Road Initiative will provide Africa with easy and cheaper access into the Middle East, Asia, and Europe (Muzapu et al., 2018). Zimbabwe's geographical location gives it an edge: because the country is located at the centre of Southern Africa, it can take advantage of the integration by serving the hub with human capital, access for cargo, and lines of communication into South Africa (African Union, 2019).

2.12. Theoretical underpinnings of China's involvement in Africa

Scholars have approached Sino-African relations through the lenses of multiple disciplines. Various theories have been employed, with the hegemony, realism, liberalism, constructivism, and capabilities approaches being the dominant theories in the relevant literature. This section discusses these theories in the context of Sino-African engagement.

2.12.1. China – an emerging global hegemony

In the study of international relations, the term "hegemony" refers to the ability of a state or nation to shape global systems, by either cooperation or force (Yurchak, 2003). A country is considered to have hegemony when it is economically, politically, militarily, culturally, and socially superior over other countries (Carney, 2018). This is normally achieved when a country has a competitive advantage over other countries in terms of raw materials, functioning financial markets, superior military technology, production value, and an acceptable ideology reflecting the status quo (Rattanaseevee, 2014). Given China's massive population, rapid economic growth, aggressive foreign policy, and

domestic policy anchored in unity, it is poised to overtake the US as a global superpower (Carney, 2018). If China does achieve this status, the entire world political system will be affected, and it will likely signal an end to Western universalism (Carney, 2018).

In the past, at least two countries have occupied a position of hegemony: the UK in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the US the late 19th century to the present. The UK used marine expansion, the resources of colonial territories, and the gold standard system to dominate the world (Rattanasevee, 2018). The US benefited from its superior naval and airborne military capacity, a network of military bases that stretched across the world, a strong economic system, and an international acceptable and dominant currency, which continues to serve as the world's reserve currency (Rattanasevee, 2018). Unlike many other countries, the US can accomplish quantitative easing at high levels without causing inflation; in addition, US firms do not incur exchange-rate costs when trading internationally (Carney, 2018). However, American hegemony was shaken by the global financial crisis of 2007. The crisis saw the emergence of China as it helped to ameliorate the crisis by investing in American bonds (*The Economist*, 2010). This resulted in a shift of economic power from the US to China.

China has been globally spreading its wings, particularly as it engages in South-South cooperation (Carney, 2018). China is targeting areas that have been neglected by the US and Europe, thus encouraging a shift in many African countries' affinity from the US towards China (Rattanasevee, 2018). The presence of China in developing countries is also threatening US hegemony due to the fact that, unlike the US, China does not emphasise or insist on the values of liberal democracy; thus, China has become popular even with rogue regimes (Carney, 2018). China has used the FOCAC platform in its

engagement with Africa and classified itself as a developing country, and thus in sympathy with Africa (Alden et al., 2008). However, China's foreign-policy initiatives (such as the Belt and Road) indicate that China is striving for global hegemony in its teenage years as it builds economic influence and power over Africa (Gilpin, 2011).

2.12.2. Amartya Sen's capabilities-approach theory

This study also reflects the principles of Amartya Sen's capabilities-approach theory of human development. Sen's theory has been used in studies of poverty alleviation in developing countries, as well as studies in welfare economics and development economics (Marsh, 2014). The theory asserts that apart from access to income and other material things like housing, food, and clothing, human capabilities that enable them to attain life goals like education can also be used to measure people's wellbeing (Sen, 1985, 1992; Marsh, 2014).

Capability is the ability to attain certain expected goals in life regardless of one's willingness to achieve those goals (Freeman, 2010). Attained capabilities, or what an individual manages to achieve, such as long life and education, are defined as functioning (Marsh, 2014). Sen's analysis concentrated mainly on the capabilities and functioning of individuals' wellbeing at a micro level (Sen, 1985). The current study sought to measure the effectiveness of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe, looking at how the aid is benefiting Zimbabweans at an individual level by drawing on the perceptions of the affected Zimbabweans.

First, the capabilities approach assumes that people have the capacity to make choices on what goals they can attain. Aid provides resources that can empower individuals to achieve their set goals (Stewart and Deneulin, 2002). This assumption was

evaluated in the context of the impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Second, the approach situates individuals as important players in economic development (Stewart and Deneulin, 2002). Finally, the approach advocates for the promotion of human freedoms (Marsh, 2014). China has given African governments a pattern of economic expansion based on their own priorities, allowing each country to identify their own needs and providing support in line with each country's resources.

2.12.3. Theories of international relations and global political economics

Theories have a targeted audience and a perspective (Cox, 2007). If theories are employed properly they can be used to describe the behavior of a particular state or states (Ndzendze and Monyae, 2019), and to analyse the causes of such behavior. There is a lack of theoretical analysis on China's cooperation with Africa, and what analysis has been conducted has employed generalisations to characterise the relationship (Ndzendze and Monyae, 2019). The challenge of applying theories in exploring the relationship between China and Africa can be traced to the element of unit of analysis: because China is one state, with one homogeneous foreign policy, whereas Africa is a continent, with each of its nations having its own foreign-policy approach, comparisons are limited. This is especially so in consideration of traditional donors' influence on African countries' foreign-policy regimes (Ndzendze et al., 2012). Alden (2008) gives three different perspectives in which China's relationship with Africa can be viewed and which can help map international-relations theories onto China-Africa cooperation: development partner with Africa; economic competitor with Africa; and colonisers who are aiming to displace the West using the soft-power approach of South-South cooperation (Alden et al., 2008).

Critical theorists (for example, Marxists) emphasise the structure of production in the confines of the international system (Nel, 1999). From this viewpoint, there is global inequality emanating from a contradictory global capitalism structure and exploitative market relations (O'Brien and Williams, 2013). The fact that China participates in South-South cooperation despite its unequal economic relations with other countries in the global South makes it difficult to use critical theory in this study.

According to Nel (1999), in both international relations and global political economics, liberalism considers the international system to be interdependent, and thus, that the emergence of regimes makes international systems governable. From the liberal viewpoint, the outcomes of international affairs are determined not just by power relations, but also by other factors, such as pluralities of actors. Liberals from the perspective of global political economics view individuals and companies as more important economic stakeholders than states (O'Brien and Williams, 2004). This viewpoint argues that state interference in the market results in economic failure as it distorts natural market mechanisms.

Liberalism is not a useful lens for examining China's involvement in Africa, because, inasmuch as the Chinese have become critical players in the global market and increased their interdependency, it has not resulted in cooperation. China has been taking advantage of its UN Security Council position and has not taken a strong stance on issues regarded important by Northerners, such as human rights. In addition, liberalism's prediction that government intervention results in economic failure does not hold in the perspective of China, as the Chinese government drives economic activity, including

China's involvement in Africa. Quite the contrary: China's state interference in economic markets has been a success, as the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly.

Pursuing individual national interests is the main aim of states in the international system (Morgenthau, 1948). From this perspective, states are rational entities that inherently seek to maximise the balance of power in their international engagements. Morgenthau contended that national interest should be specified within the cultural and political perspective of foreign policy. China's going-out strategy is designed to respond to the fluctuations within the dynamics of the international environment; thus, China will always prioritise relations with countries that have strategic resources (Zhao, 1996). The involvement of China in Africa can be best explained from a realist viewpoint on international relations. Realism states that political success can be achieved without moralistic principles (Morgenthau, 1973), and prioritises survival as the main driver of foreign policy (Zhao, 1996).

Morgenthau (1973) emphasised a number of principles as being fundamental to a realist viewpoint: society is ruled by objective laws, not by wishes; overall national interest rules and is determined by military power and strength; national interests change; and morality is secondary in politics. While realism places states at the apex of international systems, it does not totally ignore the importance of non-state actors; for example, states can use forums presented by international organisations to exploit economic and political opportunities (Heller, 2003). China's aggressive participation in international systems is not driven by the desire for political or economic integration, but rather by the motivation of being stronger than other nations, both economically and diplomatically (Roy, 1998).

Realism can be subdivided into classical realism and neo-realism. Classical realism primarily pursues the argument that states seek power (Firoozabadi and Ashkezari, 2016). Classical realism assumes rivalry between states for power and the need for that power to be distributed in a balanced way among them. Neo-realism agrees to the single principle of classical realism; however, it goes further, arguing that states seek power specifically as part of a global system (Pashakhanlou, 2009). If classical realism and neo-realism are superimposed on Alden's three perspectives on the Sino-African relationship, the relationship will be that of colonisers, where China is competing with the West for power over African resources (Alden et al., 2008).

Realism is thus a convenient instrument for analysing and describing Chinese foreign policy. Its characterisation as predatory, self-serving, and ruthless fits well with realism's notions of moral scepticism and self-interest (Roy, 1998). Realism alone cannot fully and adequately explain China's engagements in the African region, because the behavior of China in Africa challenges some of the main assumptions of realism, such as the assumption that states prioritise military security above economic security. In this regard, economic nationalism can also be used to analyse China's interest in Africa.

Similarities can be drawn between the key assumptions of realism and those of economic nationalism. Scholars like O'Brien and Williams (2004) have argued that economic nationalism is in fact a variant of political realism (Helleiner, 2002). Like realism, economic nationalism emphasises the role the state plays in global systems, and considers states as the major players in driving and shaping globalisation (Pickel, 2003).

Economic nationalism also asserts that maximising economic power results in increased political power (Nakano, 2004). O'Brien and Williams (2004) identified a

connection between power and wealth. Nakano (2004) argued that wealth helps nations to augment power. Political power is used to formulate fiscal and monetary policies that are critical in economic development, thus economic nationalism values the relationship between state power and economic development (Nakano, 2004).

Helleiner (2002) and Nakano (2004) distinguished economic nationalism from both mercantilism, arguing that whilst mercantilism focuses on autarky, economic nationalism concentrates on national unity, power maximisation, and independence. Where economic nationalists campaign for free trade to bolster state power, mercantilists advocate protectionism. From an economic-nationalist viewpoint, states design economic policies in a bid to fortify national unity. Nakano (2004) supported this proposition by identifying economic-nationalist policies like Keynesian policy, currency manipulation, and industrial policy.

Economic nationalism is an appropriate approach to examine Chinese foreign policy, as China's history is rich in nationalism and its foreign policy is distinctively nationalistic in nature. Western powers' hostility toward China during the Opium Wars of the 19th century spurred Chinese nationalism. Nationalism as a driving force for Chinese foreign policy has continued to the present (Zhu, 2001).

Economic nationalism can clearly explain the economic politics behind China's involvement in Africa. Economic nationalism is implemented using deliberate practices to create, bolster, and protect national economies in global markets (Pryke, 2012). Economic nationalism is akin to protectionism; that is, establishing a national economy closed to the global economy. China's nationalistic policies were viewed as a political response to the expansion of capitalism (Pryke 2012). China's economic interests are

subordinate to the State interest, suggesting that China pursues free-market nationalism (Gilpin, 2016). However, this closed policy can historically be traced up to the year 2000, with post-2000 China largely pursuing realism in its foreign policy, looking outward to the world rather than remaining a closed economy. China's external strategy follows nationalist ideology in that it is based on protecting China's national interest through trade and diplomatic relations (Paruk, 2014).

Chinese foreign policy is still largely dominated by nationalism, in that it aims to safeguard Chinese independence and self-sufficiency. Chinese nationalism prioritises self-sufficiency, national reputation, domestic unity, and economic development (Chen, 2005), although the largest share of effort is directed towards economic development. It is reported that no one single theory can summarily describe China's international-relations policy, although realism is dominant (Wang and Ting, 2004; Dietz and Kolokouris, 2012).

2.13. Chapter conclusion

This chapter has reviewed China's pursuit of global economic and political control, focusing on China's involvement in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa. The chapter gave a brief history of China's position in the world with regards to foreign aid. It then explored the history and nature of Sino-African relations. The chapter also compared China's dealings with Africa against those of the US. The chapter concluded by evaluating theories that attempt to explain China's behavior on the global stage. The next chapter discusses foreign aid as an instrument of economic development.

CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN AID AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

3.1. Introduction

Chenery and Strout (1966) define foreign aid as the inflow of foreign resources into a recipient country. This definition was expanded by Morgenthau (1948), who included the movement of money, goods, and services between countries. This is not an accurate definition of aid, because neglects to include other movements of resources, such as trade and FDI. Foreign aid involves a more advanced state voluntarily giving resources, knowledge, and skills to a poorer nation for the purpose of accelerating economic growth and alleviating poverty. Rosentein-Rodan (1943) differentiated between foreign aid and foreign capital inflow by stipulating that foreign aid encompasses only capital inflow that is not normally provided by market incentives. Foreign aid can come in the form of either a loan or a grant. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stipulated that aid must be at concessional terms, must have a grant element of at least 25% and must progress economic and/or social advancement in the beneficiary nation.

Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as resources extended either directly to developing countries or through multilateral institutions for onward use in the developing nations. The donor states should have a grant element of 25% and the funds should be channeled towards development. ODA can be either multilateral – channeled through multinational institutions – or bilateral – channeled directly between countries (Gunatilake et al., 2011). In the case of multilateral trade, the donor country does not place any conditions on or have control over where the resources will go or how they are disbursed. Chinese aid is mainly bilateral (Opoku-Mensah, 2009; Lengauer, 2011), and

is provided through central government channels and is focused on infrastructure, health, innovation, and exports (Lum et al., 2009). This contrasts with aid from the US or European countries, which is channeled through non-governmental organisations. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), Chinese aid

The impact of ODA on recipient countries has received a great deal of interest from development economists (for example, Civelli et al., 2016). Empirical evidence shows that to date, the OECD countries have channeled more than US\$3 trillion towards development aid since 1970. The main goal of foreign aid is to stimulate economic growth as well as alleviating poverty (Kilby and Dreher, 2010).

According to *The Guardian* of 26 May 2016, foreign aid was introduced to stem the world's migration flows from developing to developed economies; in other words, to reduce migration incentives. The other main goals and moral imperatives of aid are to eradicate poverty, hunger, diseases, and conflict. A more liberal, faith-based perspective of aid is that it is driven by the obligation to treat others as you would want to be treated. Lastly, internationalists' view on aid is that it is driven by the desire to equitably manage the infinite resources of the planet.

3.2. The history of foreign aid

3.2.1. The Marshall Plan

The former US President Truman's Point Four Plan, which pledged to provide aid to less-developed countries, is viewed by development-economics scholars as the genesis of foreign aid (Ali and Zeb, 2016). However, this plan was preceded by the Marshall Plan of 1947, which saw the US assisting the war-ravaged European economies with US\$13 billion, which enabled significant progress in putting these economies back

on track (Sohail, 2012). The success of the Marshall Plan provided the impetus for concentrating on the challenges that were facing developing economies (Hjertholm and White, 2000).

However, the success of the Marshall Plan cannot be easily transferred or extrapolated to the success of aid to developing countries because of the context in which the Marshall Plan succeeded. Its funds were not given for the development of Europe, but rather for its reconstruction after the damage caused by World War II. The war had only destroyed Europe's physical infrastructure, but the human skills and the capitalist norms, habits, and institutions remained intact. By the time the Marshall plan came in to force, Europe had already undergone two major transitions: a shift from agrarian to industrial economies and the accompanying massive urbanisation. The Marshall Plan funds were only 2.5% of the GDP of the major recipients (France, Germany, and the UK).

It is argued that resources extended through the Marshall Plan particularly by the US were driven by the motive to stop the spread of Communism into Europe, as well as to help the US develop links for new markets for American products (Sohail, 2012). This background formed the basis of the plan's much-publicised success. Today, foreign aid works within a very different context. Most, if not all, the aid targets developing countries. For example, since 1960 the countries of Africa have received aid totaling more than 13% of their average GDP; most developing economies are still agrarian-based; and the aid is for these nations' development, not their reconstruction (Riddell, 2008).

3.2.2. Foreign-aid expansion

Various international organisations, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, which comprises the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the World Bank and its regional branches, have been created with a mandate to offer cheaper loans to poor countries (Hjertholm and White, 2000). In addition, the UN and its agencies were established with a specific mandate of tackling critical development and humanitarian challenges in the poor regions of the world. In addition, the governments of many countries include specialised departments and ministries with budget allocations to deal with various aid programs (Hjertholm and White, 2000). Examples of such departments are the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984) . The G7 nations have also been putting resources into the developing world through aid. According to skynews.com, the UK is giving approximately 0.7% of its GDP, with Germany and France giving up to 0.4% of theirs, Canada giving 0.3%, and the US, Japan, and Italy giving 0.2%.

The determining factors of foreign aid were examined and differentiated into need-based (driven by the needs of the beneficiary nation) and interest-based (driven by the goals and aspirations of the donor country) (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984). Fleek and Kilby (2001), Tsoutsoplides (1991), and Wang and Jin (2013) focused on the characteristics of donors that describe variations in foreign-aid policies along a variety of dimensions. Foreign aid is distributed more by left-wing governments than right-wing governments (Noel and Therein, 2008), as the former tend to assert that the inequitable distribution of wealth is a barrier to human dignity.

ODA is divided into grants and concessionary loans. Grants do not have a repayment obligation; they are pure transfer payments. Concessionary loans have a principal amount and accrue interest. According to the OECD accounting framework, for a loan to qualify as ODA, it must be extended under grant-equivalent favorable conditions.

Aid can be classified as tied or untied. Tied aid comes with conditions that the funds extended should be used on exports from the donor country (Brech and Potrafke, 2014). In this regard, foreign aid will be tied to an industrial policy. Untied aid, in contrast, does not have any conditions attached to it. In most cases tied aid will be bilateral, whereas untied aid is usually both multilateral and bilateral. Some countries disaggregate their aid into either sector-specific or purpose-specific (Thiele et al., 2007).

3.3. Foreign-aid dependence in the South

Developing countries have consistently prioritised development aid and FDI as part of their development agenda (Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010). Foreign aid constitutes a significant percentage of most developing countries' budgets; thus, these countries prioritise foreign-aid inflows. In an attempt to attract FDI, emerging economies develop policy frameworks that incentivise FDI inflows (Nwaogu and Ryan, 2015). These incentives range from tax subsidies, duty-free concessions, and uninterrupted entrance to local markets (Kokko, 1996). The benefits of FDI for host nations include the transfer of skills, access to technology, product competitiveness, and access to international markets (Meyer, 2004). In this regard, most countries adopt liberalised policies that attract and promote the inflow of capital.

The dependence of most developing countries – particularly in Africa – on foreign aid can be attributed to the flaws of colonialism. Colonising nations did not assist their colonies to develop institutions rooted indigenously that could propel their development agenda; instead, these colonies developed a dependency syndrome (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). This has encouraged these aid-recipient nations not to mobilise self-help mechanisms such as cultivating modern governance styles, dealing with corruption, curtailing government expenditures, and increasing sustainable revenue-generation streams. Because foreign aid tends to strengthen governments without much impact on the private sector, governments in aid-recipient nations have not put enough effort into creating enabling environments conducive for the growth of private institutions that, in turn, could contribute to economic growth and promote self-reliance (Wang and Jin, 2013).

Aid tends to reward with foreign subsidies those governments that destroy their domestic economies. Aid channeled through the state tends to improve the attractiveness of politics, and hence the profitability of controlling power. This is mainly the case when there is pernicious dependency that is supported by the vested interests of capitalistic systems (Brautigam and Knack, 2004). The impact of foreign aid on an economy can only be maximised if it is supported by self-help strategies (Bell, 1996).

3.4. The effect of foreign aid on governance

Foreign aid can either positively or negatively affect governance in the recipient country. When aid is extended to a government with a clearly spelt out developmental agenda, it can be used to strengthen institutions and build capacities, which will in turn support service delivery as well as capacity usage. Countries like Taiwan, Japan, and

South Korea in Asia, and Botswana, South Africa, and to some extent Namibia in Southern Africa, are examples of recipient countries that have seen governance improving because of foreign aid (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Busse and Gröning, 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007). Aid mixed with sound macroeconomic policies can lead to economic growth, which has a positive impact on the quality of governance (Brautigam and Knack, 2004).

Aid can also affect governance negatively through weakening domestic institutions in the recipient country. Governments will see no need to develop and improve their institutions if they can depend on foreign aid to cover budget deficits. In this regard, governments will continue to have weak, non-resilient institutions that are not self-reliant. Donor conditionality also plays a part in weakening institutions, as the conditions tend to undermine fiscal policy implementation because they influence the direction that policies should take (Lienert, 1998). The fact that aid also comes with technical assistance has a negative bearing on capacity development of local staff, bearing in mind that in most cases the assistance come as an imposition (Bell, 1996).

3.5. Foreign aid and economic growth

The effectiveness of external assistance on propelling economic development has been debated vigorously by development economists, with scholars like Loxley and Sackey (2008), Kargbo (2012), and Gounder (2001) writing that countries that receive foreign aid generally experience massive economic growth. These findings contradicted findings by Easterly (2001), Leeson (2008), and Akinbobola (2016), who asserted that aid has a negative impact on economic development. This position was partially supported by Burnside and Dollar (2000), who argued that without strong and conducive

macroeconomic fundamentals, the impact of aid on economic development is either minimally positive or completely negative. In contrast to the findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), who were criticised because the methodology they used did not deal with the heterogeneity associated with aid's effect on economic growth, Heady (2008) argued that when employed productively, aid has a more-than-average effect on economic expansion.

Studies that examined the impact of foreign aid on economic growth can be classified as either sceptical or optimistic. Optimists like Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), Pattillo et al. (2007), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003), and Hansen and Tarp (2001) argued that aid has a positive effect on economic development provided the situation in the recipient state is conducive for the aid to have an impact. Sceptics have argued that foreign aid retards economic growth in poor recipient countries by crowding out private investment, promoting rent-seeking behavior and corruption in the public sector, and encouraging donor dependency, which in turn discourages accountability and the development of good policies (Knack, 1999; Moyo, 2010; Easterly, 2003).

Scholars like Clemens et al. (2004) and Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003) have argued that the impact of aid on economic growth is not clear because in most cases aid is targeted in economic sectors that usually do not affect economic growth; examples include aid to fight pandemics like malaria, Ebola, and measles. Even without directly contributing to economic growth, aid has fed and clothed the poor, provided medication to the sick, educated the underprivileged, and emancipated vulnerable women and children (Easterly, 2006; Sachs, 2006). Scholars' conflicting results show that there is no

consensus on how aid affects economic growth in recipient countries (McGillivray et al., 2006).

3.6. Bilateral aid and multilateral aid

Donor aid conditionalities, recipient-donor relations, and donor motivation vary between bilateral and multilateral aid. Thus, the impact of these aid types on the recipient country's economic growth also varies (Cassen, 1994). In this regard, it is paramount to investigate these different types of aid separately. Bilateral aid is mainly driven by the cultural, strategic, political, and economic interests of the donor (Cassen, 1994). Burnside and Dollar (2000) explained that European countries like England, France, and Portugal give most of their aid to their former colonies, which is evidence that recipient-donor relations matter in bilateral aid. Japan extends most of its aid to other Asian countries, to strengthen political ties. US bilateral aid allocations are strategically motivated.

Bilateral and multilateral aid also differ in terms of aid conditions and characteristics (Ram, 2004). Multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the IMF, use structural economic adjustments as conditions for aid disbursements (Chang et al., 1998). Most bilateral donors, particularly in the West, focus on political conditions like democracy, rule of law, and observance of human rights in the recipient country before extending aid. This is not the case with Southern donors, including China, who seem not to attach any conditions to their bilateral aid (Ram, 2003).

Cassen (1994) argued that the packaging of aid is also different for multilateral and bilateral donors. Multilateral donors concentrate on health, education, women's

programs, child development, youth projects, service delivery, and economic growth. Japan's aid, for example, is mainly targeted towards industrial advancement and infrastructural development, whilst the US tends to fund research and agriculture; in contrast, China mainly funds infrastructural development and Germany's aid is mainly untied (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001).

The other major difference between bilateral and multilateral aid is the donor-recipient relationship (Cassen, 1994). Long-standing relationships created through colonial ties, political history, trade partnerships, and cultural similarities play a significant role in facilitating bilateral aid. These relationships help both the donor and recipient countries enjoy mutual benefits from aid (Ram, 2003).

Works by scholars like Ram, (2003) who concluded that the effect of bilateral aid on economic expansion was greater than that of multilateral aid, must be treated with scepticism because he based his argument on the assumption that aid is exogenic to economic development and that the impact of aid on economic expansion happens in a short space of time. This may not be the case, given that in most cases the projects that are funded using aid money take time to start showing benefits (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004).

Ram's position was also opposed by Heady (2008), who argued that multilateral aid has a greater effect on economic development than bilateral aid. He asserted that most bilateral donors are influenced by geopolitical motives when extending aid, which in turn affects the aid's impact on economic expansion in the recipient nation. The conditions that most of these bilateral donors impose on aid to recipient countries are meant to protect and advance their geopolitical agendas.

3.7. The geopolitics of foreign aid

Foreign-aid disbursements have always been driven by political motives, with the history of aid politicisation dating back to the post-World War II era, during which aid was allocation depending on where the recipient country stood with regards to Cold War conflict (Wang, 1999). Aid has often been based mainly on political alliances, with donor nations ignoring critical issues of democracy, rule of law, and human-rights violations in politically friendly recipient allies (Lundborg, 1998).

The post-Cold War era has seen a shift in the balance of power, where aid was now being used to intervene in the sovereign matters of weaker states in the Middle East and Africa by large-scale donor states like the US, UK, France, and German (Roberts et al., 2009). These interventions were packaged as humanitarian interventions in conflict regions such as Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (Mundy, 2006). The Reality of Aid Report of 2008, as reported by Novelli (2010), highlighted a sharp increase of aid to conflict areas from 9.3% of total ODA in 1990 to 20.4% in the year 2000. From 2000 to 2006, the figure tripled in real terms to 38%, as reported by the OECD in 2008. This is evidence that aid has been used as a “firefighting” mechanism in fragile conflict regions mainly by Western superpowers. This could indicate that donor nations are now more concerned with peace than economic growth (Duffield, 2007). After the September 11 incident in the US, Western powers together with the US have started prioritising fighting terrorism, thereby linking developmental and humanitarian aid to national security (Novelli and Robertson, 2010).

3.8. Fiscal response to aid

Fiscal response to aid can be addressed through either aid fungibility (McGuire, 1978) or government utility-maximisation behavior (Hellier, 1975). Aid fungibility is when the aid recipient government uses aid proceeds for purposes different from what the donor intended (Mavrotas, 2002); for example, when a government allocates infrastructure-development donor funds towards financing a budget deficit. This reduces the potential effect of aid on economic expansion (Bhattarai, 2017). For aid to be effective, it should not be diverted to fund fiscal consumption expenditures but should rather be used for investments (Swaroop et. al, 2000). Bhattarai (2017) argued that even if aid is channeled towards its intended use, it will not be effective if it gives the government of the recipient country room either to spend it on unproductive engagements like political campaigns or to increase consumption expenditure.

Government utility-maximising behavior, as expounded by Heller (1975), argues that government expenditures are constrained by revenue expenditures that are explained by taxes and borrowings. The amount of aid extended determines the number of borrowings needed. Both expenditure and revenue targets respond to aid inflows. When a large amount of aid is received, the recipient government can respond by increasing expenditure targets, as well as reducing taxes and borrowings (Heller, 1975).

When a government reduces borrowing, particularly domestic borrowing, this leaves more resources available for borrowing by the private sector, which will in turn have a positive effect on economic expansion in general (Swaroop and Devarajan, 1999). However, the resulting reduction in taxes will increase people's purchasing power, which,

if it's not coupled with an increase in production, may have inflationary effects as a result of an increase in demand (Mascagni, 2016).

In contrast, when too little aid is expected, the recipient government can respond by increasing taxes and borrowings *ceteris paribus* (Feyzioglu et al., 1998). The increase in domestic borrowing will crowd out private investments, thereby negatively affecting economic growth. Heller (1975) found that when aid is extended, investment increases but government revenue declines due to a reduction in taxes. Pack and Pack (1990) had a different result, arguing that aid does not affect a government's domestic revenue-mobilisation attempts, but rather increases expenditure targets. Swaroop et al. (2000) found that receiving aid does not influence a country's patterns of resource allocation. These divergent views on how recipient governments' fiscal policies respond to aid are evidence that a consensus has not yet been reached on the subject.

3.9. Chapter summary

This chapter has reviewed literature on foreign aid as an instrument of economic development, providing a contextual background of the study's area of focus. It defined foreign aid, distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral aid, and provided an historical background stretching from the Marshall Plan up to the spread of foreign aid into developing countries. The chapter looked at the geopolitics behind aid disbursements and explained how fiscal policies respond to aid disbursements. The chapter also reviewed the literature on how aid affects governance and economic growth in recipient countries. The next chapter analyses the literature on how Zimbabwe views economic development, giving a contextual framework within which, the rest of the study will be premised.

CHAPTER FOUR

ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT

4.1. Introduction

Ever-since attaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has perceived economic growth as an end in itself rather than an instrument for economic development (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Despite attempts to achieve macroeconomic stability and growth through economic policy blueprints such as Growth with Equity (1981), the Transitional National Development Plan (1982-5), the First Five-Year National Development Plan (1986-9), the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP, 1991-6), the Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST, 1996-2000), the Look East Policy (2001-8), the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (I and II, 2009), the Medium-Term Policy (2011-15), and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset, 2013-2018), Zimbabwe remains an underdeveloped country (Mufunda and Mutizwa, 2017). Even though these policies focused on economic growth, Zimbabwe has struggled to fend for its people, or at least to achieve sustainable macroeconomic fundamentals like high GDP growth rates, low inflation, globally acceptable sovereign debt, and poverty eradication, among other goals, due to various political and economic factors (Kanyenze et al., 2011). This section will discuss economic growth and development in the Zimbabwean context, giving a brief history of the Zimbabwean economy, exploring challenges such economic sanctions, and examining how the government responded to the challenges.

4.2. A brief history of the Zimbabwean economy

The Zimbabwean economy has experienced four decades of transformation that started with international isolation in the 1970s and the command economy of the 1980s (Mlambo, 2014). The 1990s were characterised by market liberalisation and fiscal reforms, and the period from 2000 to 2009 saw a massive economic meltdown with hyperinflation, cash shortages, international sanctions, and the collapse of the financial sector (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The economic deterioration resulted in the inception of a Government of National Unity that brought temporary domestic economic and political stability, although international sanctions remained in place (Hove, 2017).

4.2.1. A decade post-independence (1980-1990)

The key highlight of Zimbabwe's political economy during the first decade post-independence was the infusion of socialism and a conservative macroeconomic agenda, with the government avoiding taking a radical stance that would have destroyed what was an established economy (Nyawata, 1988). Following independence from the UK in 1980, the new nationalist government anchored its political and economic policies on equity and economic growth (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The Growth with Equity Plan of 1981 saw the government increasing expenditure on health, education, and other social-welfare programs by 300% (Helliker et al., 2018). The removal of economic sanctions soon after independence opened access to foreign funding through foreign aid and concessional loans, favorable terms of trade, and FDI, resulting in an economic boom, with the GDP growing by 10% and 11% in 1980 and 1981, respectively (Mlambo, 2014). Gross investment in capital stock as a percentage of GDP increased by 1.1% between 1979 and 1981; in the same period, capacity utilization rose by 19% (Zimbabwe Statistical

Office, 1985). In 1981, the economy started showing signs of overheating as the rate of inflation increased (from 7% in 1980 to 14% in 1981) and the current account deteriorating from a US\$2.5 million surplus in 1978 to a US\$439 million deficit in 1981 (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

Sovereign debt increased markedly from US\$786 million at independence to more than US\$2.3 billion in 1983. This, together with increased budget deficits, started exerting pressure on the balance of payments (World Bank, 1983). In response, the government developed the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) of 1982-1985 (Zimbabwe, 1982). The policy did not achieve its intended goal of a GDP growth of 8% instead GDP averaged -3% during the period. Regardless of the TNDP's aim to create and protect jobs, unemployment increased during the period due to job losses because of a massive decline in domestic investments (World Bank, 1985) White settlers who were against the black government were gradually pulling their investments out of the country (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

In 1986, the government adopted the First Five-Year Plan as a way of managing socio-economic development between 1986 and 1990 (Zimbabwe, 1986). The policy aimed to increase GDP by an average of 6% and to create an average of 28,000 jobs per year (MoFED, 1986). GDP over the period averaged 4.6% and job creation increased by an average of 2.7% but was not enough to compensate for increased unemployment (World Bank, 1990). During this period, the World Bank and the IMF started pressuring the government to deregularize the economy and adopt market-liberalisation policies, with the World Bank refusing to extend the export revolving fund in 1987, arguing that that the government needed to liberalise trade first (Kanyenze et al., 2011). In response,

the government signed the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Convention and the US's Overseas Private Investment Corporation Agreement in 1989 and 1990, respectively (MoFED, 1991). The signing of these agreements, together with the formation of the Zimbabwe Investment Centre in 1989, which was meant to establish a one-stop investment window, marked the genesis of a policy shift towards market liberalisation (Mufunda, 2017)

4.2.2. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (1991-1996)


The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was adopted as a policy shift from state-controlled economics to market-led economics to generate jobs and stimulate economic growth (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The policy, which was adopted on the recommendation of the IMF and the World Bank, had the following key targets (Zimbabwe, 1991):

- ❖ To achieve a 5% average annual GDP growth (1991-1995)
- ❖ To increase savings and investments to at least 25% of GDP
- ❖ To achieve export growth of at least 9% per annum
- ❖ To reduce inflation by seven percentage points from 17.7% in 1991 to 10% by 1995
- ❖ To reduce government expenditure through the privatisation of parastatals.

To attain these targets, the IMF and the World Bank advised the government to liberalise trade, financial markets, and labour markets as well as to remove price controls, subsidies, and all other interventionist policies (International Labour Organization, 1993).

Most of the targets were not met because ESAP, together with the 1992 drought, had a stagflation effect on the economy (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Over the period, inflation rose, GDP declined, and the growth of employment slowed (RBZ, 1995). High inflation eroded the value of the Zimbabwe dollar, which in turn increased the cost of external debt servicing. The contribution of agriculture, manufacturing, and mining to GDP declined, and the budget deficit and export growth also deteriorated (MoFED, 1997).

Figure 4.1 Zimbabwe's economic performance, 1980-1996



Source: MoFED, RBZ, ZimStat (various publications)

ESAP failed to meet its targets; the World Bank attributed the failure to the absence of state intervention and national ownership, arguing that the failure of the adjustment program in Zimbabwe was evidence that the adjustments needed to be complemented with common ownership and state involvement during the adjustment process (World Bank, 1995). The government's failure to fully implement parastatal privatisation and the lack of consensus among key stakeholders contributed to the failure of ESAP (Mufunda, 2017).


4.2.3. The economic crisis period (1997-2008)

The failure of ESAP caused a huge financial disintegration characterised by cash shortages, policy inconsistencies and reversals, irrational market controls, hyper-inflation, huge fiscal deficits, and a ballooning external debt, which in turn resulted in social and political instability (Kanyenze, 2003). This caused the government to be undecided on whether to continue with a free-market economy or return to a command economy (Kanyenze et al., 2011). In March 1998, the government introduced the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), two years after it had been passed by parliament (Zimbabwe, 1999). ZIMPREST had impressive targets such as reducing inflation to 5%, reducing budget deficits to 6.5% of the GDP by 2000, and creating in excess of 50,000 jobs in three years (Zimbabwe, 1996). ZIMPREST did not meet any of these targets because it was never implemented (Kanyenze et al., 2011). In November 1997, the government decided to pay unbudgeted gratuities to 50,000 veterans of the liberation war, with each of them receiving Z\$50,000 (equivalent to US\$4,167) plus a subsequent monthly allowance of Z\$2,000 which was equivalent to US\$140 (MoFED, 1998). This caused a massive crash of the Zimbabwe dollar, referred to as the “Black Friday” of 14 November 1997, when the Zimbabwean dollar dropped 72% of its worth compared to the US dollar as reported by The Standard of 2 November 2007.

The government responded to the crash by introducing a war veterans’ levy, which was resisted by the civil society through demonstration. The government had then to resort to printing more money, as well as external borrowing (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The government became unable to service its debts from the IMF and World Bank such that by June 1998, Zimbabwe had ceased accessing balance-of-payments funding from these

organisations (Mufunda, 2017). Figure 2.2 shows the trend of government external debt servicing.

Figure 4.2: Zimbabwe external debt servicing, 1998-2008



Source: World Bank Data Catalog (2010)

As a result of the defaults, arrears on foreign debt repayments increased from US\$1.3 billion in 1999 to US\$ 6 billion in 2008; by 2008, the external debt to GDP ratio was 190% (MoFED, 2010). In August 1998, the government made two critical decisions that further adversely affected the economy. First, it deployed the Zimbabwean army to fight rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo at a cost of US\$33 million a month (MoFED, 1999). Second, it increased civil servants' wages and salaries by 90% (MoFED, 1999). These expenditures were funded through borrowing because they had not been included in the country's budget (Kanyenze et al., 2011).


In 1999, a new opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was formed. The government responded by proposing a new constitution, to be adopted through a referendum (Dzinesa, 2012). The opposition mobilised support against

the proposed constitution, which was consequently rejected (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The government's program of violently appropriating white-owned farms, known as the Fast-Track Land Reform, resulted in the government accusing white farmers of supporting the opposition in the vote against the proposed constitution (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The land reform seriously affected the country's agricultural production, reducing the country's exports by 200% between 2001 and 2002 (Stoneman, 2018)

In 2001, the US together with European powerhouses like the UK, Germany, and France imposed targeted sanctions against top Zimbabwean government officials and their families (Mufunda, 2017). This badly damaged the economy as investors and donors started to withdraw, resulting in foreign-currency shortages and a further depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar (Kanyenze, 2006). The relationship between the country and its development partners started to deteriorate to the extent that Zimbabwe was considered a pariah state (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

Without access to lines of credit, the government resorted to printing money and the rate of inflation skyrocketed. By December 2003, the annual inflation rate stood at a staggering 433%, up from the 33% figure recorded in December 1998 (World Bank, 2008). After 2003, inflation became uncontrollable, and the Zimbabwe statistical office abandoned any effort to keep records of the inflation figures (Wines, 2006). The World Bank recorded figures of 100,096% in 2005 and 3,000,000% in 2007 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). By the end of 2008, the month-on-month inflation was recorded at 79 billion percent, which gives an average daily inflation rate of 98% and a year-on-year inflation rate of 90 sextillion percent (Wines, 2006).


Figure 3.1: Zimbabwe's inflation trend, 1988-2003



Source: World Bank Data Catalog, 2006

The sharp increase in the inflation figures from 140% to 433% between 2002 and 2003 is attributed to shortages of foreign currency and an acute increase in the broad money supply when the government began funding its budget deficit by printing money (Hanke, 2009). Over the period, the annual GDP growth was recording negative figures, with a low of -18% recorded in 2008 (MoFED, 2010). This deterioration in the GDP growth rate can only be compared to average declines in war zones; for example, -7% in the Ivory Coast, -19% in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and -25% in Sierra Leone (Moss, 2007). Unlike Zimbabwe, all these countries were experiencing civil war when these figures were recorded (Ndlela, 2012)


Figure 4.4: Zimbabwe GDP (%) growth rate, 1997-2008



Source: World Bank Data Catalog, 2010

A combination of the pricing regime and hyper-inflation caused capacity utilization to decline to averages below 5%, resulting in acute shortages of basic commodities (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The balance of payments also deteriorated during this period: from US\$200 million to about US\$1.9 billion by mid-2009 (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: Zimbabwe's balance of payments position 2000-2010



Source: IMF (2012) and MoFED (2015)

The deterioration in the balance of payments was due to a massive drop in exports, an abrupt increase in imports, and the absence of external funding (Kanyenze et al., 2011). It was a clear indication that the economy had lost its competitiveness against other regional economies, such as those of South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana (Mufunda, 2017).

To avert the situation, the government adopted several policies, such as the Look East Policy of 2004, which was meant to counter the American sanctions by blaming the economic meltdown on external forces, particularly the sanctions themselves (Ojajorotu and Kamidza, 2018). The Look East Policy constituted a shift from engaging in bilateral relations with the West to engaging with the East by reinforcing political and economic relations mainly with China, and, to a lesser extent, with countries like Malaysia and Singapore (Youde, 2007).

4.2.4. The transitional and stabilisation period (2009-2018)

After the disputed elections of 2008, a power-sharing deal through the Government of National Unity was established, resulting in the country adopting a multi-currency regime (MoFED, 2010). This eased inflation and the economy grew by 5.4% in 2009 and 11.9% in 2011 (RBZ, 2012). This growth was only maintained until 2013; from 2013-2018 the economy started showing signs of renewed fragility, with GDP growth declining from 10.6% in 2013 to -3% in 2018 (IMF, 2018). This decline can be attributed to several factors, such as a lack of confidence in the financial sector, high levels of corruption, high costs of doing business, policy reversals, and industry under-capitalisation, among others (World Bank, 2017).


In addition, during the period under review, Zimbabwe faced several bank failures that resulted in four banks ceasing operations entirely: this exposed crucial vulnerabilities in the banking sector (AfDB, 2016). Further, by the end of 2013, the country was affected by a serious liquidity crisis that resulted in cash shortages and led to a high demand for electronic money (AfDB, 2017). This weakening of the financial sector has greatly affected domestic savings, thereby contributing to the negative economic growth (IMF, 2017).

An African Development Bank report of 2011 estimated that Zimbabwe needs at least US\$15 billion to rehabilitate its infrastructure and make sustainable developmental growth more feasible. Given the prevailing economic conditions, the required capital cannot be mobilised locally; hence the need for the country to engage international financiers (MoFED, 2018). Given that Zimbabwe is under sanctions from the Western countries, the only available foreign option has been China (Mufunda, 2017).

4.3. Major foreign-capital inflows in Zimbabwe (1980-2013)

Developing countries like Zimbabwe usually fail to ring-fence resources intended for economic stimulation, and hence rely more on external sources to fund budget deficits and infrastructural development (Osabuohien and Research, 2007). To critically investigate and examine the impact of FCI in Zimbabwe, it is paramount to explore the inflow trends over the years (Mufunda, 2017). Although there are many other factors, both internal and external, that can affect a country's economic growth, this study will emphasise foreign aid, also known as official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and external debt (EXD) (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: Foreign-capital inflows and GDP (US\$ M) in Zimbabwe, 1980-2013



Source: World Bank Economic Indicators Database, MoFED (2013)

4.3.1. FDI in Zimbabwe

Over the period under review, FDI in Zimbabwe has shown a positive correlation with GDP (Figure 4.6). FDI has fluctuated between US\$30 million in 1987 and US\$444 million in 1998 (World Bank, 2013). The low FDI levels recorded in the first decade after independence (1980-1990) can be attributed to the inward-looking domestic policies adopted by the government soon after liberation (Mufunda, 2017). The implementation of the economic-liberalisation policies under the IMF- and World Bank-recommended Economic Stabilization Adjustment Programme between 1990 and 1995 can explain the increase in FDI (1992-1998) that was in line with GDP growth. FDI again trended downward throughout the phase of economic disaster, 1998-2008; the GDP did the same over this period. This can be attributed to the fact that over the same period and because

of the targeted sanctions, many foreign companies, particularly American and European companies, moved out of Zimbabwe, culminating in massive job losses and a sharp fall in economic productivity (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 2009).

The sudden increase in FDI inflows in the midst of an economic crisis in 2004 can be ascribed to China's involvement after the government adopted the Look East Policy in 2003 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The further increase in the trend from 2009 to 2013 can be credited to political and macroeconomic stability that was brought about by the Government of National Unity (Kriljenko et al., 2013). Even though it accomplished stability, targeted sanctions remained in place and Western investors continued to regard Zimbabwe as a high-risk capital destination; however, investors from the East, particularly China and India, gradually started investing into the country. This explains the increase in FDI inflows between 2009 and 2013 (Mufunda, 2017). FDI in the amounts of US\$387 million and US\$399 million entered Zimbabwe in 2011 and 2012, respectively (Figure 4.5). These FDI inflows were insignificant compared to the inflows received by the rest of the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) region over the same period (UNCTAD, 2013).

The data in Table 4.1 shows that over the period under review, Zimbabwe received among the least FDI in the SADC region, at less than 2% of the FDI received in the region as a whole (UNCTAD, 2013).

Table 4.1: FDI (US\$ millions) in SADC region 2006-2012

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Angola	9064	9796	16581	13101	9941.6	3023.8	6897.8
Botswana	486	495	521	234	-	413.6	292.5
Lesotho	89	97	56	48	-	132.1	172.3
Malawi	72	92	170	60	55.8	128.8	129.5
Mozambique	154	427	592	881	788.9	2662.8	5218.1

Namibia	387	733	720	516	864	816.0	357.5
South Africa	-527	5695	9006	5696	1553	6004.3	4572.5
Swaziland	121	37	106	66	130.7	93.2	89.6
Zambia	616	1324	939	959	1041.4	1108.0	1066.0
Zimbabwe	40	69	52	60	165.9	387.0	399.5
Total	12660	23192	33278	25131	18391.4	8722.1	5399.8

Source: UNCTAD (2013), FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics)

4.3.2. Foreign aid

Foreign aid into Zimbabwe increased dramatically from US\$106 million in 1982 to US\$1.2 billion in 1992 (Figure 4.5). The high of US\$1.2 in 1992 can be attributed to donor support for drought relief in 1992 (Kanyenze, 2006). After Zimbabwe acquired pariah status during the crisis period (1998-2008), foreign aid inflows fell drastically due to donors abandoning the country (ACBF, 2010).

After the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2009, foreign-aid inflows started to increase again, reaching US\$800 million by the end of 2009 (Figure 4.5). Foreign aid inflows in Zimbabwe are disbursed through NGOs, which spearhead programs in sectors like health, education, and rehabilitation, due to the impasse between the central government and the donor community (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

4.3.3. External debt (EXD)

At independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government inherited US\$700 million, with 85% of it being private debt and the rest being bilateral and multilateral debt (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). As of December 2018, external debt in Zimbabwe amounted to US\$10 billion, about 90% of the GDP according to the Ministry of Finance 2019 budget statement. Seventy percent of this debt figure is arrears, as the country is battling to service its debts due to economic hardships and lack of foreign currency. Moreover, lending restrictions have been imposed on Zimbabwe due to defaults, prohibiting the

country from accessing fresh lines of credit from multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (World Bank, 2013). During the Government of National Unity (2009-2013), the government tried without success to re-engage with bilateral and multilateral donors, including the Paris Club (Mufunda, 2017). Since 2009, the government has also been pursuing debt relief from the IMF and World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, but the recent GDP rebasing that the government undertook in November 2018 increased the country's GDP and GDP per capita to US\$23 billion and US\$1,500 respectively, thereby moving Zimbabwe from a low-income country to a middle-income country (MoFED, 2018).

External debt increased steadily between 1980 and 1985 (Figure 4.5). The increase in external debt can be attributed to the government borrowing to fund social-sector projects like health and education (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Between 1996 and 2001, debt declined due to the government failing to access more lines of credit as relations with the international community started to deteriorate (Mufunda, 2017). Debt began to rise again in 2001 after the government implemented the Look East Policy and began borrowing from China (MoFED, 2009). The increase in 2001 can also be attributed to the increase in arrears, as the government was defaulting on external debt (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

4.4. Socio-economic development

4.4.1. Poverty

Approximately 72.3% of the population in Zimbabwe is considered poor, with 22.5% of the population living in extreme poverty and 62.6% of the households considered to be poor (ZIMSTATS, 2013). The prevalence poverty is higher in rural areas

than urban areas, with 76% of households in rural areas and 38.2% of urban households living in poverty. Poverty is least prevalent in Harare and Bulawayo, with 36.4% of the population in Harare and 37.2% of the population in Bulawayo living in poverty (ZIMSTATS, 2015). Poverty is most prevalent in Matabeleland North, with 85.7% of the population living in poverty (Karanda and Toledano, 2018).

After independence, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on socialist policies, with poverty reduction being the main priority. Government spending centered on social sectors, and social-sector expenditure increased from 25.7% of the overall government budget in 1980-1981 to 34.9% by 1990-1991 (Alwang et al., 2002). However, disparities between government revenues and expenditures by the start of the 1990s compromised the sustainability of the government's poverty-reduction policy (Alwang et al., 2002). Government expenditures grew at a faster rate than did revenues.

Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe's economy and society has deteriorated significantly (Kanyenze, 2003). The period of economic meltdown (1997-2009), which was characterised by hyperinflation, has reduced the returns from both the human and physical assets of the country, thereby contributing to poverty growth in Zimbabwe (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

4.4.2. Health sector

Over the years, health has been recognised as a fundamental human right in Zimbabwe. Consistent with the National Health Strategy (2016-2020), the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) seeks to deliver equity and quality health care in accordance with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Kidia, 2018). The infant mortality rate and the under-five mortality rate decreased significantly after independence,

but began to increase again in the mid-1990s (Lannes et al., 2017). The under-five mortality rate has increased from 77 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1994 to 84 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010 (UNICEF, 2018a). This is possibly a result of the 1997-2008 economic crisis and the introduction of user fees in public health care as part of the cost-recovery measures during the ESAP period (Kidia, 2018).

Zimbabwe's economic decay coupled with escalating inflation and deteriorating physical structures led to the inability of the public sector to deliver basic social services. During the crisis period, the public sector, particularly the health sector, faced severe human-resources shortages because of the government's failure to meet the workers' welfare needs and the resulting brain drain of experienced workers (Murisa, 2010). There was also a shortage of drugs and medical supplies in the health sector, which contributed to a major outbreak of cholera in 2008-2009, which resulted in 4,288 deaths and 98,591 documented cases (Kidia, 2018).

One of the challenges facing the health sector in Zimbabwe is underfunding. Between 2010 and 2018, government investment in the health sector varied from 10.3% of the overall budget in 2010 to 8.3% in 2018, and reached the lowest share of 6.6% in 2015 (UNICEF, 2018a); this is in worrying contrast to the recommended Abuja target of 15% (UNICEF, 2018a).

The 2018 health-sector budget of US\$473.9 million is far below the sector's financing requirements of US\$1.197 billion for 2018, which is in line with NHS (2018-2020). Furthermore, per capita budgeted expenditure on health in 2018 stood at US\$28.02, which is also far below both the per capita expenditure of US\$93.8 estimated in the NHS and the US\$86 recommended by the World Health Organization (UNICEF,

2018a). The country is at risk of failing to respond to the disease burden it faces, particularly in the case of non-communicable diseases, which require high-level and costly interventions.

4.4.3. Education sector

Most Zimbabweans (95% of males and 91% of females aged 6 and older) have attended school and attained a certain level of education (ZIMSTATS, 2016a). Zimbabwe has been on the forefront in terms of raising the literacy rate in the region. In 2014, the literacy rate was at 98%, a percentage point higher than in 2011. The literacy rate for the age group 15 to 34 years was above 99% for both males and females and close to 99% for the age group 35 to 39. The high levels of literacy among the young are because of the post-independence government policies emphasising education for all (ZIMSTATS, 2016b).

Public investment in primary and secondary education has been the Zimbabwean government's top priority. Expenditure on education from 2012 to 2014 averaged 29% of the government budget, the highest allocation of all the ministries. In 2014, 50% of the budget for education was allocated for infant and junior education, 27% was for secondary education, and higher education absorbed 17% (UNESCO, 2016). In 2018, about US\$905.6 million (15.8% of the budget) was channeled towards primary and secondary education, a 12.7% increase from the previous year's US\$803.7 million. However, an enormous share of the sector budget has been absorbed by salaries, leaving little for capital expenditure. In the 2018 budget for primary and secondary education, 93.7% of the sector budget was allocated to salaries and the remaining 6.3% was allocated to learning materials and education infrastructure (UNICEF, 2018b).

Despite the primary and secondary education sector being the top government priority, overall public investment in the sector is inadequate by regional standards. The 15.8% allocation to the sector is significantly below the 22% SADC benchmark and the 20% Dakar threshold (UNICEF, 2018b). Therefore, there is a need for the Zimbabwean government to allocate more public resources in education to reach international standards, as well as to rebalance expenditure between capital and revenue, as over 93% of the budget is revenue expenditure.

4.5. Zimbabwean geopolitics

After years of struggle for liberation, Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 and inherited a thriving agro-based economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe was assigned the food-security portfolio in the SADC region due to its capacity to export excess grains to its neighbouring countries, and was considered the 'breadbasket' of the Southern African region (Hammett, 2011).

However, the Zimbabwean agricultural sector was characterised by a large-scale commercial agricultural sector and a small-scale communal agricultural sector. The whites who constituted a small proportion of the population (less than 1%) occupied 45% of all farming land in the form of large-scale commercial farms, while the indigenous Africans occupied small-scale communal farms (Zikhali, 2008). This background of imbalance in land distribution and the perceived political allegiance of the white farmers led to the controversial land-reform program in 2000 (Kanyenze et al., 2011).

The program resulted in the violent transfer of white-owned farms to black Zimbabweans. The land -reform program in Zimbabwe was viewed as the black

Zimbabweans regaining their land in response to colonialism. The program has devastated Zimbabwe's agricultural sector and jeopardised Zimbabwe's international relationship with the Western countries.

The US and EU responded to this contentious land-reform program by imposing several economic sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe (Chingono, 2010). The sanctions made it illegal for the EU to provide financial support to the Zimbabwean government. Multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank terminated their financial assistance to Zimbabwe and donor agencies such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ended their relationship with Zimbabwe and terminated all the projects in progress at that time (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011). The government of Zimbabwe reacted to the economic sanctions by adopting a foreign policy anchored on the eastern countries and China – the Look East Policy (Youde, 2007) – which aimed to strengthen Zimbabwe's relationship with the eastern countries for mutual economic benefits (Ojaborotu and Kamidza, 2018).

4.5.1. Effects of the economic sanctions

4.5.1.1. Agricultural sector

As discussed above, during the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe had an efficient agricultural system in comparison to other sub-Saharan Africa countries, and was considered the "breadbasket" of the Southern African region. It was among the few countries in Africa that were self-dependent in agriculture, and in fact was a net exporter of cereal foodstuffs and had no need to resort to significant imports even in most drought years (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011).

Following the Fast-Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) in 2000, the EU donors withdrew their agricultural funding programs in Zimbabwe. Western countries' withdrawal of agricultural financing to the newly relocated black farmers led to decreased agricultural production (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011): agricultural output declined to 600,000 tonnes of maize in 2006 from a total output of 2.7 million tonnes in 1981 (Simpson and Hawkins, 2018). Ultimately, the land reform program had a negative effect on Zimbabwe's food security (Shonhe, 2019).

4.5.1.2. Zimbabwean health sector

After gaining independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a national health program that was in line with the World Health Organization's strategy of "Health for all by the Year 2000" (Kidia, 2018). Programs included supplementary food for children, free health care for low-income groups, a diarrhea disease control program, and an extension of the country's immunisation program against the main six killer diseases among children (Lannes et al., 2017). The EU has been on the forefront in financing these health initiatives, donating millions of euros as well as providing medical supplies including anti-retroviral drugs (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011).

The health sector has experienced a huge setback, with health-service delivery being hindered by shortages in drug supplies and in foreign currency to acquire medical supplies after the withdrawal of EU financial support to the health sector in 2001 (Chingono, 2010). In 2002, the majority (about 73%) of Zimbabwe's health facilities had recorded a shortage of important drugs (Richardson, 2007).

4.5.2. Zimbabwe`s emergency plan: The Look East Policy

Following the economic sanctions on Zimbabwe and the withdrawal of EU financial support to major government programs, the government of Zimbabwe embraced the Look East Policy, shifting their attention from the Western countries to the Eastern countries in their quest for much-needed foreign aid.

China has provided Zimbabwe with an alternative source of finance after the EU's withdrawal of its financing. Chinese support includes grants, concessional loans, and export credits, in sectors such as agriculture, mining, and energy as well as in support of infrastructure-development projects.

For infrastructure development, the Chinese government granted Zimbabwe US\$0.7 million and US\$3.6 million in 1999 and 2002, respectively, for the renovation of the Harare National Sports Stadium (Edinger and Burke, 2008). In 2001, the Export-Import Bank of China provided the Ministry of Water with a concessional loan for infrastructure development valued at US\$8 million (Jones et al., 2011). The loan was used to purchase equipment for upgrading and maintaining road infrastructure.

China gave another concessional loan valued at US\$25 million in 2006 to purchase agricultural tools and equipment, with Chinese companies supplying more than 50% of them as part of the loan agreement (Jones, 2011). In 2011, the government of Zimbabwe received a loan of Yuan 640 million, which was equivalent to US\$ 100 million at that time (Jones, 2011), to build a defense college in Harare. However, such loan agreements have drawn criticism as supporting unproductive projects and being tied to Zimbabwe's exports (Jones, 2011).

Besides providing Zimbabwe with concessional loans, The Export-Import Bank of China has also played an important role in providing export credits to Zimbabwe. In 2006, the Export-Import Bank of China lent the government of Zimbabwe a US\$200 million buyer's credit loan to purchase agricultural inputs for the sector (Jones, 2011) for which Zimbabwe lacked the foreign currency to purchase, including irrigation equipment, pesticides, fertilisers as well as other agricultural tools and equipment.

China and Zimbabwe implemented a Development Cooperation Framework Agreement by which Zimbabwe agreed to settle debts with China (both current and future) by exporting mineral resources (such as gold, diamonds, platinum, and copper) as well as cash crops (such as tobacco and cotton) to Beijing (Hodzi et al., 2012b). These Zimbabwean exports to China were vital for supporting China's accelerating economic growth and industrial development. Zimbabwe also agreed to settle the debts by granting China mineral concessions (Hodzi et al., 2012). In 2010, a Chinese firm, Aijin Investments, was granted permission to start mining diamonds at Chiadzwa as part of the China-Zimbabwe loan agreement (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Given that the government of Zimbabwe was failing to settle the debt and that credit lines from the Western countries were cut, China and Zimbabwe's debt agreement provided a suitable option for Zimbabwe (Hodzi et al., 2012).

China's continued assistance to Zimbabwe after the West's imposition of sanctions meant that Zimbabwe was not completely isolated in the international community. However, it is noteworthy that the relationship between the two countries raises concerns about whether Chinese foreign aid will lead to Zimbabwe's economic development.

4.6. Chapter conclusion

This chapter discussed Zimbabwe's economic developmental context and how the country's policies have affected the growth of its economy. The chapter also reviewed Zimbabwe's foreign policy, drawing on its relations with both the West and the East. The chapter showed that the Sino-Zimbabwean relations intensified after those between Zimbabwe and the West had faltered. In addition, the chapter also explained why Zimbabwe attracted sanctions from the Western countries and how the sanctions affected the performance of the economy. The subsequent involvement of China in Zimbabwe opened new lines of fresh funding, but the relationship was almost ruined when Zimbabwe failed to pay some of its Chinese loans. In the context of these events, the study examined Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid to their country. The next chapter will discuss the study's methodology.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the ontological and epistemological assumptions used to shape this study, the methodology used, and the limitations of the research field. The conceptual framework in Chapter One discussed the gap in the literature concerning Sino-Zimbabwean relations and the difficulty that accompanies attempts by Africans in general, and Zimbabweans in particular, to understand the drivers of China's outward foreign-aid policy, as well as the difficulty of measuring the impact of China's aid in host countries. Methodologically, this prompted me to consider how Chinese aid to Zimbabwe can be examined substantively and systematically. The study is a qualitative analysis that adopted an analytical approach given in the Straussian school of grounded theory. In this chapter, I explain the study research design, the steps taken to collect and analyse data, and the methods used to engage with the research questions. The next section gives the study design, Section 5.3 describes the criteria used to select participants, Section 5.4 depicts the data-collection methods, Section 5.5 discusses the grounded-theory methods that guided the data analysis, Section 5.6 discusses the ethical considerations, and the chapter is concluded in Section 5.7.

5.2. Research design

My choice of a qualitative study was motivated by the need to develop a theoretical framework that gives an in-depth explanation of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, the nature of the aid, and its impact, using the narratives of people who are directly affected by the aid. To reach this understanding, I deployed an epistemological approach,

as discussed above. This research focuses on how China's engagement in Zimbabwe has affected, and continues to affect, the social and economic wellbeing of Zimbabweans. As wellbeing is a phenomenon that is socially constructed, qualitative research is appropriate. In addition, the fact that this research also made a micro-level analysis of the impact of Sino-Zimbabwean relations on individual Zimbabweans implies that the researcher needed to gain insights in the phenomena in their natural settings and through an enquiry that is wholly natural and not too scientific (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006; Cooper and Schindler, 2013).

5.2.1. Straussian grounded theory

Grounded theory seeks to establish a theory from data systematically obtained and comparatively analysed (Chun Tie et al., 2019). The theory was initially developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), who explained the inductive generation of theory from data. They challenged the belief then that quantitative research was superior to qualitative research in that the former lacked rigour, and they developed a method of comparative analysis that can generate theory (Chun Tie et al., 2019). After their 1967 paper "The Discovery of Grounded Theory", Glaser and Strauss diverged in their views on grounded theory, with Strauss and Corbin modifying their approach and Glaser continuing to advocate their original formulation of the theory (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Chun Tie et al., 2019). My study followed the modified version of Strauss and Corbin's approach founded on symbolic interactionism (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). I was guided by the work of Chun et al. (2019). In my own divergence from Strauss and Corbin (1980), who argued that theory emerges from data, I sketched conceptual framework and conducted a literature review before collecting data to shape my

appreciation of the phenomena. I then sought to look for a theory from the data and went back to modify my conceptual framework to reflect and support new insights into Chinese aid to Africa.

China's motive in its aid engagements in the global South and the impact of its aid on host nations have been subjects of so-far unresolved debate (Taylor, 2004 2007, 2019b, 2019a; Thompson, 2005; Ray et al., 2015). This prompted me to seek to construct an explanatory theory grounded in data that uncovers China's motives in Zimbabwe and whether China's engagements there are of any benefit to Zimbabwe. My choice of grounded theory was straightforward because my participants were homogenous in the sense that they all were experts in various areas of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations. They were selected based on their knowledge and experience from their involvement with different organisations, or from different departments with the same organisations, that engaged with China at different levels. To cater for their holistic contexts, I needed an analysis of their individual views of why China was giving aid to Zimbabwe, and of how those views shaped their evaluation of the impact of the aid on their day-to-day lives. The Straussian grounded-theory method employed in this study will be discussed later in this chapter.

5.3 Data triangulation

To gather and analyse the data, I employed data triangulation, where semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis were used together with the literature. Interviews were the main data source, but to make sense of the participants' views, I also used government documents such as national budgets, government websites, speeches, and bulletins to support or evaluate those views.

Triangulation is defined by Patton (1999) as the use of several methods or sources of data to qualitatively explore phenomena. The main goal of triangulation is to test the validity of research findings using convergent information drawn from different and independent sources (Denzin, 2017). Patton (1999) identified four distinct triangulation types: investigator, theory, data-source, and method triangulation. The current research used method, theory, and data-source triangulation.

Method triangulation entails the use of many different methods to gather data used to study the same phenomenon (Cope, 2014; Polit and Beck, 2012). This type of triangulation can use methods such as participatory observation, in-depth interviews, and field notes (Denzin, 2017). Theory triangulation entails using multiple theories to analyse, interpret, and explore data to come up with convincing findings regarding an area under study (Eaton, 2017). The use of different theories will help the researcher to either support or disagree with previous findings by other scholars (Denzin, 2017). Data-source triangulation involves using multiple data sources to investigate a phenomenon to introduce different perspectives from different people coming from different backgrounds and communities (Polit and Beck, 2012).

5.4. Participant selection and ethical considerations

In a study employing grounded theory, an excellent participant is one who is an expert in the phenomena under investigation, must be willing to be a participant, must be available to participate, and must have the capacity to fluently articulate issues to do with the phenomena (Spradley, 1979; Morse, 2010). Participants in this study were recruited basing on their expertise about Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements.

I interviewed 25 participants drawn from government departments, political parties, civil society, and NGOs. Government officials had information on how aid is negotiated, and on the quantity, purpose, and disbursement of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. This assisted me in understanding the nature and magnitude of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. NGOs had information on the sectors they are co-funding with China and the areas where the aid is being allocated. Again, this helped me to understand the pattern and effect of Chinese aid distribution in comparison to aid from other donors. The representatives of civil society and political parties had information on how citizens are reacting to Chinese aid in Zimbabwe and how they view Chinese aid in relation to alternative foreign policies. This helped me to access the impact of the aid on the lives of general citizens.

Table 5.1 lists the organisations from which participants were drawn and why the organisations were selected. is presented.

Table 5.1: Organisation and justification for inclusion

Organisation	Justification for inclusion
Ministry of Finance	The ministry is responsible for aid negotiations and receiving the aid. They have information on the quantity of the aid received, the sectors being funded, the nature of the aid, and the distribution process.
Zimbabwe Debt Office	The office is responsible for keeping records of debt and separating the grant elements from the debt components of the aid.
Ministry of Trade	The ministry is responsible for managing the sectors where the aid is disbursed and conducting trade relations with foreign countries.
Zimbabwe Economic Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) – NGO	ZEPARU is responsible for research and development and for acting as the alternative data centre. Their data is used by NGOs that avoid using government figures when allocating aid. They capture data about all donors and about the distribution of all the aid that comes to Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) – NGO	ZIMCODD is responsible for recording all sovereign-debt figures and facilitating citizens' involvement in public-policy formulation. It has a department that facilitates equitable distribution of aid proceeds in rural areas.

Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRI) – civil society	LEDRI is a civil-society research think tank that gathers data that is usually not published by the government. Their role is to inform the public about all the deals in which the government is involved and to explain government policies.
Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC) – political party	The MDC is the largest opposition political party in Zimbabwe. It formulates alternative policies, including an alternative Sino-Zimbabwean aid policy. The party, which is represented in parliament, is responsible for approving China-Zimbabwe deals before they are signed.
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) – civil society	The ZCTU represents workers and the public in labour-related issues. They have a keen interest in Chinese aid because of the labour component attached to the aid as well as its general effect on the welfare of workers and the public.

I initially contacted organisations seeking a blanket approval to directly contact the participants. After getting approval, I used organisations' employee lists (publicly available on organisations' websites) to select participants based on their knowledge, accessibility, and availability (Babbie, 2007).

5.4.1. Inclusion criteria

Participants were 18 years of age or above and had intensive knowledge of China's engagements in Zimbabwe either through their line of work or through interacting with Chinese representatives in Zimbabwe. Organisational approval was important to protect the participants from the risk of losing their jobs. Participants then expressed orally or in writing their willingness to participate, after which they were requested to sign a consent form.

5.4.2. Exclusion criteria

Participants without knowledge of China's aid engagements in Zimbabwe or those who were not directly dealing with Sino-Zimbabwean aid issues were excluded, as were participants who were minors (below 18 years of age). Participants whose organisations

had not given approval (for example, the Chinese embassy, USAID, and Plan International) were also excluded.

Table 5.2: Interview participants profiles, code, and organisation

No.	Organisation	Interviewee code	Profile	Duration working with Chinese aid	Interview duration
1	Ministry of Finance	MF1	Male senior officer	Over 15 years	45 minutes
2	Ministry of Finance	MF2	Male desk officer	More than 3 years	39 minutes
3	Ministry of Finance	MF3	Female desk officer	Over 10years	40 minutes
4	Debt Management Office	DO1	Male senior officer	Between 5-7 years	35 minutes
5	Debt Management Office	DO2	Female line manager	Over 5 years	40 minutes
6	Debt Management Office	DO3	Female desk officer	Over 3 years	30 minutes
7	Debt Management Office	DO4	Male desk officer	Over 10 years	60 minutes
8	Ministry of Trade	MT1	Male senior officer	Over 15 years	40 minutes
9	Ministry of Trade	MT2	Female desk officer	Over 5 years	33 minutes
10	Ministry of Trade	MT3	Male desk officer	Between 5-7 years	40 minutes
11	Zeparu (NGO)	Zep1	Male desk officer	Over 10 years	45 minutes
12	Zeparu	Zep 2	Male desk officer	Over 3 years	30 minutes
13	Zeparu	Zep3	Female senior officer	Over 5 years	39 minutes
14	MDC-Alliance (Political Party)	MD1	Female senior officer	Over 10 years	55 minutes
15	MDC-Alliance	MD2	Male senior officer	Over 15 years	40 minutes
16	MDC-Alliance	MD3	Female senior officer	Over 20 years	45 minutes
17	LEDRIZ	LZ1	Male desk officer	Over 7 years	35 minutes
18	LEDRIZ (NGO)	LZ2	Male desk officer	Over 10 years	45 minutes
19	LEDRIZ	LZ3	Female desk officer	Between 2-3 years	30 minutes
20	ZIMCODD (NGO)	ZD1	Female senior officer	Over 5 years	40 minutes
21	ZIMCODD	ZD2	Male desk officer	Between 5-7 years	45 minutes
22	ZIMCODD	ZD3	Male desk officer	Over 5 years	38 minutes
23	ZCTU (Civic Society)	ZU1	Female desk officer	Over 3 years	40 minutes
24	ZCTU	ZU2	Male senior officer	Over 10 years	35 minutes
25	ZCTU	ZU 3	Male senior officer	Over 15 years	50 minutes

5.5. Data collection

Data collection was done concurrently with data analysis in line with what Corbin (2007) called the hallmark of grounded theory. Semi-structured interviews were used to gather data that allowed me to explore and interpret facts in a natural way (Corbin et al., 2007). The perceptions of participants regarding (1) why China was giving aid to Zimbabwe, (2) the nature of the aid, and (3) how the aid was affecting the wellbeing of Zimbabweans were captured through participant narratives.

I recorded the interviews whilst simultaneously taking field notes. Recorded interviews were transcribed, and field notes were typed up for ease of analysis. Transcription of interview data was done soon after each interview. The study used the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to code and analyse the data. Throughout this method, dominant themes occurring from the data based on their frequency were pinpointed.

This study followed the recommendation of Tharenon et al. (2007) that when carrying out interviews, flexibility must be balanced with focus: the interviews must be flexible enough to enable the interviewee to be relaxed and comfortable when answering questions, but should at the same time be focused strictly on the issues that pertain to the study. To achieve this, an interview guide was developed was used flexibly but in a focused manner. Open-ended questions were used to address the study research questions.

The interview guide was pilot tested for clarity and appropriateness. Semi-structured interviews gave an opportunity for participants to extensively express themselves, whilst at the same time allowing me to further probe and follow up on critical issues that emerged from the interviews.

5.5.1. Documentary data collection and analysis

When considering the documents to use in this study, I started by conducting my own secondary research on the available documents before extracting them for use in this research. The process involved checking the authenticity of the documents, their credibility, and their representiveness, as well trying to derive meaning from them (Bohnsack et al., 2010). Checking for the authenticity of the documents entailed looking

at their soundness and authorship (Fitzgerald, 2012). Through the process of checking the authenticity of the documents, I asked questions such as, who authored the document? What was the target audience and why was the document authored? I checked whether each document was a true facsimile of the document in its original form, not altered in any way, by verifying the page and section numbers.

Checking for the documents' credibility entailed evaluating their accuracy (Fitzgerald, 2012). This involved verifying whether the documents reflected the coherent views of the author. When collecting speeches from government officials, for example, I compared the contents with what was reported in the national budget of that year. The process also involved reading secondary data sources about the events where the speech was made, as well as about the person who delivered the speech.

Document representativeness was determined by assessing the availability of the documents and establishing whether the chosen documents represented the present environment (Ahmed, 2010). I kept in mind that whilst hard-copy documents might be vulnerable to poor storage environments, computerised documents can also be saved in incorrect formats, thereby distorting critical information (Fitzgerald, 2012). To ensure the representativeness of the documents, I tried my best to avoid selective retention, as recommended by Fitzgerald (2012).

To deduce the meaning of the documents, I performed surface reading before extracting them for analysis. This process involved searching for key words and concepts that were of interest to me. This was followed by a brief textual and content analysis. The content analysis involved counting the number of times a concept was used in the document (Robson, 2002), and the textual analysis concentrated on deducing meaning

from the graphs, tables, and concepts discussed in the documents (Adam and Coupland, 1999).

Documentary data analysis involved systematically identifying themes and providing an analysis and interpretation from them. Most of the themes had already been derived from interview data; I tried to identify the same themes in the documentary data. I kept on reviewing the themes as more data became available and new interpretations emerged, in line with Altheide (2004), who advocated for ethnographic content analysis, a form of grounded theory where data is constantly reviewed to come up with a clear narrative (Fitzgerald, 2012).


Table 5.2: Type and source of documents analysed

Document type	Source
Zimbabwe national budget statements (2000-2020)	http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index
Zimbabwe Monetary Policy documents (2000-2008) and (2013-2020)	https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) document	http://www.veritaszim.net
AidData set (China and Zimbabwe)	https://www.aiddata.org/china
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) document	http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php
Zimbabwe External Debt to GDP data: Trading Economics data set	https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/government-debt-to-gdp
Various literature	

5.5.2. Interview sequence

Interview sequencing followed the recommendation of other qualitative studies, which began interviews by asking simple and easy questions before moving on to the hard, threatening, and sensitive questions (Grinnell Jr and Unrau, 2005) (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 1: Interview sequence



5.6. Ethical considerations and integrity

Ethical considerations, such as giving respondents assurance of their anonymity and confidentiality, were important ingredients for the research to be successful (Spencer, 2017), especially considering that the research involved sensitive government information (Berg and Lune, 2012). Due to the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality, respondents were free to air their views without putting their jobs and safety at risk; thus, all responses from respondents were kept in confidence in line with Berg and Lune (2012). Spenser (2017) warned against what he termed “outsider arrogance”, where a researcher opts to take images without the consent of the participants, thereby posing a threat to the research process. This was supported by Sontag (1977), who described taking photos without consent as an act of aggression, with a camera being predatory in nature (Parsons and Culture, 2009). I had a deep and extensive understanding of ethical issues before engaging respondents, especially regarding the use electronic devices such as cameras and recorders (Langmann and Pick, 2014).

Interviews were conducted in open spaces that allowed participants to be comfortable. In those public places, individual privacy was kept (Wang et al., 2001). Participants reserved the right to stop an interview at any time (Berg and Lune, 2012). During the interview process, I maintained professionalism and integrity by not infringing on the rights of the participants.

5.6.1. Obtaining participants' consent

Those who agreed to participate in the project were emailed the Participant Information Statement, which provided an overview of the research project, the study objectives, of the scope of the participants' involvement, and the estimated duration of the interviews. Before the commencement of the interviews, the participants were given a chance to confirm their willingness to continue with the interview before being requested to sign the official consent form, which they gave to me shortly before the interviews.

5.6.2. Data storage

Each interview was recorded, with the informed consent of participants, to ensure that data coding was completed accurately and efficiently after the interviews. The interviews were transcribed, and the participants were given an opportunity to review the transcripts prior to use. Once the data was transcribed, the recordings were stored in compliance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research.

5.7. Interview data analysis

Throughout the data analysis I wrote memos to detail how and why decisions were being made at every stage of the analysis. Stern (2007) wrote that "if data are building blocks, then memos are the mortar when developing a theory". Soon after conducting the first five interviews and transcribing them, I started the process of coding the data by

identifying concepts, similarities, and recurring concepts in the data. My codes consisted of short labels and were categorised into iterative phases.

5.7.1. Open/initial coding

The initial coding is the first step of data analysis in Straussian grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2015). I began by deciding whether to use line-by-line coding or broader coding. I adopted a more generalised approach first, where coding was ascribed to substantial groupings of data (Bernard et al., 2016), as in the following extract from one of the interviews, which was coded as “giving aid to maintain historic relations and search for business opportunities” (extract A).

Extract A, Interview 1 (MF1)

Henry: Why is China giving aid to Zimbabwe?

MF1: Well, I think, firstly, China has been labelled as a friend of Zimbabwe for some time, so ordinarily the Chinese government has been providing aid to Zimbabwe, and we think China is giving aid to Zimbabwe because of that friendship. But then, when you look at China, they are a growing economy – and at the moment I think it’s the second-largest economy in the world – so I think with that status, when China comes here for business, I think, they would like to have an image of a country that is a friend and also doing business with us. So, ordinarily, you would expect them to provide some aid, whilst at the same time they would be doing business.

Labelling large groupings of participants’ with general codes like “giving aid to maintain historic relations and search for business opportunities” limited my ability to

capture all the views of the participants, which would have led to a generalised analysis of the data. I then adopted a more detailed approach using line-by-line coding to allow me to code small amounts of data. Figure 5.2 shows an example of how I applied line-by-line coding to the same account provided by MF1.

Figure 5.2: Applying line-by-line coding to MF1 views


MF1: Well I think firstly, China has been labelled as a friend of Zimbabwe for some time so ordinarily the Chinese government has been providing aid to Zimbabwe and we think China is giving aid to Zimbabwe because of that friendship but then, when you look at China, they are a growing economy and at the moment I think it's the second largest economy in the world, so I think with that status, when China comes here for business I think they would like to have an image of a country that is a friend and also doing business with us, so ordinarily you would expect them to provide some aid whilst at the same time they would be doing business.	<i>To maintain friendly relations,</i>
	<i>To maintain its economic growth,</i>
	<i>Strictly for business purposes,</i>
	<i>To portray a good image</i>

Line-by-line coding proved to be more detailed, and was useful in controlling my own preconceived theories regarding the data (Charmaz, 2014). Line-by-line coding is a process of labelling each sentence of the data without creating conceptual codes (which will be done in the selective stage); it minimises the risk of the researcher imposing their assumptions on the data, because the coding is based on a summary of participants' views.

Microsoft Word was used to do the line-by-line coding. Initially, I tried to use the comments option in Microsoft Word by creating the codes as comments, but the comments were not appearing next to the corresponding line or sentence, rendering the


method ineffective. I then created a table with two columns with the line-by-line codes in one column and the participants' views in the other (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3: Conducting line-by-line coding in Microsoft Word



This was done for all interviews, and the MS Word text files were imported into NVivo 12. Unfortunately, NVivo did not recognise codes created in Word as codes, and the software generated new codes. As a result, I used the codes created in Microsoft Word as references (Figure 5.4) below.

Figure 5.4: Data imported from Microsoft word and recorded in NVivo (Screenshot from NVivo)




This process was done only for the first five interviews because line-by-line coding is done at the initial stages of data collection (Charmaz, 2014; Khandkar, 2009; Gibbs, 2007). From the sixth interview, as specific patterns began to develop and the codes were merged into categories, the data was fractured looking for similarities and differences; at this point I inductively generated as many codes as possible. Important words, phrases, and concepts were identified and labelled, and they were developed into themes. I continued to reread all the coded manuscripts and analysing them visually to make sure that the coded data was described accurately by the created codes. The NVivo system then organised the codes into “parent-child” relationships (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Screenshot from NVivo of codes organised into parent-child relationships

Name	Files	References
Search for outside labour force	1	1
Enhance Trade	2	4
market loans	3	4
looking for investment opportunities	3	10
create employment for their citizens	4	6
Extract Resources	5	13
market exports	7	16
China's political Interests	0	0
political legitimacy	3	5
voting ally	5	8
To become a global power	5	5
Maintaining Historical Ties	7	12
nature of the aid	0	0
beneficiaries of the aid	0	0
the chinese	2	6
government officials	3	4
the public	4	8
politicians	6	13
Effect of the aid	0	0

The codes were classified this way to gain a deep insight into the data. In some cases, the parent-child codes were further broken down into more-specific thematic categories; for example, the data coded as “voting ally” in Figure 5.5 was eventually changed to a parent code called “seeking diplomatic support” after more analysis. This theme was instrumental in explaining the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Similarly, some of the “child” codes were merged and some were completely dropped from the analysis. For example, the “enhance trade” child code was merged with “marketing exports”, and the “seeking investment opportunities” child code was completely dropped. Models of relationships within the codes were created to visualise the data as well as to explore in detail the relationships between the codes (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6: A visualisation of the relationships between codes (extracted from NVivo)




As shown in Figure 5.6, using NVivo to create model relationships gives rather limited options, and the output will be simple models. The created models were, however, useful, as they were updated in real time if any change was done in the analysis.

5.8.2. Within-case analysis

As the data grew, each case was analysed separately, as was recommended by Bazeley (2013), who argued that each participant's views should be analysed separately. This step involved making a summary of each case that concentrated on all the relevant information. This helped me to gain new insights about the participants' views and to draft questions on issues for which I needed more clarity or items for which I needed further validation from the participants (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7: A case of DO2 (extracted from NVivo 12), Interview 7



After summarising the cases, I created visual interactive models for every transcript. This involved creating relationship models separately as well as total coding

models for each participant, making sure that each participant was linked to a particular phenomenon. The models were created by the NVivo software automatically and were updated as new data was added. Each participant's coding charts showed the codes ascribed to each participant as well as the percentage of the data covered by the codes. These charts enabled me to identify the topics more interesting to the participant and facilitated comparisons among the participants' responses.

The within-case analysis helped to flag patterns unique to each participant. I followed Lincoln and Guba's (1985) guidance to follow up with participants whenever there was need to clarify their accounts. Participants were given access to full interview transcripts and were given a chance to add and correct their initial responses.

The within-case analysis provided the foundation for cross-case analysis, which involved comparing accounts of different participants identifying common themes to see if the themes developed in individual cases were consistent across the board. The cross-case analysis started by grouping similar themes from all participants' data, making sense of all differences in the cases, and exploring all cases that were not consistent with the developing theory (negative cases). The process of analysing negative cases was important for building a rigorous theory and testing the assumptions I was developing throughout the analysis, in line with the literature (Bazely and Jackson, 2013; Rodriguez, 1998; Van Maanen, 1979).

Throughout the process, I continued to ask what the study was for, what the data was assuming, whom the data was representing and where the data was coming from (Charmaz, 2006). This assisted me in challenging and exploring my sensitivity to the data,

and thereby in identifying the direction in which the data was going. To guide the collection of further data, I employed theoretical sampling.

5.7.3. Theoretical sampling

Theoretical sampling is the process of pursuing clues that evolve throughout preliminary data analysis in a grounded-theory study (Birks and Mills, 2015). This process was defined by Charmaz (2006) as the building of a theoretical category. I used theoretical sampling to seek additional information to saturate the themes I had created during the initial coding, as well as to highlight gaps and give insight into what was not yet revealed by the data.

The initial round of data generated codes associated with the concepts of China using aid to create markets for its exports in Zimbabwe and to market its manufactured goods. This prompted me to include participants from the Ministry of Trade as well as from ZIMCODD; thus, I decided to theoretically sample these participants. One participant from the Ministry of Finance mentioned in the initial interviews that the parliament building that is being built by China in Zimbabwe was not a government-to-government aid deal; rather, the Chinese Communist Party was giving aid to the ruling political party in Zimbabwe (ZANU PF). This led me to ask other participants if China was in any way interfering in Zimbabwean politics through aid. This approach was employed by Edwards et al. (2018). Initially my interview schedule had had no question regarding China's political interference, and I had not intended to interview participants from the Ministry of Trade.

5.7.4. Intermediate/selective coding

Building on the initial fractured codes, I transformed the data into more-abstract sub-themes by reviewing categories and subsuming some under others. Sub-themes were created in such a way that codes that had similar characteristics were grouped under one sub-theme. This process led to a theoretical saturation where I began to feel that additional data was no longer going to provide information that differed from what I already had, because the themes were now explained sufficiently, and the themes were representing the views of many participants.

5.7.5. Advanced/theoretical coding

Advanced coding is essential in producing a theory grounded in the data (Corbin et al., 2007). I followed the advice of Birks and Mills (2015) that advanced coding must include theoretical coding and storyline techniques. Findings were presented as interrelated themes with explanatory statements backed by literature detailing the relationship between sub-themes and core themes.

5.7.6. Storyline

Storyline is an approach that facilitates the construction, integration, and presentation of research findings using grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 2015). It was first proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) without much detail but was advanced by Birks and Mills (2015). I used storyline to conceptualise the core themes, as recommended by Birks and Mills (2015), by building a story that connected themes forming discursive theoretical propositions. Storyline was used in the study as it enabled an in-depth description of themes and discussion about how the themes of China's economic interests in Zimbabwe, China's political interests in Zimbabwe, historical

relations between the two countries, and the nature and sustainability of Chinese aid fit together to form the final theory that “China does not give aid”. The use of storyline ensured that the resultant theory was grounded in the data. In addition, writing the storyline enabled me to identify gaps in my developing theory, and I continually returned to the data iteratively to refine the storyline. The storyline culminated into the use of theoretical coding that integrated my theory.

5.7.7. Theoretical sensitivity

Theoretical sensitivity is the ability to identify data relevant to the emerging theory or the insights into what is significant and meaningful in the data for developing a theory (Glaser and Holton, 1967). To enhance theoretical sensitivity, I resorted to reading literature, open coding, and doubling-back data collection. I also used theories such as the debt-trap theory, global-hegemony theory, and aid-dependency theory to explain participants’ views. These theories either could not explain all the participants’ views or helped in shaping the theory developed in this study.

5.7.8. Rigour, quality and reliability

The quality of a grounded theory is established by the skill of the investigator, the congruence of the methodology with research questions, and the precision with which the methodology is applied (Birks and Mills, 2015). To achieve methodological congruence, the researcher’s philosophical position should correspond with the method and the research questions (Morse, 2010). Reliability is achieved through carrying out the research honestly, carefully, and thoroughly (Noble and Smith, 2015). This includes the phraseology of interview questions and the relationship and rapport between the interviewer and the interviewees (Breakwell, 2000).

To ensure validity in this study, I tried to address the three main threats to qualitative research validity as explained by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Lincoln (2007): reactivity bias, respondent bias, and researcher bias. Researcher bias is caused by the researcher's underlying assumptions about the research layout and the sampling strategy (Chenail, 2011). Reactivity bias looks at how the researcher influences the studied phenomena and the people involved in the study (Pannucci and Wilkins, 2010). Respondent bias happens when participants give inaccurate responses, either as a way to please the researcher by telling him what they think is what he wants to hear or when they feel that disclosing some information poses a threat to them (Sackett, 1979).

To deal with these biases I adopted strategies suggested by Robson (2002): carrying out negative-case analysis, member checking, maintaining an audit trail, peer debriefing, prolonged involvement, and triangulation. I tried to prolong my involvement in the study by constantly engaging the participants in verifying some of the concepts they had discussed during interviews. This helped develop rapport with the participants, thereby reducing the effects of respondent bias and reactivity bias; however, it increased the effects of researcher bias, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Triangulation entailed the use of data triangulation, where I used interviews and documents to collect the data, along with method triangulation and theory triangulation, which involved comparing existing theories in the literature with the theory that emerged from this study, as suggested by Denzin (1988). Triangulation reduced the effects of all three biases. Peer debriefing helped me to deal with researcher bias as I continued to engage other researchers, my supervisory team, my review panel, and fellow students in

providing comments and valuable feedback that assisted me in evaluating the study and reducing the risk caused by my influence over the study.

I also carried out negative-case analysis, a core part of cross-case analysis: whenever a participant mentioned something inconsistent with other participants, I investigated the source of the incongruity. This, coupled with member checking, helped to deal with researcher bias. In this study, data collection and analytical conceptualisation were meticulous. I carefully maintained a thorough audit trail and detailed procedures through memoing.

5.8. Professional competence

My academic background in the field of social science and professional work in research and policy formulation have equipped me with the requisite skills and competence to engage a research project of this type. I participated in the collection of the data that I used for my master's thesis. My master's program also had modules that taught both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Apart from my previous experience and general knowledge of the broad issues in development economics and international relations, I have also reviewed a great deal of literature on the subject, which provided a strong foundation for the study.

5.9. Research plan


The fieldwork commenced in October **[year?]** and lasted approximately seven months. I used the first month of fieldwork to gain familiarity and cement rapport with the study participants. Initial reading and an extensive literature review had already been started and was ongoing. All the collected data was transcribed, and while data analysis

was an ongoing process, it gathered momentum in the post-fieldwork phase. Following the completion of data analysis, I began writing up the thesis.

5.10. Research process

The research process followed the seven steps that have been adopted by Neuman (2000): selecting a specific researchable topic, coming up with clear research questions linked to the topic, developing a clear conceptual framework, coming up with a workable research methodology, collecting and analysing data, interpreting findings, and publishing. Borrowing from Neuman (2000), the process followed by this research is detailed in Figure 5.8. Given the complexity of the research, the research process was not linear.

Figure 5.8: The research process



5.11. Chapter conclusion

This chapter explained the philosophical basis that shaped the study, outlined the ontological and epistemological assumptions that guided the researcher's philosophical views, and described the research design. The study employed a Straussian grounded-theory approach that employed data, method, and theory triangulation. Structured interviews were the main source of data, supported by documentary analysis and literature review. The NVivo software was used for data analysis. The chapter further explained the criteria used to select interview participants, the justification for picking

them, and the study's ethical considerations. It concluded by outlining the data-collection and analysis procedure and the research process and plan.

CHAPTER SIX

RESULTS ANALYSIS 1: DRIVERS OF CHINESE AID TO ZIMBABWE

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the ontological assumptions and methodology used to shape this study. This chapter, the first of the two results chapters, documents the participants' conceptualisation of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, focusing on what they thought were the pull and push factors of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Documentary analysis was used to compliment participants' views and to verify their claims. The main themes discussed in this chapter are (i) China's economic interests, (ii) China's political interests, Zimbabwe's political situation, and (iv) Zimbabwe's developmental situation, consisting of its political, economic, and social needs. The analysis sub-divides these main themes into sub-themes (Table 6.1. These themes are explained in detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

Table 6.1 1: Themes discussed in Chapter 6

Main theme	Sub-themes	Facts from documents/quotes from participants
China's economic interests	China in search of natural resources	China is a big country in need of resources to drive their industry, they want resources from us, and the aid is only for softening up negotiations. <i>(Interview with MT1: Transcript Number 8)</i>
	China marketing its loans	We receive a bigger chunk of the aid in the form of loans and given our relations with other creditors we will always go back to China for loans. The loans are being used as carrot for future bigger loans which I find to be some sort of a trap because we lack capacity to pay back. <i>(Interview with DO1: Transcript Number 4)</i>
	China creating employment for its nationals	The way the aid deals are structured is suspicious in my opinion. They demand that project workforce should come from China and we see the Chinese taking up jobs that should be done by locals especially in the construction sector. So, I think they are just creating jobs for their people. <i>(Interview with Zep 3: Transcript Number 13)</i>
	China marketing its exports and technology	The Chinese are promoting their products. We now have a lot of Chinese owned shops selling Chinese ware but if you investigate it closely, you will see that most of the shop owners came here as project employees. <i>(Interview with ZD2 Transcript Number 21)</i>
		I think the relationship is mostly political and symbolical in nature. China views Zimbabwe not as a significant

China's political interests	China looking for an ally in international blocs	economic partner but a significant symbolic partner, because Zimbabwe has consistently voted with China at the United Nations, and it is one of the biggest proponents of China when it comes to the whole Taiwan issue. So, I think we must look at Chinese aid to Zimbabwe in that context. <i>(Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14)</i>
	China seeking to improve its global image	China is giving aid to Zimbabwe as part of its global campaign to portray itself as an ally of the downtrodden. It is about their global image: as a giant they need to be seen helping the weak, which will improve their already battered image. <i>(Interview with Zep2: Transcript Number 12)</i>
	China maintaining historical relations	There are various reasons why China is giving aid to Zimbabwe; the first being ideological in a sense that the relationship of China and ZANU PF goes back to the '60s when the Chinese supported ZANLA guerrillas with artillery, military strategies, and so on, so that they could prosecute the bush war. So that relationship has grown from that time, and has evolved, and up to where we are today. <i>(Interview with MT1: Transcript Number 4)</i>
Zimbabwe's political situation	Need to spite the West	I think China is simply responding to a friendly invite by Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has been on the offensive, courting superpowers like China, Russia, and India among other non-Western countries to infuriate the US and its allies. Therefore, China, being an enemy of the West, they are using aid to show solidarity with Zimbabwe. <i>(Interview with LZ1: Transcript Number 17)</i>
	Need for an ally at the UNSC	Just like China, Zimbabwe also needs voting allies in the United Nations Security Council. Both China and Zimbabwe have been voting with each other from as far back as the '80s. And for as long as that voting pattern continues, the aid will continue pouring in. <i>(Interview with MT2: Transcript Number 5)</i>
	Need to suppress domestic opposition	Chinese aid is targeted mainly on the security sector, and some of the equipment donated by China is being used to silence dissenting voices. There is need for the junta government to silence opposition after the coup, and China, being a close ally, has been donating equipment and specialised training. <i>(Interview with LZ3: Transcript Number 19)</i>
Zimbabwe's economic situation	Need for external funding	The main driver of the aid, especially loans, is Zimbabwe's appetite for external funding. We have not been receiving loans from traditional donors and have turned all our efforts to China. There is a need for the aid in Zimbabwe, and China is coming in handy. <i>(Interview with MF2: Transcript Number 2)</i>
	Need to revamp a dilapidated infrastructure	We are in desperate need of an infrastructure boost. Our roads are now a death trap, and I think because of China's expertise in construction, Zimbabwe is looking east for assistance in that regard. <i>(Interview with Zep 2: Transcript Number 12)</i>
	Need to save an ailing health system	I will talk about aid in the health sector. I think the aid is coming to address a dire situation. Doctors and nurses are constantly striking, and there is a huge medication shortage. So, the Chinese are coming in to assist. I [wish] they would stay in the health sector and not go to the other sectors where they are causing havoc. <i>(Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14)</i>

Zimbabwe's social needs	Need to improve service delivery	Some of the aid is need-based. There is serious need for assistance in every aspect of our lives. Nothing is really working; we have been turned into a basket case. Look at the service delivery – even garbage trucks are now coming from China. Even the plastic bins, everything is Chinese. The situation under ZANU PF is a sorry situation, hence the assistance from others. <i>(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 26)</i>
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As a starting point, this chapter highlights participants' emphasis on China's economic interests as a driver to Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations. It then shows participants' perceptions on how China's political interests, coupled with the historical relations between China and Zimbabwe, are propelling China's aid initiatives. The third section examines the Zimbabwean situation from social, political, and economic standpoints as a pull factor attracting Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. The chapter concludes by organising the arguments into the key components of the theoretical framework developed in this study.

6.2. China's economic interests

China's going-out strategy has been linked to its pursuit of its own economic interests (Pannell, 2008). The literature repeatedly states that Chinese aid is tied to strategies to improve China's economic opportunities in the aid-receiving countries (Bräutigam, 2011a; Sieber-Gasser, 2011; McCormick, 2008; Johansson and Pettersson, 2009; Kim and Kim, 2016). Participants in this study agreed, arguing that China has an economic interest in Zimbabwe in the forms of extracting resources, creating jobs for Chinese workforce, promoting Chinese products and services, and marketing their loans as the main pillars of their economic aims.

6.2.1. China in search of natural resources

China's main economic interest when providing aid to Zimbabwe is the need to acquire natural resources (Hanauer and Morris, 2014). This was emphasised by some

of the study participants, who spoke of China providing aid in areas that will give them access to natural resources or with conditions that will allow them to extract minerals. Participants felt that the need to have access to natural resources is the main driver of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe:

There is a direct link between the growth of the Chinese economy and their aid initiatives. If you consider that their population has also been growing even outside their borders, you will realise that they seriously need resources to drive their economic growth and feed their growing population, including the population outside of China itself. These guys try to take care of their citizens wherever they may be. This explains why China has been trying to have access to resources wherever they are, and aid has been used as a key to open resource doors. It is in this context that we hear all the noise about an influx of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe; it is just that our people are not making enough noise about an outflux of Zimbabwean resources to China. The Chinese are doing a lot of mineral extraction. They are the biggest extractors of minerals in Zimbabwe, including clay soil.

(Interview with MF3: Transcript Number3)

A World Bank report (2017) explained China's motives when providing aid to sub-Saharan African countries as ultimately targeted at securing natural-resource exports to China. Mineral exports from Zimbabwe have contributed 60% of total exports, 82% of which were exported to China (MMZ, 2019). Whilst there is no evidence to link these mineral exports to the aid Zimbabwe is receiving from China, there is no doubt that the aid is easing trade negotiations. This view was supported by MT1, who was of the view that China was using aid to soften up negotiations for resource deals with the Zimbabwean government:

China is a big country in need of resources to drive their industry. They want resources from us, and the aid is only for softening up negotiations.

(Interview with MT1: Transcript Number 8).

China using aid to negotiate for trade is a good thing if it culminates in equal benefit for both countries. Participants felt that the aid relationship was benefiting China more than it was benefiting Zimbabwe:

The Chinese are benefiting from our resources. They offered to build the Defence College, and in return they could mine diamonds in Chiadzwa. In Mouth Hampden they are building a parliament building but already they have been allowed to buy all the land around that area, and if you consider that we are going to build a new city in that area, you will realise that the aid is way less than the benefit to the Chinese.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 16).

When the participant spoke of the Defence College, she was referring to a college funded by US\$98 million in Chinese aid and loans that was built for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in 2013. The participant was linking the aid to contracts that were given to Chinese companies that partnered companies owned by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces to mine diamonds in the remote town of Marange (Maguwu, 2013). These Chinese companies received favourable treatment from the government of Zimbabwe in that the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, which required that all companies should have at least 51% domestic shareholding, was not applied (Ramani, 2016). Chinese-owned companies, like Anjin Enterprises, which are 50% owned by the Chinese Defence Industry and 50% by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces were allowed to operate in Zimbabwe despite having less than 51% domestic ownership (Maguwu, 2013). The diamonds mined by Anjin Enterprises were garnished by Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company, which was linked to the construction of the Zimbabwe Defence College (Chikuhwa, 2013).

The involvement of Chinese companies and those linked to the Zimbabwe military have caused Zimbabwe to lose a great deal of revenue, with the Zimbabwean

government estimating that more than UD\$15 billion worth of diamonds have been lost through illicit deals involving the Chinese and Zimbabwe military personnel in Marange (Mupfumi, 2017).

If China has gained at least half of what Zimbabwe estimates to have lost, it means that it has gained more than the UD\$98 million it has provided as aid in the construction of the Zimbabwe Defence College. The link between the Zimbabwe Defence College and mining of diamonds in Marange supports the participants' view that the need for natural resources is driving China's aid initiatives in Zimbabwe. The literature offers abundant evidence that China's quest for mineral resources is the driving force in its continued presence in Africa (Butts and Bankus, 2009).

While Zimbabwean government officials tend to think that all China-funded projects have the blessing of the Chinese government, some Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe, or in Africa in general, are doing so solely for profit, completely separate from Beijing's ambitions (Shepard, 2019). It is, however, hard to separate the economic interests of Chinese nationals in Zimbabwe and those of their government, as most of these companies come through the Chinese embassy and are sometimes represented by the Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe. Whilst some of the aid and projects coming to Zimbabwe may not be from the Chinese government, they are in Beijing's broader geoeconomics interests. This was supported by another participant, ZD2, who felt that China receives preferential treatment when tenders are allocated because of the aid they will have given to Zimbabwe.

The Chinese are here to pursue their interests; the aid makes them more [favoured] when it comes to awarding contracts. You will find out that most projects that are allocated to the Chinese do not go to tender and are linked to sectors where they will have provided aid. So, we consider them first before we consider, say, the Germans. They have become more attractive to work with because they have been willing to open their purse. So, they obviously have

our resources on one eye, because if they help us with a project, it gives them access to other projects in the same sector, especially mining, so they will end up involved in the whole value chain, from extraction of the minerals to buying of the same minerals.

(Interview with ZD2: Transcript Number 21)

Zimbabwe is building a new capital city in Mt Hampden, some 10 km from Harare, the current capital city. China's Shanghai Construction Group has provided a gift of US\$46 million towards the building of a parliament building in the new city, with the Chinese government pledging a further US\$20 billion towards the city (Nyabiage, 2020). The same Shanghai Construction Group has been allowed to buy vast tracks of land in the new city at very low rates long before construction is completed (Mushekwe, 2019). Based on the study participants' responses, the US\$46 million aid from the Shanghai Construction Group may have been extended as an incentive to provide the company with access to land. Another participant, MF1, argued that China deliberately targets resources or places where they will benefit when choosing sectors or areas to provide aid:

Part of the aid goes into infrastructure development, but if you then look closely at the infrastructure, it is the kind of infrastructure that allows them to tap into the resources that they want. So, you do not find aid in areas where they will not directly benefit. We have not seen them providing equipment for education [or] where they do not have a direct benefit, but only where they have access to certain places and resources. So, you find a road being done elsewhere but that road is taking them to a certain place where they must extract minerals. They do a dam and present it as aid, but if you look closely, you will find out that they are building the dam because they want water for another project that they are undertaking, maybe to do brick moulding and stuff like that, which needs a continuous supply of water. So, they do one thing here and the next thing you have got some other Chinese activities there.

(Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1)

This position has been supported by several scholars who classified China's aid as "rogue aid", in that it is determined by China's economic interests and not the

needs of the host countries (Naim, 2007; Dreher et al., 2019b; Strange et al., 2017) Participants' general feeling was that China's aid initiatives in Zimbabwe are predatory and should be taken with caution:

We have a big problem with the Chinese, my brother. We expect the government to engage everyone when signing these aid deals, but everything is done in secret. After some time, we see the Chinese everywhere extracting minerals, including even the Chinese embassy here. When a whole embassy is involved in mineral extraction then, we should be worried. China is here for resources, with aid only being a sideshow.

(Interview with LZ1: Transcript Number 17)

Participants linked to the government were of a slightly different view. Whilst most of them agreed that China was pursuing natural resources in Zimbabwe, they emphasised that Chinese aid is provided according to Zimbabwe's request sheet, thus cannot be classified as "rogue aid" but rather a win-win affair. A senior official from the Debt Office, DO1, said:

The Chinese are benefiting from our minerals, but I do not think they have a hidden agenda, because before receiving aid we submit our request sheet to the Chinese embassy, and the aid we receive is in line with that request sheet.

(Interview with DO1: Transcript Number 4)

The classification of Chinese aid as rogue was also opposed by Dreher et al. (2019), who found that China's aid is targeted at countries that are of economic interest to China, but that these are not necessarily countries with large mineral deposits (Dreher and Fuchs, 2016). Dreher et al. (2019) suggested that China has other economic interests in sight when giving aid, but that those interests are not necessarily resources (Dreher et al., 2019). This was supported by a participant, Zep3:

In the grand scheme of things, China is targeting more than just minerals, because if it were only minerals, they would have been in DRC or just in the Middle East, where there is oil. China has a cocktail of economic interests in Zimbabwe, and not just minerals.

(Interview with Zep3: Transcript Number 13)

6.2.2 China markets its exports and technology

Apart from targeting natural resources, some participants mentioned that China was using aid to market its exports in Zimbabwe. Participants emphasised that China does not give cash hand-outs; instead, aid is mainly in the form of equipment and services. If the aid is an infrastructure project, for example, all the equipment will come from China; that way, China is able to showcase its equipment and technology, and each time Zimbabwe requires a construction project, it will engage the Chinese. In addition, the aid allows China to develop trade relations with Zimbabwe:

By giving funding to projects that Zimbabwe is pursuing, China can establish a market for their finished products, because once you are in a good relationship you can develop good trade relations. So, China will be importing raw materials from Zimbabwe and exporting finished goods to Zimbabwe. Without the aid, it is difficult to build some of these bridges.

(Interview with MT2: Transcript Number 9)

The participant shared the viewpoint of De Looy (2006), who noted that the influx of China's aid to the security services in Zimbabwe saw Zimbabwe importing of 12 army jets and one hundred trucks worth more than US\$200 million from China in 2006.. Another participant, ZD3, linked China's aid to the agricultural sector with its cigarette exports to Zimbabwe:

I will give you an example of the agricultural sector, where China has been donating farming equipment and other inputs. All the tobacco being produced by local farmers is now being sold to CNTC at very low prices that are not benefiting the farmers. To make it even worse, we buy expensive cigarettes from China made from Zimbabwean tobacco and if you do the maths, CNTC is buying a kilogram of tobacco at US\$1.80 but we buy a pack of 20 cigarettes at US\$3.00 from China.

(Interview with ZD3: Transcript Number 22)

The participant's views were in the context of China's donations of agricultural equipment to Zimbabwe through the Chinese Agricultural Demonstration Centre (CADC), although some of the equipment comes as debt (Lixia et al., 2018). In contrast, the government of Zimbabwe has given the China National Tobacco Company a monopoly on buying tobacco from Zimbabwean farmers, with the buying price being determined by the company itself (Fang et al., 2020). Whilst there is no evidence to link the aid with the contract, there is no doubt that China is receiving more benefit from the sector than it is giving to the sector, given China's value-addition comparative advantage.

The fact that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce heads China's bilateral aid provision highlights China's economic interests in the provision of aid (Davies, 2007). China uses aid to penetrate African markets, with aid in the health sector being used to improve the reputation of Chinese medications and doctors in host countries (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, 2005). Chinese medicines have become popular in Zimbabwe, and China has been donating significant amounts of medical equipment since the turn of the millennium (Chun, 2014). In May 2020, China sent a 12 doctors to Zimbabwe with a plane full of medical equipment to fight COVID-19, raising questions from the public as to why China was trying to help a country that had only 34 confirmed cases at the time, when China itself was one of the most affected countries (Makurumidze, 2020).

In 1999 China's Ministry of Commerce admitted that Chinese enterprises are eagerly welcomed by the governments of countries that receive aid from China, and that the enterprises have easy access to markets in those countries (Lammers, 2007). China's bilateral aid to Zimbabwe was tied to, and depended, on Zimbabwe's use of

materials sourced from China; this conditionality promoted China's imports in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2019).

6.2.3 Creating employment for China's workforce

Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, particularly aid in the form of infrastructure projects, comes with a condition that all the equipment and workforce for the project will come from China (Mapaure, 2014). Participants felt that China was seeking to create employment for its people:

The aid comes with an influx of Chinese nationals. Some of them have now established themselves here, but they came as project employees, so I think China is doing these projects to create employment for its big population and at the same time buying other favours from us.

(Interview with ZU1: Transcript Number 23)

6.2.4 Marketing Chinese loans

Participants from government-related institutions indicated that Chinese aid comes attached to loans and were of the view that China is giving aid to Zimbabwe to market its loans. Some felt that China is taking advantage of Zimbabwe's desperation by providing non-cash aid, leaving Zimbabwe without options other than borrowing from China:

Their aid is attached to loans and the loans have very high [interest rates], the kind of interests you get in capitalist banks. So, the Chinese are giving us aid to market their expensive loans. They also give us aid so that we look at them in a more favourable way than our traditional lenders. And by "traditional lenders" I am referring to the Paris Club and the Bretton Woods institutions. So, when the Westerners give loans, they come as pure loans, but the Chinese attach the loans to aid such that if you are not privy to the details, you cannot separate the two. So, it is an economic strategy.

(Interview with DO2: Transcript Number 5)

Zimbabwe has been attempting unsuccessfully to obtain budgetary support from the IMF and the World Bank after receiving sanctions from most of the countries in the Paris Club except for Russia (Saungweme and Odhiambo, 2018). This has

forced Zimbabwe to adopt a Look East Policy targeted at improving China-Zimbabwe relations receiving budgetary support from China (Youde, 2007). China supported the policy and has extended lenient lending to Zimbabwe, but the current study's participants felt that the loans were attached to aid and the terms of the loan element of the aid were not favourable:

In most cases aid is used as a bait to achieve other goals, and in the case of the China-Zimbabwe aid relations, China is simply selling its loans, which come enveloped by aid. So, the aid is used to build relations or to build trust, but at the end of the day we remain with debts. So, from a government point of view, the aid complements the loans. But if you look at the interest being charged, China recoups all its money, so it is just business to them.

(Interview with ZD1: Transcript Number 20)

A closer look at what China calls official aid will explain this participant's view. Chinese aid is characterised by its concessions, which include zero-interest loans, concessional loans at fixed or low interest rates, and grants. Grants are managed by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and concessional loans are managed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Bräutigam, 2011a). In 1998, China's Ministry of Finance included interest subsidies for concessional loans as one of the costs included in the country's foreign-aid budget (Kobayashi, 2008).


It is in this context that China uses its aid as an instrument of diplomacy by offering loans to Zimbabwe. It may start as grants, then zero- or low-interest loans. Because Zimbabwe has a capital deficit, the government ultimately seeks non-concessional loans, and is left with difficulties in repaying the loans (Analytica).

China-Zimbabwe relations are characterised by China offering loans to Zimbabwe, and analysts have generally agreed that Zimbabwe has been failing to repay some of the loans (Brautigam, 2011). This has also affected the inflow of Chinese aid into Zimbabwe, with China being frustrated by Zimbabwe's failure to

service its debts (Mudyadzo, 2017). However, the fact that even as Zimbabwe defaults, China is happy to maintain diplomatic and financial relations suggests that China is also benefiting from the engagements.

Figure 6 summarises the views of most of the participants who felt that China was in Zimbabwe for resources, to create markets for its industry, and to market its loans. In 2005, after then-President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe had visited China a record 13 times, China pledged to assist Zimbabwe by funding the refurbishment of Zimbabwe's television and radio network using a US\$90 million interest-free loan with a 30% grant component (Clifford, 2017); US\$63 million of the \$90 million loan came as equipment that was supplied by Star Communications, a Chinese private company. Zimbabwe then failed to repay the loan and was forced to cede chrome-ore deposits (Clifford, 2017). The China Development Bank then financed Star Communications' equity in the project, where it partnered with a Zimbabwean firm to process chrome ore into ferro-chrome for export. Revenues from the project were then used to repay the initial loan (Clifford, 2017). This is an interesting example because after repaying the loan, Star Communications is still operating in the project and China has recovered its money. The loan deal has opened new avenues for Star Communications in the mining sector after it was awarded a US\$1.3 billion coal-mining partnership contract with the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (Saunders, 2008).

Figure 6.1: China-Zimbabwe aid/loan for telecom equipment



Source: Clifford (2017)

6.3. China's political interests

Aid has always been used as a tool to reward allies, punish enemies, and, in some instances, forge new coalitions and shape public opinions (Morgenthau, 1962; De Mesquita and Smith; 2007, Dreher et al., 2008). Participants asserted that China is using aid in Zimbabwe to achieve the same objectives:

I think the relationship is mostly political and symbolical in nature. China views Zimbabwe not as a significant economic partner, but a significant symbolic partner, because Zimbabwe has consistently voted with China at the United Nations, and it is one of the biggest proponents of China when it comes to the whole Taiwan issue. So, I think we must look at Chinese aid to Zimbabwe in that context.

(Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14)

6.3.1 China seeking a voting ally

Participants expressed that apart from having an economic interest in Zimbabwe, China also has political interests that are informed by its overall geopolitical strategies. Some participants argued that China is giving aid to Zimbabwe as a way to forge a strong alliance that will come in handy when China's international legitimacy is questioned. Foreign aid, according to China's official documents like its first white paper on external aid, stated that China uses aid to consolidate relations with other developing countries in the South (SCIO 2011a). This helps China to secure favourable international environments to facilitate its rise as a global power, and to maintain the legitimacy of the ruling Communist party:

Zimbabwe has stood with China on several occasions. For example, in 1989, you may still remember the Tiananmen Square issue, it was President Robert Mugabe who stood as a lone voice to say that the Westerners do not have the authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Chinese. So, from that time, it appears that the Chinese have also been trying to give back to Zimbabwe by repaying through aid for what President Mugabe did for them.

(Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1)

Prior to the Tiananmen Square issue referred to by the participant, Zimbabwe had consistently stood with China since the 1949 proclamation of a new People's Republic of China, which had resulted in China facing isolation from the Western world and their allies (Chun, 2014; Mano, 2016; Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). World powers instead recognised the Taipei-based Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, and placed an economic embargo on the People's Republic of China after its involvement in the Korean War (Shen, 2020; Fairbank et al., 1978; Zhang, 1998).

During the period of the One China Policy China began giving aid to other developing countries in an attempt to build alliances and isolate Taiwan (Kobayashi,

2008). This continued after the 1955 Bandung conference, when China intensified its bid for diplomatic recognition using aid to the decolonised sub-Saharan Africa (Dreher et al., 2017). Zimbabwe was at the time still under British colonial rule, but the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a black indigenous political party was also being formed to fight for liberation (Mlambo, 2014). China quickly moved to support this movement with arms and military training (Hodzi et al., 2012a). When then-President Mugabe supported China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, he was basing his actions on this relationship and on the knowledge that China rewards its allies.

6.3.2. China giving aid to Zimbabwe to maintain historical relations

One participant asserted that China is giving aid to Zimbabwe because of the two countries' long-standing relationship that started before Zimbabwe's independence:


There are various reasons why China is giving aid to Zimbabwe, the first being ideological in a sense that the relationship of China and ZANU PF goes back to the 60s when the Chinese supported ZANLA guerrillas with artillery, military strategies, and so on, so that they could prosecute the bush war. So that relationship has grown from that time and has evolved and up to where we are today.

(Interview with MT3: Transcript Number 10)

This relationship has grown to the extent that Zimbabwe now votes with China even on matters of little or no significance to Zimbabwe. For example, in 2017 Zimbabwe emerged as the only African country to vote against a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on Myanmar's persecution of Rohingya Muslims. Interestingly, China also voted against the resolution (Shaban, 2017). This may to some extent explain the influx of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe: China is rewarding Zimbabwe for its voting behaviour. Figure 6.2 indicates that a spike in Chinese aid

after a vote suggests that China may have increased its aid to countries that voted with it (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019).

Figure 6.2: Number of Chinese aid recipients over time



Source: Fuchs and Rudyak (2019)

Chinese leaders have on different occasions admitted openly that they have used aid to obtain votes at the United Nations General Assembly, and that countries that agree with the One China Policy are friends of China (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019). Zimbabwe subscribes to the policy and stood with China on the Tiananmen issue and many other issues where China needed international support, as suggested by one of the participants:


If you were to look at the voting patterns of Zimbabwe in the United Nations Security Council, it has always been aligned to China, and [in] very few instances to Western countries. So, I think China is trying to maintain that relationship. Zimbabwe might not be an equal partner to China – remember, Zimbabwe’s GDP is far less than that of Shanghai alone – but its relations are worth maintaining when it comes to global influence and voting at the UN Security Council.

(Interview with Zep2: Transcript Number 12)

Literature on China-Africa relations propose that China is desperate to foster relationships with African nations to raise its international influence (Hanauer and Morris, 2014; Thompson, 2005; Sautman and Hairong, 2007; Dreher et al., 2019; Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). Hanauer and Morris (2014) corroborate participant Zep2's views, arguing that China maintains relationships with African countries that account for more than 25% of the United Nations member states, and they represent a significant voting bloc in the UN Security Council.

In 2012, after the signing of a US\$180 million aid agreement with China, the then-Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joice Mujuru, reiterated that Zimbabwe adhered to the One China Policy (Chun, 2014). The timing and the occasion of the announcement cannot be overemphasised, as the Zimbabwean authorities were conscious of China's need for legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that Zimbabwe only started to receive official aid from China after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Prior to that, China had been giving aid to rebels who were fighting for liberation and had no relationship with the colonial regime (Alao, 2014). Figure 6.3 shows the year in which each country started receiving aid projects from China by decade.

Figure 6.3 1: First Chinese-funded projects by country and decade



Source: *Fuchs and Rudyak (2019)*

When giving non-humanitarian aid, China considers the recipient country's stance on the One China Policy, as it did in 1993, after China rewarded countries that rejected Taiwan's attempt to re-enter the United Nations with increased aid (Lin, 1996; Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019). In addition to canvassing for votes at international forums, China also gave aid to Zimbabwe, portraying itself as a responsible big brother who is always there to give a helping hand. One participant commented:

The Chinese want to give this picture that they are a friend of the downtrodden, a friend of the weak, and supposedly the weak that are being abused by the greater powers like the US – which is a way of taking their own battle with the USA to another level. So it is ideological in nature, and it is also symbolic in nature, to give the picture that those who would have been rejected by the West are free to come under our protection and our security, or [we can] provide what they require in terms of national development.

(Interview with ZU2: Transcript Number 24)

6.3.3. China giving to Zimbabwe in search of international legitimacy

Some of the participants who agreed that China was in search of international legitimacy went on to argue that the China-Zimbabwe aid relationship is a key diplomatic strategy on the part of China, where Zimbabwe provides China with a platform to operationalise its non-interference principle and thereby gain international political legitimacy. A participant from the MDC argued that China is emerging as a superpower, and that this status involves building alliances:

Another thing is how we see the global politics evolving. You will realise that the Chinese will also want to have their sort of “own empire” characterised by their non-interference policy, so Zimbabwe provides a perfect platform to showcase the effectiveness of that policy, as well as to be an ally that supports China in global politics.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 16)

Each time the possibility of a Chinese global hegemony is brought forward, the question of whether China will be a responsible global leader arises. This is a sign that China’s image in global eyes needs to be changed, and that China may be using aid to improve its image (Lin, 1996). China frames this motive as an attempt to promote friendly relations (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019). Either way, Chinese aid has been instrumental in increasing the collective voice of the leaders of developing countries as well as placing China as the leader of the global South (Ding, 2008; Bergamaschi et al., 2017). In that leadership role, China would also want to use aid to rally other developing countries to join in its cold war with the US. This especially evident in the case of Zimbabwe, to which China increased its aid after the US and other Western countries had sanctioned it (Sachikonye, 2019). Participants felt that China was giving aid to Zimbabwe to get back at the US:

I think China is giving aid to Zimbabwe to escalate their power war with America. Remember America has a military base in Botswana which covers the rest of Southern Africa, If China comes into Zimbabwe and build a military base as we are hearing, that will be a way of penetrating a region currently being dominated by America.

(Interview with LZ1: Transcript Number 17)

Reports that China was planning on building a military base in Zimbabwe began to surface soon after the military coup that removed former President Mugabe from office, with China being heavily linked to the coup (Rogers, 2017; Banerjee and Rich, 2017). Banerjee et al. (2017) linked the coup to the diamonds in Chiyadzwa, which Maguwu (2013) had previously linked to the US\$98 million Chinese aid used to build the Zimbabwe Defence College. Thus, participants in this study felt that there was a link between the coup and Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, and that the aid was intended to help China gain an edge over the US:

China is supporting Zimbabwe because they share the same enemy, which is America. Remember, Chinese aid and Chinese visibility in Zimbabwe increased after 2003 when the Zimbabwe was directly confronting America and looking for new friends.

(Interview with LZ2: Transcript Number 18)

In June 2020, the US national security advisor Robert O'Brien mentioned Zimbabwe together with China as American adversaries that were taking advantage of protests that had rocked America after the murder of George Floyd in police custody. This was an official acknowledgement by America that Zimbabwe and China were allies. In addition, the fact that Zimbabwe and China were mentioned together, regardless of Zimbabwe's size in the global body politic, suggests that China has a significant influence on Zimbabwe; the discussion in this chapter has shown that the influence is exercised using aid.

6.4. Zimbabwe's situation

If you are clever as a nation, you should be able to extract and unlock value from the relationship with China.... Most of the criticisms of the Chinese in Africa are initiated by their competitors from Europe and America. Africans are being used to do the bidding for them.- – Arthur Oliver Mutambara, Former Zimbabwe Deputy Prime Minister (Mapaure, 2014).

Zimbabwe has been facing economic and political challenges since the turn of the millennium, with the United States of America imposing sanctions against senior members of the Zimbabwean government and suspending government-to-government non-humanitarian aid (Grebe, 2010). This position was supported and adopted by other Western countries such as the UK, Germany, France, and Australia. The sanctions came against the backdrop of Zimbabwe's violent land grabs of the early 2000s, where white farmers were forcibly removed from farms that were then allocated to native black people (Chingono and Relations, 2010).

The Western countries accused Zimbabwe of abusing the rule of law, abusing human rights, and engaging in political violence targeted at white farmers and members of the opposition party (Helliker et al., 2021). The land-reform exercise came at a time when a new political party had just been formed, posing the toughest challenge to the ruling party since Zimbabwe had obtained independence in the early 1980s. The exercise had the support of white farmers, and in response the government unleashed violence on the farmers and opposition supporters, attracting sanctions from the West (Grebe, 2010).

Responding to the sanctions, in 2003 the Zimbabwean government crafted its Look East Policy, which sought to engage with countries from the East such as China, Japan, India, and Malaysia to fill the gap that had been left by the Western countries (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018). The immediate result of the Look East Policy was the rejuvenation of Sino-Zimbabwean relations (Mudavanhu, 2014). Some participants in

this study expressed that China was giving aid to Zimbabwe because Zimbabwe was deliberately seeking to attract such aid to meet its political and economic needs.

6.4. 1. Zimbabwe's economic needs

After the falling out between Zimbabwe and the West, government-to-government aid was stopped, and FDI into Zimbabwe and trade between Zimbabwe and the West both declined. Domestically, the financial sector collapsed, with inflation reaching six digits in 2008 (Kararach and Otieno, 2016), leaving Zimbabwe desperate for a financial bailout:

I may be wrong, but I think China is acting like a big brother looking after a brother in need. Well, China is benefiting through resources and other things, but we cannot rule out the fact that Zimbabwe needs external funding and has been begging China for help. So, China is just looking after a friend, and whether they benefit from it or not is another thing.

(Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1)

The view that China was supporting a friend in need was echoed by former President Mugabe during the China-Africa summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2015. Mugabe, referring to Chinese President Xi Jinping, said, "He is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to do, we will say he is a God-sent person" (Asante, 2018).

Other participants emphasised that Zimbabwe's need for external funding in the form of both loans and grants was one of the factors pulling Chinese aid to Zimbabwe:

The main driver of the aid, especially loans, is Zimbabwe's appetite for external funding. We have not been receiving loans from traditional donors and have turned all our efforts to China. There is a need for the aid in Zimbabwe, and China is coming in handy.

(Interview with MF2: Transcript Number 2)

Some participants blamed Zimbabwe's desperation for what they called abuse by China. Their argument was that Zimbabwe is ignoring local laws to accommodate the Chinese in a frantic bid to get Chinese funding at all costs:

Our slit-eyed friends are taking advantage of the incompetence of this regime. The government is hunting for foreign currency to the extent of even selling off the country to the first bidder. All the laws are relaxed, especially labour laws, when it comes to the Chinese. Their projects do not go to tender, and they are tax-exempted, which makes them feel superior – explaining all the problems we have with them.

(Interview with MD2: Transcript Number 15)

Zimbabwe has comprehensive laws to deal with any local or foreign investment, but application of these laws is lax and in most cases selective (Mapaure, 2014). The literature argues that the Chinese see the standard of Zimbabwe's laws to be too high and rigid, and often assert that, in contrast, Chinese laws are flexible and allow innovation (IWAAS, 2012). The Zimbabwean authorities seem to ignore the country's laws when dealing with the Chinese. It is also important to note that the Chinese usually establish joint ventures with the Zimbabwean army, and there are allegations that the deals are marred with kickbacks and corruption (Mapaure, 2014). Zimbabwe has failed to combat corruption involving the Chinese; some participants felt that this was not due to lack of capacity, but instead was a deliberate ploy by the Zimbabwean government to attract more Chinese financing (Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 16). This was highlighted in 2012, when a Chinese company called Tianze was exempted from abiding by the Zimbabwe Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33), which mandated that all foreign-owned companies with an annual turnover of US\$500000 or more must cede 51% of their ownership to Zimbabweans (specifically, black Zimbabweans). The then-Minister of Indigenisation explained why Tianze was exempted: "We allowed Tianze to retain 100% ownership because they

have brought in millions of dollars and are employing our small-scale farmers through sub-contract” (Mapaure, 2014:18). What can be drawn from this statement is that whatever China is doing in Zimbabwe has the blessing of the Zimbabwean authorities; this, in turn, dispels the argument that Chinese aid is predatory. Zimbabwe is an active player in Sino-Zimbabwean relations; hence the use of the term “all-weather friends”.

6.4.2. Zimbabwe’s political interests

From a political point of view, Zimbabwe has been battling for legitimacy both globally and domestically. The falling out with the West and allegations of human-rights abuses have placed Zimbabwe under a spotlight, especially with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This has left Zimbabwe with no option but to seek for new alliances that can vote with them in the UNGA. Whilst Zimbabwe could get that support from other African countries, there was need to be in alliance with a superpower that can shield Zimbabwe from what it calls international bullies (in other words, the US and its allies). Addressing the UNGA in 2017, then-President Mugabe responded to Donald Trump’s speech:

Some of us were embarrassed, if not frightened, by what appeared to be the return of the biblical Goliath. Are we having a return of Goliath to our midst, who threatens the extinction of other others? May I say to Mr Trump, please blow your trumpet. Blow your trumpet in a musical way towards the values of unity, peace, cooperation, togetherness, dialog, which we have always stood for (The Independent, Saturday 23 September 2017).

Mugabe’s remarks underscored Zimbabwe’s stance on the West’s interference and provided a context for Zimbabwe’s efforts through the Look East Policy to engage with China. Commenting on Sino-Zimbabwean relations, Mugabe said, “We have turned east, where the sun rises, and turned our back to the west, where the sun sets” (Chun, 2014). This statement shows a deliberate policy stance by Zimbabwe to shun the West and concentrate on China. In China Zimbabwe saw an ally that could protect it

from the West and, given the bad blood between China and the US, Zimbabwe was in a way spiting the West by engaging with China:

I think China is simply responding to a friendly invite by Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has been on the offensive courting superpowers like China, Russia, and India among other non-Western countries to infuriate the US and its allies. Therefore, China being an enemy of the West, they are using aid to show solidarity with Zimbabwe.

(Interview with LZ1: Transcript Number 17)

Just like China, Zimbabwe is being guided by their geopolitical strategy. They also need voting allies in the United Nations security Council. Both China and Zimbabwe have been voting with each other from as far back as the 80s and for as long as that voting pattern continues, the aid will continue pouring in.

(Interview with MT2: Transcript Number 5)

Chinese aid is targeted mainly on the security sector and some of the equipment donated by China is being used to silence dissenting voices. There is need for the junta government to silence opposition after the coup and China being a close ally has been donating equipment and specialised training.

(Interview with LZ3: Transcript Number 19)

The participants' remarks point to a conscious ploy by the Zimbabwean government to accommodate China and suggest that whatever interests China may have in Zimbabwe are being overshadowed by Zimbabwe's strong desire for a positive relationship with China. Whether Zimbabwe is reaping any rewards from the engagements is up for debate, but what is clear is that the authorities in Harare rate Beijing highly and are keen to maintain the relationship as it is.

6.4.3 Zimbabwe's social needs

The economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 has caused a deterioration of social life, with the health and education sectors being the most affected. Participants in this study expressed that one of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is the need to address Zimbabwe's social issues, especially an ailing health system:

I will talk about aid in the health sector. I think the aid is coming to address a dire situation. Doctors and nurses are constantly striking and there is a huge medication shortage. So, the Chinese are coming in to assist. I [wish] they would stay in the health sector and not go to the other sectors, where they are causing havoc.

(Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14)

This participant's view is supported by media reports that in 2020, China opened a Chinese medicine centre in Zimbabwe that provides an inexpensive alternative to Western medicines, as most of the medicines are donated (Xinhua, 2020). The Chinese have donated PPE and ventilators as well as seconding doctors to fight COVID-19 in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had also received more than 3 million doses of Chinese vaccines by the end of 2020 (Analytica, 2021).

Participants also argued that the need to improve Zimbabwe's service delivery was another pull factor that was attracting Chinese aid to Zimbabwe:

Some of the aid is need-based. There is serious need for assistance in every aspect of our lives. Nothing is really working; we have been turned into a basket case. Look at the service delivery – even garbage trucks are now coming from China. Even the plastic bins, everything is Chinese. The situation under ZANU PF is a sorry situation, hence the assistance from others.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 26)

Some participants disputed the view that Chinese aid was assisting Zimbabwe in improving service delivery, asserting instead that the aid was in fact being used to destroy people's property. This argument is driven by the fact that in 2005 the government used Chinese-donated graders to destroy houses that were illegally built and shops that were unlicensed (Musoni, 2010). However, AidData, a research lab based at William and Mary Global Research Institute, shows that China has been extending loans to the Harare City Council and donating equipment such as garbage cars, bins, and protective wear (AidData, 2020).

6.5. Chapter Conclusion

The Sino-Zimbabwe engagements are a microcosm of China's behaviour in the global South. Although the general perception is that Chinese aid is driven solely by China's economic and political endeavours, this chapter has argued that Zimbabwe's own interests play a much bigger role in attracting Chinese aid and enabling China to use the aid to advance its own goals. The dimension of participants' arguments, supported by literature and content analysis, has shown a picture of two players that are willing participants and are achieving their individual goals in a union that, while unequal, is acceptable to both parties. The chapter has argued that Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is driven by both push and pull factors, with the push factors dominated by China's need to extract natural resources, access markets for its products, provide employment for Chinese nationals, improve Chinese trade relations, and market its loans. On the political front the chapter identified China's quest for political legitimacy, need for voting allies in international forums, need to maintain historical ties, and need for allies in its cold war with the US as the main political push drivers to Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. The pull factors include Zimbabwe's appetite for external funding, need for a protector against "global bullies", need to suppress domestic dissent, and need to spite the West, as well as social needs such as improving the health system and service delivery. The chapter concludes by presenting the initial components of the theory evolving from this study, which argues that China's conduct in host countries is enabled by the interests and characteristics of the host nation. The theory will be developed further in the next chapter, which presents participants' views on the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and the perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESULTS ANALYSIS (II): THE NATURE OF CHINESE AID TO ZIMBABWE

What, how much, and where?

7.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses findings from participants' views, supported by documentary analysis and secondary data, on the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. I use a qualitative analysis strategy and adopt an analytical approach given in the Straussian school of grounded theory. The purpose of this study was to develop a theoretical framework that explains the Sino-Zimbabwean aid relationship specifically, and China's aid engagements in the global South in general. The study explored the drivers and the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, as well as the perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding the aid. The emergent framework proposes that the geopolitical strategy in the host country creates an environment conducive for China to advance its geopolitical and geoeconomics interests. The theory argues that China's aid approach in the global South may be rogue, but it is not predatory. Whilst China has self-interests, the extent to which the self-interests shape the allocation of aid depends on the host country's domestic and international strategies.

The main themes covered in this chapter are (i) The nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, (ii) economic sectors targeted by Chinese aid in Zimbabwe, (iii) conditions attached to Chinese aid in Zimbabwe, and (iv) Zimbabweans' perceptions regarding Chinese aid. These main themes are subdivided into sub-themes as shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Themes discussed in Chapter 7 and endorsement of main categories (N=25)

Main theme	Sub-themes	Facts from documents/quotes from participants	Number of participants
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			endorsing the theme
Nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe	Concessional loans	Zimbabwe received approximately US\$5.9 billion in concessional loans from China in 2010-2019 (<i>Table 7.4</i>).	23
	Zero-interest loans	China extended US\$471.7 billion [?] to Zimbabwe in zero-interest loans in 2010-2019 (<i>Table 7.5</i>).	20
	Grants and donations	Zimbabwe received US\$406.84 billion [?] in grants and donations from China in 2010-2020 (<i>Table 7.6</i>).	25
	Scholarships and exchange programs	We see the children and relatives of the ruling elite being awarded Chinese scholarships to go and study in China. We also have seen Chinese doctors coming here through an exchange program, which is a form of aid because the Chinese regard that as aid (<i>Interview with ZD1: Transcript Number 20</i>).	19
Economic sectors targeted by Chinese aid in Zimbabwe	Agriculture sector	18% and 10% of Chinese grants and donations and loans to Zimbabwe, respectively, went to the agriculture sector in 2010-2019 (<i>Figures 7.2 and 7.3</i>).	18
	Security/military sector	40% of Chinese grants and donations to Zimbabwe went to the Security sector in 2010-2019 (<i>Figure 7.2</i>).	24
	Health sector	9% and 5% of Chinese grants and donations and loans to Zimbabwe, respectively, went to the health sector in 2010-2019 (<i>Figures 7.2 and 7.3</i>).	22
	Education and sports sector	12% of Chinese grants and donations to Zimbabwe went to the education and sports sector in 2010-2019 (<i>Figure 7.2</i>).	18
	Energy sector	3% and 27% of Chinese grants and donations and loans to Zimbabwe, respectively, went towards the energy sector in 2010-2019 (<i>Figures 7.2 and 7.3</i>).	22
	Government	8% of Chinese grants and donations to Zimbabwe in 2010-2019 went to the agriculture sector (<i>Figure 7.2</i>).	25
	Multi-sector	10% of Chinese grants and donations to Zimbabwe in 2010-2019 were recorded as multi-sector (<i>Figure 7.2</i>).	16
	Diplomatic conditionality	One of the main conditions attached to Chinese aid is that Zimbabwe subscribe to the One China Policy. We must continue to be in solidarity with China (<i>Interview with ZU3: Transcript Number 25</i>).	19

Conditions attached to Chinese aid	Entrenched conditionality	Chinese aid has economic conditions attached to it, and the conditions are there to advance China's economic interest. The main condition is what I would call the "buy China clause", where all the equipment should come from China. The project contractor should be Chinese and should bring a Chinese workforce. This is different from Western aid, where selection of a project constructor goes to tender. So, the Chinese will make sure that they also benefit directly from the aid (<i>Interview with Zep1: Transcript Number 11</i>).	22
	Implicit conditionality	When it comes loans, there is a condition that Zimbabwe must not default on current loans before accessing new financing (<i>Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1</i>).	24
Zimbabweans' perceptions regarding Chinese aid	China after Zimbabwe's mineral resources	If you look at the default clause inserted in most of the loan agreements, it states that in the event of a default, Zimbabwe must cede a certain amount of minerals like platinum or diamonds. So, to me, they are looking at our minerals, and that is a view held by most of the people I interact with (<i>Interview with DO1: Transcript Number 4</i>).	23
	China advancing a neo-colonial approach	I will comment [on] people's views from an economic perspective: people feel that China is using aid in Zimbabwe to propagate a neo-colonial agenda where we are exporting cheap raw materials and importing expensive finished goods from China (<i>Interview with LZ3: Transcript Number 19</i>).	18
	Aid encourages corruption	When people see the Chinese, all they see is corruption all over, and they are justified because Chinese projects do not go to tender, and we have been hearing reports of people receiving brown envelopes to approve some of these deals. There is high-level corruption associated with these deals. (<i>Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14</i>).	19
	China has a big-brother mentality	The Chinese are treating their workers badly because they think they are superior. They look down upon us and I think that is the same mentality that their leaders have. It is not a relationship of equals (<i>Interview with Zep3: Transcript Number 13</i>).	17
	Stifling democracy	China's support for ZANU PF is a challenge because the aid is not helping ordinary citizens; instead, it's cementing ZANU PF's grip [on] power. The aid is being used to rig elections. ZANU PF is the distributing agent of the aid, and they use it to buy votes (<i>Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 14</i>).	15

7.2 The nature of the aid to Zimbabwe (What?)

The global aid architecture consists of two different kinds of aid flows: "official development assistance" (ODA) and "other official flows" (Bräutigam, 2011b). For funding to be regarded as aid, according to the definition of aid agreed to by the

members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1972, it must be concessional in nature or must have a reasonable and genuine subsidy (Thérien, 2002). If aid is extended with loan elements, the grant element should be at least 25% at a 10% discount rate (Manning, 2013); in other words, the extended loan's present value should be at least 25% less than the present value of a comparable loan extended at the prevailing market rates (Radelet, 2006). Thus, if a loan has a 10% interest rate, the grant element will be zero, and an absolute grant carries a 100% grant element; all other loans have a grant element between zero and 100%. The other official flows include all loans that are neither regarded as concessional nor have a grant element below the 25% threshold (Klein et al., 2014).

Participants in this study expressed that Zimbabwe receives aid from bilateral and multilateral donors and that the nature of the aid is determined by the relations between Zimbabwe and the donor. Aid from multilateral institutions and Western bilateral donors comes mainly in the form of grants and donations distributed through non-governmental organisations; in contrast, aid from the East comes in the form of loans, grants, and donations channelled through the government. This was stressed mainly by participants from government departments:

We receive aid from all over the world, even though some of the aid, especially from Western donors, does not pass-through government coffers, but comes through NGOs or directly to the beneficiaries. This is because of our relations with the West: they do not trust us when it comes to the distribution of the aid. But, when you look at Asian donors like Japan, China, and India, for example, the aid comes directly to the government.

(Interview with MF3: Transcript number 3)

Currently, Zimbabwe receives aid mainly in the form of grants and donations because we have not been getting loans from the IMF and the World Bank due to defaults and strained relations with the USA and its allies. Only China and, to some extent, India are providing loans. But with the West, it is strictly granting and donations. I can give you an example of when the US embassy donated food items to Tokwe Mukosi flood victims, the government was not involved, it

was the embassy going to the communities directly with the help of the civic society. I, however, have problems with the distribution channels used by these Western donors because their aid comes through non-governmental organisations and the government cannot budget for it. If you look at the Tokwe Mukosi flood victims' case that I gave you, China donated clothes and grain through the government and it was easy to manage, but the US and the UK donated through the civic society and NGOs, which made it difficult for the government to account for the aid.

(Interview with DO2: Transcript number 5)

Aid is coming in the form of loans and grants with the loans determined by Zimbabwe's relationship with the lending institution. You may recall that Zimbabwe is not in good books with the West and as such, the West no-longer give loans to Zimbabwe, however, given the good relations with China, the government has opened new lines of credit with the Chinese and the Afreximbank. So yes, we receive loans from China but from the West it is only grants and donations.

(Interview with DO4: Transcript number 7)

Zimbabwe has not been receiving loans from the West since the 2000s after Zimbabwe was placed under targeted economic sanctions by the US, the UK and the European Union (Moyo and Tsakata Mafuso, 2017). The sanctions were extended against the Zimbabwean government because of human- and property-rights abuses after Zimbabwe undertook a fast-track land redistribution program that saw indigenous Zimbabweans violently displace white farmers (Hellum and Derman, 2004). Even before the sanctions, Zimbabwe had struggled to repay loans from both bilateral and multilateral creditors, including the Paris Club and the Bretton Woods institutions (Mazorodze, 2020). Data from the Ministry of Finance shows Zimbabwe's debt from Western bilateral and multilateral development partners (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Zimbabwe's external debt as at the end of 2018 (US\$ million)

	Central government debt	Guaranteed debt		

	2017 DOD	2018 DOD	2017 Arrears	2018 Arrears	2017 DOD	2018 DOD	2017 Arrears	2018 Arrears	2017 Grand total	2018 Grand total
Total external debt	1,955	1,702	4,135	4,607	135	49	1,264	1,299	7,489	7,658
Bilateral creditors	1,182	1,380	2,432	2,532	68	49	753	770	4,435	4,732
Paris Club	165	179	2,255	2,255	48	38	733	741	3,201	3,263
Non-Paris Club	1,017	1,202	177	227	20	12	20	29	1,234	1,469
Multilateral creditors	344	322	1,642	1,712	67	0	511	529	2,564	2,563
World Bank	251	226	920	967	0	0	282	291	1,453	1,483
African Development Bank	33	35	560	570	0	0	80	81	673	687
European Investment Bank	23	20	135	144	0	0	150	158	307	322
Others	37	41	27	31	67	0	0	0	131	72
RBZ assumed debt	429	0	61	363	0	0	0	0	490	343

Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance (2019 National Budget Statement)

NOTE: DOD = Debt Outstanding (not in arrears)

RBZ = Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Of the US\$7.7 billion total debt (61% bilateral debt) as at the end of 2018, US\$5.9 billion [?] was default penalties (MoFED, 2019). Zimbabwe remains in default on Western debt (Table 7.1), but continues to acquire new debt from China, the Afreximbank, and other non-Western countries (Jones et al., 2011). In 2011, the then-Minister of Finance Tendai Biti, after being questioned in parliament about external debt repayments, said, “A country like Zimbabwe does not have the capacity of repaying those interests. It does not have the capacity of paying such amounts” (Saungweme and Odhiambo, 2018).

These remarks indicate Zimbabwe's stance towards Western debt, which would naturally put the country on the spot with creditors. Even with strained relations due to the sanctions and Zimbabwe's failure to repay loans, with the total external debt (principal plus interest arrears) reaching US\$7.7 billion (Table 7.2), Zimbabwe still receives more aid from the West in the form of grants than from the East (Table 7.3).

Participants underscored this:

The Sino-Zimbabwe relationship is more of a diplomatic relationship, with very little to show for in terms of economic ties, especially from a Zimbabwean side of view. Our government is always praising the Chinese, but we receive more donations from the US compared to China. Apart from the loans, Chinese donations are very minimal and are targeted at areas where China seeks to benefit.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript number 16)

Chinese aid is difficult to quantify because most of it comes as goods and services, but using government figures, I would say most of the aid we receive comes from the West. It is Western aid that reaches the people because it comes directly to the people, unlike Chinese aid, which is abused by politicians and is distributed on partisan grounds.

(Interview with LZ3: Transcript number 19)

When it comes to Zimbabwe, aid is more of a political tool, especially when you consider how and from where the aid is supplied. The bigger chunk of the aid comes from bilateral donors like America, Britain, China, and the European Union. Only China still donates through the government, and Chinese loans go into infrastructure projects. Whereas aid from the other donors is channelled outside government departments and targets social sectors. Therefore, you see Western aid being more popular with the people because they see it. It is not easy to separate Chinese aid and aid from our politicians because when China donates, say, rice, it is the politicians who distribute it and sometimes they do not disclose the source of the rice to the people, and in the end, people will credit the politicians. But with American aid, the people will know that this aid is from the Americans.

(Interview with ZU3 Transcript number 25)

One participant's view that more aid comes from bilateral donors than multilateral donors is supported by data in various budget publications (2015-2020) by

the government of Zimbabwe showing that Zimbabwe has received most of its bilateral aid from the US (US\$1.3 billion), the UK (US\$723 million), and the European Union (US\$245 million) between 2014 and 2020 (Table 7.3). During the same period, Zimbabwe received most of its multilateral aid from the Global Fund, the World Bank, and the AfDB (Table 7.3)

Table 7.3: Bilateral and multilateral aid to Zimbabwe in US\$, 2014-2020


Bilateral partners							
Country	2014 (US\$)	2015 (US\$)	2016 (US\$)	2017 (US\$)	2018 (US\$)	2019 (US\$)	2020 (Projected)
US	143,287,098	136,243,972	187,987,094	165,945,000	192,825,861	252,722,653	253,827,231
UK	77,240,980	93,268,653	68,332,637	144,990,000	113,224,800	83,460,375	112,992,500
EU	32,768,000	41,086,243	24,480,746	36,363,467	51,547,211	59,731,595	72,947,916
Sweden	21,872,890	26,980,000	16,350,739	32,979,000	35,983,667	28,050,000	10,590,000
China	46,724,908	37,786,000	62,955,096	53,382,701	31,900,000	3,881,500	46,211,500
Japan	12,786,980	15,672,000	11,049,973	10,144,984	17,201,545	14,293,496	11,274,953
Australia	8,265,926	12,256,876	5,016,201	4,945,000	3,607,299	4,250,600	5,274,240
Switzerland	6,265,780	7,980,271	5,721,710	7,129,000	7,732,285	6,425,180	8,515,140
Sub-Total	349,212,562	371,274,013	381,894,196	455,879,152	454,022,668	452,614,799	520,499,902
Multilateral partners							
Global Fund	96,908,770	102,564,879	139,315,405	192,841,795	157,919,891	88,684,303	116,728,288
World Bank	27,456,900	28,987,220	29,618,382	32,741,715	28,416,182	24,650,000	26,600,000
AfDB	4,928,900	7,928,352	2,720,000	6,600,000	14,864,000	21,401,088	3,412,133
UNICEF	7,787,090	8,876,200	7,553,648	8,000,000	8,849,553	8,810,587	7,809,000
UNDP	3,902,873	4,287,900	4,079,116	5,163,000	2,977,207	3,788,439	3,054,000
WHO	1,980,221	2,897,220	1,916,957	2,603,500	3,556,711	9,400,461	6,738,342
UNFPA	3,280,000	2,097,263	1,720,409	2,400,000	3,162,106	2,733,164	3,780,249
IFAD	5,9287,341	4,237,213	3,526,271	5,362,712	3,463,397	712,639	6,436,751
FAO	674,090	753,870	613,242	593,000	559,024	732,782	644,000
ILO	398,785	450,000	527,000	507,000	258,619	329,760	1,050,00

ITU	167,230	280,740	149,166	221,170	198,456	62,000	763,425
UNESCO	60,360	38,980	40,030	32,000	38,211	58,670	87,653
IAEA	420,125	345,980	268,298	427,100	436,273	526,172	537,766
Sub-Total	155,483,485	159,261,270	192,092,901	257,492,992	224,899,630	161,890,065	169,207,244
Grand-Total	504,696,047	530,535,283	573,987,097	713,372,144	678,922,298	614,514,429	689,707,146

Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance (2015-2020 National Budget Statements)

Both bilateral and multilateral aid were provided through the Programmatic Multi-Donor Trust Fund, administered through the AfDB; the Analytical Multi-Donor Trust and the Results-Based Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank; and the Health and Education Transition Funds and the Child Protection Fund, managed by UNICEF (MoFED, 2020). Much of the aid (25%) supported the health sector, with the social-services, capacity-building, and energy sectors receiving 10%,10%, and 13% respectively. The rest went to water and sanitation, humanitarian, governance, education, and transport sectors (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1: Sectoral disbursements of development-partner support, 2014-2020



Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance (2015-2020 National Budget Statements)

Most of the participants mentioned humanitarian assistance as the sector where development partners' aid to Zimbabwe is more visible. One linked this to the natural disasters that Zimbabwe has experienced in recent years:

I have seen most of the aid in the humanitarian, or rather, social sectors. We have experienced several disasters of late, like the cyclone Idai, Tokwe Mukosi floods, Binga floods, and the 2018 drought, to mention a few. And in all these challenges, we have seen a lot of help coming from all over the world to assist victims of the disasters. So, in my view most of the aid goes to assisting vulnerable people or disaster victims.

(Interview with ZD3: Transcript number 22)

The aid is targeted towards food security, mainly. A lot of our people are living below the poverty datum line; if I am to be specific, they are surviving with less than US\$1 a day. So, NGOs have come in handy in assisting these people, especially those in rural and peri-urban communities. The question that comes out is, where [do] the NGOs get the money that they use to help people? The money comes from Western donors as aid. So, for me, most of the aid goes to humanitarian assistance. Of course, we see aid in other sectors like transport, infrastructure, health, and education, especially Chinese aid, but overall, most of the aid targets the poor who are susceptible.

(Interview with Zep2: Transcript number 12)

The participants' views corroborate the figures from the Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance reporting that between 2015 and 2020, 25% of the aid received by Zimbabwe went towards the humanitarian sector, with the rest going to other sectors like governance (13%), capacity-building (11%), social services (10%), and education (10%), among other sectors (Figure 7.1). Participants mainly from civil society and political parties questioned the government's figures, arguing that the recording of aid data may not be accurate:

Some of the aid is used by politicians for vote buying. And when the aid is recorded, the government tends to understate the aid because they will have distributed the aid as coming from the politicians. This is especially true with Chinese aid that is channelled through the government.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript number 16).

The government does not have the capacity to record and account for all the aid we receive. Part of the aid does not reach the intended beneficiaries and is misused by our politicians for their personal gain, and they do not record it as aid from donors but as personal donations.

(Interview with ZU1: Transcript number 23)

Politicians' use of aid for political mileage was refuted by participants from the Ministry of Finance in follow-up interviews. MF1 argued that senior government positions are held by politicians who assist in aid distribution not as politicians but as government officials. However, MD3's and ZU1's comments are supported by an incident where, when announcing the 2020 National Budget, Zimbabwe Minister of Finance Professor Mthuli Ncube reported that China had given Zimbabwe US\$3.9 million of aid in 2019, against US\$252.7 million given by the US in the same year (Table 7.3). Both the US and China responded by accusing the Minister of understating their aid figures by US\$77 million and US\$133 million, respectively. The Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance attributed the disparity in the US aid figures to an accounting error, but asserted the need to establish a common accounting position with China (Zhang, 2020). The difference could, as mentioned by ZU1, be the failure by the Zimbabwean government to account for all the aid received, or, as was reported by MD3, the use of aid by politicians for personal gain and failing to record it as aid.

Another possible reason for this disparity could be the opaqueness of Chinese aid and/or a difference in the definition of aid between China and Zimbabwe (Nyabiage, 2020). The figure announced by Zimbabwe did not include forms of financial support such as the cost of receiving expert help from China and donations given directly to local groups by the Chinese embassy (Nyabiage, 2020). The misunderstanding emanated from the fact that China has a five-year development plan for Zimbabwe where they agree on the money available for aid. Zimbabwe will then

submit development project proposals through the Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe and the project will be funded from the agreed fund; the Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance will capture the aid accordingly. Where China donates outside the agreed fund, it is difficult for Zimbabwe to capture correct figures if there is no reconciliation. It is from this background that the Minister of Finance in Zimbabwe requested figure reconciliation with Chinese authorities.

China's going-out strategy actively adds to the confusion on what the host nation will have to record as aid, because Chinese agencies are urged to "combine aid with investments, trade and export, labour cooperation and service contracts" (Piao, 2006). The intention is to increase the feasibility of the Chinese projects and make them attractive to the host country, but this also makes it difficult to capture the aid component of the package as a whole (Sun, 2014).

7.3. The nature and quantity of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe

Several participants discussed the nature of China's aid to Zimbabwe. Their views were supported by data from AidData, which shows that China's financial aid to Zimbabwe consists of the equivalence of ODA through grants, zero-interest loans, and concessional loans (Tables 7.6, 7.5, and 7.4). Contrary to Brautigam (2013), as quoted by Chun (2014), who asserted that China is not interested in giving aid to Zimbabwe, data from the Ministry of Finance (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) and AidData (Table 7.4), supported by the accounts of participants in this study, show that China gives aid to Zimbabwe, and that the aid is extended as loans and either grants or donations. The loans are both non-concessional and concessional, with a grant element averaging 27% to 30%, a tenor of more than 15 years and a five- to seven-year grace period on average (Table 7.4).

7.3.1. Concessional loans

Data compiled by AidData shows that Zimbabwe received more than US\$5.5 billion in concessional loans from China between 2010 and 2019 (Table 7.4). The loans had an average maturity period of 20 years with 2% interest, an average grace period of five years, and an average grant element of 40% (Table 7.4). Most of these loans were extended through the Export-Import Bank of China.

Table 7.4: Concessional loans extended to Zimbabwe by China, 2010-2019

Lending institution	Purpose of the loan	Targeted sector	Year	Amount (US\$)	Interest rate (%)	Maturity period	Grace period	Grant element (%)
Export-Import Bank of China	Agricultural support facility	Agriculture	2010	200m	3	25	5	30
Export-Import Bank of China	Refurbishment of telecom infrastructure	ICT	2011	45m	3	25	7	32
Export-Import Bank of China	Purchase of agriculture machinery	Agriculture	2012	342m	2	20	5	27
Export-Import Bank of China	Supply of medical equipment	Health	2012	99m	2	20	5	27
Export-Import Bank of China	Renovation of Harare City sewer	Water and sewer	2013	144m	2	25	5	30
Export-Import Bank of China	Expansion of Victoria Falls airport	Transport	2013	162m	2	20	7	28
Export-Import Bank of China	Retooling healthcare equipment	Health	2014	89m	2	20	5	27
Export-Import Bank of China	Telecom network upgrade	ICT	2014	218m	2	25	6	31
Export-Import Bank of China	Retooling healthcare equipment	Health	2014	89m	2	20	5	27
Export-Import Bank of China	Kariba South expansion	Energy	2015	320m	2	25	5	31

Export-Import Bank of China	Rehabilitation of Hwange Power Station	Energy	2015	1 200m	2	30	7	34
Export-Import Bank of China	Expansion of Harare International Airport (now Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport)	Transport	2016	153m	2	20	6	28
Export-Import Bank of China	Beitbridge-Harare Road dualization	Transport	2017	1 300m	2	30	7	34
Export-Import Bank of China	Harare City water sanitation	Water and sewer	2018	868m	2	25	7	32
Export-Import Bank of China	Net One upgrade	ICT	2019	350m	2	20	7	28
Export-Import Bank of China	Hwange 7 and 8 expansions	Energy	2019	350m	2	20	7	28
Total Loans				5 929.5m				

Source: AidData (2020)

The results of this study support Brautigum's (2006) claims that China uses concessional loans to fund only large projects; that is, those costing a minimum of \$2.4 million. All the concessional loans recorded by AidData were above this threshold. Participants highlighted that Zimbabwe receives both concessional and non-concessional loans from China. Participant MF3 explained the nature of the aid:

Basically, what I can say is [that] we have received various loans from the Chinese government, and we have two windows where we draw the loans from: they are either concessional or non-concessional loans. By concessional, it means the loans have got better terms; it is the soft window that is a bit cheaper for the government. If we look at it in terms of the features of the loans, usually the interest is as low as 2%, which is way lower than the 6% we can borrow [at] domestically. The grace period can be stretched to even five years, then the maturity period can go to as much as 40 years.

(Interview with MF3: Transcript number 3)

The 2% interest referred to by the participant is a sign of improved Sino-Zimbabwe relations: in 2010, the Export-Import Bank of China restructured loans that were extended to Zimbabwe during Zimbabwe's crisis years of 2000-2008, reducing interest rates from 4% to 2% (Chun, 2014). Loan restructuring is another form of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, especially in the agricultural sector, where farmers find it difficult to repay the loans on time (Mukwereza, 2013). Even with the debts restructured, Zimbabwe has been struggling to repay Chinese debts, which are now in excess of US\$2 billion (Sachikonye, 2019). By mid-2018, Zimbabwe had arrears on Chinese loan interest repayments of more than US\$300 million, resulting in China being reluctant to advance more non-concessional loans to Zimbabwe (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 2019). One participant underscored Zimbabwe's troubles with repaying Chinese loans:

We are struggling to repay some of the debts. In October 2018 we had to cough up an off-budget amount of US\$180 million in loan repayments to stop the Chinese from shutting down the non-concessional loans route. Non-concessional loans are expensive, but at least they are given in cash so we can be flexible with them.

(Interview with DO1: Transcript number 4)

Participants considered that China extends concessional loans differently from non-concessional loans. Whereas non-concessional loans can come in the form of cash, concessional loans are mainly extended in the form of equipment or services. Cash payments give the Zimbabwean government some form of flexibility regarding how to use the money, and in some cases are used to finance budget activities (Chipaike et al., 2019). This suggests parallels with the official ODA, as accountability is not a condition. However, this promotes abuse of the aid resources, and corruption

is not controlled for, hence the government's capacity or ability to repay the loans becomes over-stretched.

The aid, however, is delivered with little or no financial transfer to Zimbabwe: 90% of the concessional loans and grants is spent on Chinese equipment and services. Aid that comes as equipment poses a disadvantage because it competes with the local industry, as all the equipment and technical assistance will come from China (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013). One participant said:

The aid or loans come as equipment. Take, for example, the Kariba South energy project. Ninety percent of that loan came as construction equipment, with the rest covering workforce and technical expertise. Aid that is extended for humanitarian purposes comes as food items like maize and wheat. We do not get to see the money; they will simply tell us the value of the items. And when it is a loan, we first sign the loan agreement, and they will deliver equipment equivalent to that agreement.

(Interview with MT3: Transcript number 10)

When a loan for a project is approved, the Chinese government, through its Ministry of Finance and Commerce, signs a framework agreement and forwards it to Export-Import Bank of China. The Zimbabwean government then submits a request to the Export-Import Bank of China (Brautigam and Hwang, 2016). After completion of the project, the Chinese contractor will forward its invoice through the Chinese government to the Export-Import Bank of China for payment (Chaponnière, 2009, Brautigam and Hwang, 2016). Zimbabwe then pays the principal amount of the loan and the interest directly to the Export-Import Bank of China.(Kärkkäinen, 2016; Brautigam and Hwang, 2016).

As China's way of hedging against sovereign risk, infrastructure development loans are structured on the "Angola model", where China gives inexpensive loans to countries endowed with natural resources. The resources are then used for securing

Chinese loans as collateral (Davies, 2010). In the case of Zimbabwe, when China extends a project loan, Zimbabwe does not receive the money directly; instead, a Chinese company is appointed by the Chinese government to do the construction of the project in Zimbabwe and be paid by the Export-Import Bank of China Bank. Zimbabwe will then offer another Chinese company specialising in mining the equity or mining licences to extract minerals in Zimbabwe (Chaponnière, 2009). Revenue from the mining venture will be used to, first, reimburse the mining company's investment in Zimbabwe, and then later repay the principal amount of the loan extended to Zimbabwe plus the interest (Chaponnière, 2009). The fact that Chinese concessional financing to Zimbabwe is tied to Chinese companies implies that the financing is targeted at creating opportunities for these companies. Although the approach helps Zimbabwe to avert the challenges posed by the country's high loan default risk, the method disadvantages Zimbabwean companies, as they will not be involved in the deal.

Despite these measures being designed to curb and limit corruption (Chaponnière, 2009), participants were of the view that Chinese aid engagements with Zimbabwe are marred by high-level corruption that encompasses government officials and politicians who are involved in the negotiations of the deals:

It is mainly the politicians and government officials directly linked to the Chinese who benefit from Chinese aid, because they are the ones who negotiate the aid in the first place. And when those companies come in, there is a lot of corruption that takes place, a lot of corruption at the highest level. When the Chinese come here, they apply for various permits and a lot of money changes hands with government officials. There are reports [that] a member of parliament demanded US\$10 million from the Chinese for a deal to be cut and for the investment to go through. Fortunately, they reported him, but many cases are not reported.

(Interview with MD2: Transcript number 15)

Whilst corruption is very difficult to substantiate, the participants' perceptions had been shaped by their experiences with other people or institutions as well as by the media and the interests of donors on the issue (Afro barometer, 2006). Thus, whilst their perceptions on corruption associated with Chinese aid might not be accurate (Andersson and Heywood, 2009), a study by (Olken, 2009) found a correlation between perceptions and actual corruption in Indonesia; the same could be the case in Zimbabwe, judging by media reports and reports by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. Media in Zimbabwe has linked Chinese aid, especially in the agricultural sector, with state corruption (Farineau, 2013a), and the Anti-Corruption Commission has arrested a few politicians on Chinese-associated corruption charges, although it should be noted that the commission has been accused of targeting government critics (Choruma, 2017).

7.3.2. Zero-interest loans

It is interesting to note also that China extends zero-interest loans to Zimbabwe, although like other concessional loans, these zero-interest loans are mainly extended as equipment or services (Table 7.5). Data from the Ministry of Finance between 2011 and 2019 shows that Zimbabwe received more than \$500 million in interest-free loans from China.

Table 7.5: Zero-interest loans from China to Zimbabwe, 2010-2019

Lending institution	Purpose of the loan	Amount	Year
China Development Bank	Construction of the defence college in Harare	100m	2011
China Development bank	Agricultural equipment and tools	25m	2011
China Development Bank	Purchase fertiliser and agricultural equipment	200m	2012
China Development Bank	Steel production	20m	2012

China Tobacco Import & Export Corporation	Providing \$100m interest-free loans to Zimbabwean farmers	100m	2013
China Development Bank	Road construction in Mt Hampden	31.9m	2019
China Development Bank	Establishment of an airspace-management system at J.M. Nkomo International Airport	16.8m	2019
China Development Bank	Construction of Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport control tower	78m	2019

Source: Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance (2011-2020 National Budget Statements) and AidData (2020)

Participants also mentioned zero-interest loans, although they stressed that such loans are rare:

China also gives free-interest loans, especially in the agricultural sector for tobacco production. Another well-known zero-interest loan that we have received from China is that \$100 million that was used for the construction of the Defence College. The Chinese are on record claiming that it was a grant, but it in fact was a loan with no interest.

(Interview with DO1: Transcript number 4)

It is also interesting to note evidence of loans being extended by the Chinese private sector to Zimbabwe (Table 7.5). The China Tobacco Import & Export Corporation is a private association of Chinese companies dealing in tobacco manufacturing and trade that has extended loans totalling US\$100m to Zimbabwean farmers. This loan came to light because it was presented to the president of Zimbabwe during an agricultural exhibition show in 2013, drawing questions about how often other such loans are extended outside the public domain (Chipaike and Bischoff, 2019).

7.3.3. Grants and donations

China also provides part of its aid as outright grants to Zimbabwe (Table 7.6). Grants are non-refundable financial gifts extended by a development partner to

cement relations (Chun, 2014). On paper it appears that Zimbabwe benefits from its relationship with China by receiving these donations; however, participants in this study felt that Beijing was the sole beneficiary of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, and that Zimbabwe was being short-changed:

Zimbabwe should pull out of its relationship with China and re-engage the West because the Chinese are stingy and cannot be trusted. If you look at where they are doing mining activities, they do not give back to those communities; they bring their employees and do not employ locals. They do not do any social-responsibility programs. The aid they give is meant to open doors for them, and the aid is insignificant, so we are not benefiting much from the deals. When you compare it with how we used to relate with the West, they used to come here and establish manufacturing plants, employing locals, and giving back to the communities. I grew up at a mine where my father was working; we had schools and clinics built by the Germany-owned mine and we were not paying for those services. The Chinese do not do that.

(Interview with MD3 Transcript number 16)

The view that Zimbabwe is not benefiting from Chinese aid engagements is rebuffed by both the Chinese and Zimbabwean authorities, who brand the relationship as mutually beneficial (Chun, 2014). The lack of adequate data on aid engagements makes it difficult to substantiate these claims; thus, people tend to rely on media reports and on infrequent government publications. It is, however, clear that both Zimbabwe and China understand what constitutes development assistance, and that if they wanted to do so, they could make the detailed figures available to the public (Bräutigam, 2011a). China's reluctance to make official data of their aid available to other countries can be attributed to the fact that China is itself still a developing country battling poverty, and may not want to let its citizens know the extent of their government's assistance to other countries, which brings to question China's motives when extending aid (Brautigam and Hwang, 2016).

Evidence from data on Chinese grants to Zimbabwe between 2010 and 2020 shows that China's aid to Zimbabwe has generally been symbolic, with China

extending grants to Zimbabwe in different sectors (Table 7.6). The opaqueness of China's dealings and the distribution channels where the grants are channelled through central government may be why participants were not sure of how to differentiate loans from grants (Sachikonye, 2019). China's donations to Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2014 are shown in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6: Purpose and value of Chinese grants to Zimbabwe, 2010-2020

Donating institution	Purpose of the grant	Targeted sector	Year	Amount (US\$)
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated to the Zimbabwe Minors Association	Civil sector	2010	10m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated library equipment to rural primary schools	Education	2010	1.5m
China Development Bank	US\$100 million grant to the government	Government	2011	100m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Purchase of agricultural equipment to support Zimbabwe's land-reform program	Agriculture	2011	2m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated rice and maize to rural areas	Food security	2011	9m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated office equipment to government departments	Government	2011	1.11m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Purchase of medical equipment	Health	2011	2.05m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated ICT equipment to the National Defense College	Military	2011	7m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated a broadcasting van to Zimbabwe Broadcasting	ICT	2012	3.15m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated vehicles and IT equipment to government departments	Government	2012	1.83m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Grain donation	Food security	2012	15m
Chinese Community in Zimbabwe	Donated grain to rural Matebeleland communities	Food security	2012	150m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated medical supplies through Women Unlimited Zimbabwe	Health	2013	5m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated office equipment to government departments	Government	2013	11.3m

Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated food to Tokwe Mukosi flood victims	Food security	2013	2m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Built Mahusekwa Hospital in Marondera District	Health	2013	6m
ANJIN Pvt Ltd	Built a primary school at the request of Grace Mugabe the then-first lady	Education	2013	7m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated computers, generators, and library equipment to rural schools	Education	2014	6m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated office equipment and 525 mobile solar power units to government departments	Government	2014	1m
Chinese Communist Party	Donated \$46 million to ZANU PF towards the construction of a new parliament building in Zimbabwe	Government	2015	46m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Built Lupane Primary school through the China-Zimbabwe friendship initiative	Education	2016	1.7m
Chinese embassy to Zimbabwe	Built a school in Hatfield, Harare	Education	2017	2m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated US\$100m to victims of Cyclone Idai	Humanitarian	2017	1m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated 32,000 tons of rice to victims of El Niño-induced drought after President Mugabe's declaration of a state of disaster	Humanitarian	2018	15m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Construction of boreholes in rural areas	Water and sanitation	2019	6m
Chinese Embassy to Zimbabwe	Donated items to victims of Cyclone Idai in Manicaland Province	Humanitarian	2019	2m
Chinese Community in Zimbabwe	Donated cash and goods to victims of cyclone Idai in Manicaland Province	Humanitarian	2019	0.2m
Chinese Government	Donated 10,000 tonnes of rice to victims of Cyclone Idai in Manicaland Province	Food security	2019	5m

Source: AidData (2020)

Participants noted that to cement Sino-Zimbabwean relations, China occasionally gave donations to Zimbabwe through the Chinese embassy whenever embassy representatives attended government functions. They also mentioned that China makes donations whenever there is a high-level visit between China and Zimbabwe:

Donations are pledged to the government, and it is the government that decides where to channel the donations. For example, if China donates rice, which they always do, they do not specify who should benefit from the rice, they just make an announcement that they will be donating X kilograms of rice and the government will then receive and distribute the rice. Most of these announcements are done by the Chinese embassy at government functions, like the Heroes Day celebrations, or when they are invited to the State House.
(Interview with ZD3: Transcript number 22)

Most of these donations during Zimbabwe's national events come as goods and equipment such as foodstuffs, agricultural equipment, or office equipment (Table 7.5). However, China also gives cash donations, especially when there is a high-level visit by senior government officials of either country. In 2011, when the then-President of Zimbabwe visited China, he received a donation of US\$100 million disbursed by the China Development Bank (Table 7.5), after China praised him as an old friend of China (Hodzi, 2018).

Participants also stressed that China donates to Zimbabwe each time there is a crisis or a natural disaster. These donations are targeted at certain areas, and even though distribution is done by the government, the Chinese specify where the donations should go. Interestingly, some of the donations come from the Chinese community and companies in Zimbabwe as a part of their social-responsibility efforts:

We have received a lot of donations from the Chinese whenever we are faced with calamities. The Chinese community in Zimbabwe has donated food, clothing, and materials to rebuild houses of the victims of Cyclone Idai in Chipinge. We have also seen the Chinese embassy sending trucks full of rice to Chipinge and to Tokwe Mukosi to victims of the Tokwe Mukosi floods. These are some of the donations that we receive from the Chinese. The Chinese companies in Chiyadzwa have also donated to Cyclone Idai victims. So, the donations come from everywhere.
(Interview with LZ1: Transcript number 17)

Whilst donations from the Chinese private sector, such as Anjin Pvt Ltd and the Chinese community in Zimbabwe, can be a form of social responsibility, the US\$46 million donation by the Chinese Communist Party to ZANU PF (Zimbabwe's ruling party) is of great significance, especially considering that the purpose of the grant was to build a parliament building, which is a government building, not a party building. Participants mentioned this gesture when they were discussing the complex relationship between Zimbabwe and China:

The Chinese Communist Party has a strong relationship with ZANU PF, and they have been working together for a long time now even before our independence. The relationship grew over the years to the extent of the Communist Party donating some funds, which are being used to construct the new parliament building in Mt Hapden. That one – I did not mention it when I was talking about the other projects because this one, it came as a party-to-party donation. It was political ruling parties donating to each other, ZANU PF receiving funds from the Chinese Communist Party.

(Interview with MF2: Transcript number 2)

This gesture can be an acknowledgement by the Chinese that they do not see ZANU PF leaving government in Zimbabwe, which fuels concerns that China supports ZANU PF's quest for a one-party state in Zimbabwe (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018). The grant also shows a deep conflation of party and state in Zimbabwe (Ndakaripa, 2020), as the construction of a parliament building should be the sole responsibility of the government and not political parties. There have been public complaints in Zimbabwe that a very thin line separates government activities from those of the ruling party (McGregor, 2002); this grant provides evidence for that position. Participants mainly from civil society and political parties queried China's motives when dealing directly with a political party on government business:

It may be true that China has permanent interests, and maybe not necessarily permanent friends, in other countries, but in our case, they seem to be making permanent friends too. The nature of the aid they give and how the aid is disbursed shows that in their eyes, the Chinese do not see a change of government in Zimbabwe, and we are afraid that they may influence our

elections to protect their friends and their interests. They donated money for the building of the new parliament through ZANU PF, the ZANU PF head office was built using a Chinese donation, and if you take into consideration the number of houses belonging to ZANU PF leaders that have been built by the Chinese, you will see how deep the relationship has become.

(Interview with MD2: Transcript number 15).


As noted above, Chinese aid to Zimbabwe consists of concessional loans, zero-interest loans, grants, and donations, most of which would not be classified as ODA. The analysis so far shows that concessional loans are extended mainly for commercial purposes and would help achieve China's commercial interests, such as acquiring resources, promoting Chinese imports, and creating employment for Chinese nationals, as discussed in Chapter 6. In contrast, zero-interest loans are meant to cement bilateral relations between China and Zimbabwe and portray China as a friend in need who is ready to help without profiting in the process. Grants and donations seem to be targeted towards humanitarian assistance, which will help improve China's image as a benevolent ally in adversity and a friend looking out for a friend in need. Zero-interest loans seem to target decision-makers and the security sector. This form of aid helps China achieve its political motive of having a diplomatic ally. The politicians targeted by this form of aid represent and vote for Zimbabwe in international forums and are more likely to vote with China. The section below investigates the sections targeted by the aid.

7.4 Economic sectors targeted by Chinese aid in Zimbabwe

To conceptualise the drivers of Chinese aid as well as the effect of the aid, there is need to evaluate the economic sectors in which the aid is prioritised (Thiele et al., 2007). The OECD identified three broad and distinct ODA sectors: economic infrastructure, service infrastructure, and social infrastructure (Guillon and Mathonnat,


2020). China's aid allocation to Zimbabwe is multi-sectoral, as shown in Figures 7.2 (grants and donations) and 7.3 (loans).

Figure 7.2: Distribution of Chinese grants and donations to Zimbabwe by sector, 2010-2020



Source: AidData (2018) and Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance (various publications)

Figure 7.3: Distribution of Chinese concessional loans to Zimbabwe by sector, 2010-2019



Source: Source: AidData (2020) Ministry of Finance (Various Publications)

Whilst Chinese aid is multi-sectorial, Figure 7.2 shows that 40% of the grants and donations go to the military sector, whereas concessional loans are targeted towards development sectors of the economy such as energy, transport, water and sanitation, and ICT (Figure 7.3). This could be because these sectors are expected to

generate income, and hence have the capacity to repay the loans. One participant particularly spoke of the multi-sectoral nature of Chinese aid:

We see the aid in many sectors, but I can mention the transport sector, where we refurbished and expanded the Harare and Victoria Falls airports as well as the Harare-Chirundu Road dualisation using Chinese loans. In the agricultural sector, they are donating equipment and other inputs to resettled farmers. They built a hospital in Mahusekwa, and we hear they have been donating some medical equipment in government and council hospitals. I have also mentioned projects in the energy sector before, so I can say its multi-sectoral.

(Interview with Zep2: Transcript number 12)

Data from the AidData portal and various publications by the Zimbabwe Treasury show that aid allocation in the economic infrastructure sector in Zimbabwe appear to be associated with China's quest for natural resources, its need to create markets for its products, the creation of employment for its workforce, and the desire to market its loans. In contrast, aid allocation in the social infrastructure appears to be associated with meeting Zimbabwe's needs as well as China's need for diplomatic support and quest for global legitimacy:

China's aid to Zimbabwe is mainly technical in nature and is meant to maintain good relations with the government and to make government officials have a bias towards Chinese policies and interests. You will see that the technical assistance, or technical aid, mainly targets the training of government officials. It is more like they take them to China, and they pamper them through these training workshop just to create a mindset that China is the right partner to engage, so it is more like a political strategy. And the other issue is that the aid is interventionist in nature. It is not a long-term, program-based strategy, but rather it is more like [a] humanitarian type of assistance, where you see China coming to donate medical equipment and drugs, just for a particular intervention or challenge that the government of Zimbabwe will be facing, but it is not long-term in nature.

(Interview with MD1: Transcript number 14)

This type of aid, which targets politicians and government officials, helps drive China's foreign policy. Between 2010 and 2020, China directed most of its grants and

donations to Zimbabwe towards government departments and the security sector, more than to social sectors (Figure 7.2). The conflation between the state and its army wing in Zimbabwe makes it difficult to separate aid that is directed to government departments from that which is directed to the security sector, because the army is involved at every stage of distribution (McGregor, 2002). Participants felt that Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is mostly directed towards the defence or policymakers:

They have directed significant aid towards the defence sector through the construction of the Defence College, exchange programs, as well as donation of armoury. They have also provided aid in the form of construction of a parliament building and houses of politicians, including the current President and the former President. These aid programs are interesting in the sense that the Chinese seem to be targeting decision-makers. When you build a parliament, you will have captured all the lawmakers of the country and you can influence the making of the laws that affect your operations. It may be the reason why Chinese projects are tax-exempted, and probably the reason why their projects do not go to tender.

(Interview MT2: Transcript number 9)

Whilst the security sector tends to receive more grants and donations mainly because of the historical relations between China and ZANU PF military wing, which became the national army at independence (Maringira, 2017, Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013), data from AidData and the Ministry of Finance in Zimbabwe (2010-2019) shows that concessional loans have been targeted towards economic sectors, such as transport and energy, with very little going towards social sectors like health (Figure 7.3).

7.5. Conditions attached to Chinese aid to Zimbabwe

There is a widely held impression that Chinese aid does not have political conditions attached to it, in line with China's non-interference principle. In this section I use participants' views to show that Chinese aid in Zimbabwe involves diplomatic conditionality, entrenched conditionality, and cross-conditionality. I also show that

Chinese lending to Zimbabwe has some indirect conditions and lock-in effects that limit Zimbabwe's fiscal-policy choices just as direct Western conditionalities can.

7.5.1 Diplomatic conditionality

Diplomatic conditionality, also referred to as political conditionality, is when an aid-giving country directly or indirectly imposes some diplomatic conditions on an aid-receiving country before extending help (Mattlin and Nojonen, 2015). Participants asserted that diplomatic conditions are associated with Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, particularly regarding adherence to the One China Policy and the maintenance of friendly relations, such as voting with China at the United Nations Security Council:

There are political conditions attached to the aid, but they are concealed. For example, Zimbabwe will continue to receive aid for as long as we continue to support China in their fight with Taiwan, what they call the One China Policy. It is a precondition that is not publicised, but one that is sacred to China. That is why our government is quick to reaffirm their support of the One China Policy: they know that it is a condition to continue receiving aid. Vanenge vachitambira murungu! "Pleasing the master", if I am to put it in English.

(Interview with Zep1: Transcript Number 11).

This condition by China is in the same spirit as the democracy clause or the human-rights clause demanded by Western donors when extending aid to developing countries.

Participants noted that UN voting was another diplomatic conditionality associated with Chinese aid to Zimbabwe:

Voting with China at the United Nations is a condition for Zimbabwe to continue receiving aid. They are not giving aid out of benevolence, it's tied aid. They want support from Zimbabwe, and if they fail to get the support, they will stop the aid. So, I am saying it is a condition because it is the support that started before the aid came. For me, diplomatic support is a condition for Zimbabwe to receive aid from China.

(Interview with LZ2: Transcript Number 18)

The political condition is linked to China's non-interference principle, which is a very attractive principle to Zimbabwe because, like China, Zimbabwe frowns on international interference (Tendi, 2016).

7.5.2 Entrenched conditionality

Entrenched conditionality refers to demands that are attached to project funding. Participants observed that before an aid project is approved, Zimbabwe must agree to conditions such as using a Chinese contractor, buying all equipment from China even when it is locally available, and using Chinese labour. Some participants referred to this conditionality as the "buy China clause":

The main condition is what I would call the "buy China Clause", where all the equipment should come from China. The project contractor should be Chinese and should bring [a] Chinese workforce. This is different from Western aid, where selection of a project constructor goes to tender. So, the Chinese will make sure that they also benefit directly from the aid.

(Interview with Zep1: Transcript Number 11)

This conditionality crowds out local industry and represents a cost to the Zimbabwean economy. It also creates a dependence syndrome, where the Zimbabwean market will eventually become over-reliant on Chinese technology, contractors, and skills.

Yes, there are conditions. They have the input condition, where they demand that project inputs should come from China. Some people call it the "buy China" condition, and they are very strict about it. If it were possible, they would want to even bring their water and soil from China (laughs).

(Interview with MT2: Transcript Number 5)

For Chinese aid, it's tied aid. If they are supporting us in agriculture, education, or health, or whatever sector that they would have identified, their support is tied: they want the project to be implemented by a Chinese agent.

(Interview with MF3: Transcript Number 3)

7.5.3. Implicit conditionality

Implicit conditionality, also referred to as cross-conditionality, is driven by China's geoeconomics strategy. It is based on China's need to hedge against Zimbabwe's high risk of loan default and, like entrenched conditionality, it complements China's quest to acquire minerals. China is interested in ensuring that issued loans are repaid (Mattlin and Nojonen, 2015). The conditionality also helps China to strike a balance between Zimbabwe's reluctance to repay loans and its appetite for fresh funding:

When it comes loans, there is a condition that Zimbabwe must not default on current loans before accessing new financing. The other related condition is that Zimbabwe must deposit a certain percentage of the loan amount before a project commences, and all projects are linked to each other, if you default on one project all projects underway will be stopped.

(Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1)

In October 2019, three Chinese projects in Zimbabwe were suspended after the Zimbabwean government raided an escrow account and withdrew US\$10 million that was meant for the upgrade of Harare's airport (*The Independent*, 2019). The US\$10 million was part of conditions attached to the US\$153 million, one of which was that Zimbabwe was going to deposit \$10 million. The government of Zimbabwe, facing liquidity challenges, decided to make a short-term withdrawal from the escrow account without the consent of the Chinese, and the Chinese responded by suspending the project and two other projects, the Hwange power station expansion and NetOne telecoms expansion. To hedge against such unexpected actions from the government of Zimbabwe, China now inserts cross-conditions in the project deals. In some cases, loans are secured with mineral deposits:

The biggest risk we are facing is the risk of loan default. Most of our loans from China are secured using platinum deposits, such that if we default, we will have to cede those deposits to the Chinese. The other challenge is that all the Chinese-funded projects are tied, such that if we default on one project, all the other projects will stop – like what happened when we failed to pay for the

Harare airport loan: the Chinese then stopped construction at [the] Victoria Falls airport and Kariba South extension. So, I think the conditions are somehow not fair and need a revisit.

(Interview with DO2: Transcript number 5).

Participants felt that conditions attached to some of the Chinese loans are meant to give China access to Zimbabwe's mineral resources, as some of the loans are tied to mineral deposits in case of default. This strategy by China is clearly targeted at gaining profits for China; in contrast, the West's application of conditions is used as a carrot-and-stick framework to discipline and coax recipient countries, a clear attempt at control (Zimmermann and Smith, 2011). One participant summarised the use of minerals to secure Chinese loans:

If you look at the default clause inserted in most of the loan agreements, it states that in the event of a default, Zimbabwe must cede a certain amount of minerals, like platinum or diamonds. So, to me, they are looking at our minerals, and that is a view held by most of the people I interact with.

(Interview with DO1: Transcript Number 4)

The participant's views resonated with claims by a 2008 World Bank paper that said, "Most Chinese-funded projects in sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources to China" (Foster et al., 2009). Whilst China may not necessarily be targeting resources, given the low interest rates on their loans to Zimbabwe and the long grace and maturity periods (Table 7.1), it is interesting to note that they continue to give Zimbabwe loans regardless of Zimbabwe's well-documented history of defaulting on sovereign loans, which has resulted in the Bretton Woods institutions and the Paris Club delisting Zimbabwe from accessing loans (Bond, 2005).

However, Lui Guijin, a 2008 Chinese special envoy to Africa, indicated that China's aid approach is informed by the economic and political landscape in Africa, which is not perfect, and China does not wait for a perfect environment before

extending help (Morris, 2008). As argued before in this chapter, Zimbabwe seems not to be worried about the nature of Chinese conditionalities, as they do not necessarily affect Zimbabwe's domestic politics. The sense of appreciation for China's non-intervention approach was succinctly summed up by former President Mugabe, who, on Zimbabwe's 25th anniversary of independence, said, "We have turned East where the sun rises and turned our back on the West where the sun sets.... China has been our all-weather friends who should be credited for supporting us without trying to interfere with our sovereignty" (Aidoo and Hess, 2010).

China seems to prioritise the political conditionality and the entrenched conditionality ahead of the implicit conditionality in Zimbabwe because regardless of Zimbabwe's continued defaulting on some of the Chinese loans, China has continued to extend loans to Zimbabwe and has sometimes forgiven some of the debts (Acker et al., 2020). The political conditionality which is the first handle is not difficult for Zimbabwe to follow since it is in line with Zimbabwe's 'State Sovereignty' mantra. All that Zimbabwe needs to do is to continue having a cordial relationship with China supporting the One China Policy. This is not unique to Zimbabwe because almost every country these days including the Western superpowers have a diplomatic relationship with China including recognising the One China Policy. The challenge is in the entrenched conditionality, where project loans are advanced with a condition that construction is done by a Chinese company that may bring their own labour and equipment from China. The conditionality may have a push effect, where the Chinese contractors will end up using technology that they are familiar with, which may not be suitable for the Zimbabwean market. The fact that the contractors bring their own workforce may work against the Zimbabwe government's priority to create jobs for locals and to protect the local industry from foreign competition.

In the long run, Zimbabwe may become over-reliant on Chinese labour, technology, and financing, influencing the overall performance of the Zimbabwean economy.

7.6. Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid

China's presence in Africa has attracted a range of reactions from different stakeholders, with some government leaders praising China's aid for infrastructural development, particularly in the transport sector, where Chinese projects in road and rail construction have benefited ordinary citizens (Wang and Elliot, 2014). Some citizens have praised China for improving their lives through employment creation and boosted service delivery (Rebol, 2010). Generally, African politicians applaud Sino-African relations, "as they have no desire to kill the goose that is laying the golden egg" (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 55). However, some politicians, especially those in opposition parties, have criticised Chinese aid for stifling democratic space in host nations (Dreher et al., 2019). In Zambia, Michael Sata denounced Chinese aid during his 2011 presidential campaign, promising to cancel all Chinese contracts if he was elected (Carmody and Kragelund, 2016). Overall, African opinion on Sino-African aid relations have been mixed. Sautman and Hairong (2009) summed this up by saying, "African views on China are not as negative as Western media make out, nor as positive as official Chinese sources imply" (Sautman and Hairong, 2009, p. 729).

In Zimbabwe, the general perception regarding China's aid as reflected by this study's participants showed a primarily negative image: the participants depicted the Chinese as neo-colonialists who seek to exploit Zimbabwe's resources and treat locals as second-class citizens. They argued that Chinese aid promotes corruption in

Zimbabwe and is being used to undermine democracy and shrink the democratic space:

I am not so sure if I can speak on the behalf of ordinary Zimbabweans, but I can probably speak on behalf of people that are here or that I am close to. It is all bad news around here, to be honest. I have not seen anyone who is enthused about them, and everyone seems, maybe except the politicians, everyone that I come across, they seem to be very clear that these guys are very exploitative and dangerous. Whatever they do is for their own benefit and [they] should not be trusted. That is the perception of those that I have heard and those that I am close to.

(Interview with DO2: Transcript Number 5)

7.6.1. Is China after Zimbabwe's minerals?

Participants felt that Zimbabweans' hostility towards the Chinese was shaped by the widely held belief that China was after Zimbabwe's resources:

Zimbabweans are very hostile to China because of the exploitative nature of some of the Chinese nationals here, who are obviously after our mineral resources. They are coming here in large numbers and are competing with us for everything. Most of the Chinese who are now based in Zimbabwe came as project employees, but after the project they do not go back to China. They start operating businesses in areas that are reserved for locals – and where they employ locals, they abuse them. So, generally, Zimbabweans are not happy with the Chinese.

(Interview with Zep1: Transcript number 11)

These remarks were supported by those of another participant, who felt that Chinese companies in the mining sector were not following environmental laws, as they were leaving uncovered holes and, in some cases, endangering both animals and humans through their mining activities:

The Chinese are after resources, and they do not care how and where they get the minerals. You find them competing with illegal gold panners doing open-cast mining in rivers. They sometimes end up blocking a whole river, causing harm to the ecosystem. They are leaving uncovered holes in valleys and in some instances, they even destroy a whole mountain searching for minerals. They do not care about the traditional and spiritual significance of some of these mountains and rivers.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 16)

In September 2020, the Zimbabwean government banned mining activities in all Zimbabwean national parks, reversing an earlier decision by the Office of the President of Zimbabwe to award two Chinese companies with contracts to mine coal at Hwange Game Park (Flanagan, 2020). The decision was reversed after animal-rights activists took the government to court, arguing that mining activities at the park would cause ecological degradation (Mavhunga, 2020). Hwange Game Park houses in excess of 40,000 elephants and many other animal species such as lions, cheetahs, and the endangered black rhinoceros (Mpakairi et al., 2020).

7.6.2. Does Chinese aid promote corruption in Zimbabwe?

Questions have been raised as to why the contracts in Hwange were awarded in the first place, raising suspicion that some authorities may have been bribed to approve them. This aligns with participants' views that China's engagement with Zimbabwe is promoting corruption, especially in high offices:

The Chinese know how to grease the hands of decision-makers. Their projects do not go to tender, and sometimes not even to parliament. The projects are given a State Security Status because money changes hands at the top there. Even when people complain about the conduct of the Chinese, the politicians will see no evil and hear no evil because they received brown envelopes.

(Interview with LZ1: Transcript Number 17)

In 2015 then-President Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe had lost US\$15 billion to corruption and smuggling involving Anjin Investments, a company core-owned by the Chinese and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, forcing the company's closure (Moyo, 2018). In November 2020, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa officiated the company's reopening, angering locals who said the company had a dark

past, including corruption and human-rights abuses (Nyangani, 2020). This prompted Tawanda Majoni, a corruption activist and journalist, to write an opinion piece accusing the Chinese embassy of facilitating the reopening of Anjin by paying senior government officials (Majoni, 2020). The Chinese embassy denied these claims:

Majoni, who claims to be a journalist and anticorruption activist, has been making up so-called inside stories about Chinese government being involved in Anjin's business, seeking to distort and smear China's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe through carefully woven lies. It [Majoni's writings] shows his hypocrisy, double standard, fears of being caught in a lie and zero confidence. It shows that, in his view, the so-called freedom of speech is selective and only for himself, this is a typical practice against the embassy. (Public announcement issued by the Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe on 10 September 2020).

These media reports may have shaped participants' opinions on corruption linked to Chinese aid. However, participants in government institutions hinted about having experienced this kind of corruption first-hand:

I cannot say much, but the general view even in these corridors is that the Chinese are corrupt. I find them to be very cunning: they do not take no for an answer, they are prepared to do anything to win contracts. Working with them is a time bomb because most of my colleagues who work directly with the Chinese have pending cases in the courts involving corruption. You cannot blame them, because the Chinese are so tempting, they can offer you money 10 times your annual salary. It is so tempting in these difficult times. So, the general feeling is that Chinese aid comes with corruption.

(Interview with MT2: Transcript Number 9)

7.6.3. China has a big-brother attitude towards Zimbabwe

Another dominant view linked to Chinese employees' human-rights abuses against Zimbabwean workers was that the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship was not a partnership of equals. Participants felt that China has a big-brother mentality, leaving Zimbabwe relying on China's approval even when prosecuting Chinese nationals who break the law in Zimbabwe:

Most Zimbabweans think that the Chinese aid is more like a Trojan horse when it comes to Zimbabwe: the aid provided is not just aid, it's that kind of aid with a sort of a fine print where they will, tomorrow, say, "We gave you aid. Can we have these concessions?" You see? We have Chinese nationals who are violating Zimbabwean laws with impunity, but when it comes to their prosecution, their government has been able to protect them based on the support that they have been giving to the government. There was a case in Norton where a Chinese national beat up a local traditional leader and got away with it. The government did not do anything for fear of the Chinese. The attitude of these Chinese nationals is not good. They behave as if we owe them.

(Interview with ZU3: Transcript number 25)

Well, Zimbabwean workers do not like the Chinese. We receive a lot of complaints every day. There is a sense of entitlement in these Chinese employees. They have this belief that they are doing us a favour or that they are superior to us. I cannot say they are racists, so to say, but they think they are superior, and that has affected their relations with their employees. The workers hate them; they are not liked. And if this is not addressed, the hostility may turn into violence.

(Interview with ZU3: Transcript Number 23)

Most participants believed that Zimbabwe had a potential to benefit from the relationship with China, but felt that China's motives in the relations were a bigger cost to Zimbabwe than the benefits that would accrue from the relations:

I will comment people's views from an economic perspective; people feel that China is using aid in Zimbabwe to propagate a neo-colonial agenda where we are exporting cheap raw materials and importing expensive finished goods from China.

(Interview with LZ3: Transcript Number 19)

Government officials argued that whilst the projects being undertaken by China in Zimbabwe would undoubtedly benefit ordinary citizens, it was the conduct of Chinese nationals involved in the projects that created a hostile reaction from citizens. One participant explained that the differences between the Chinese and Zimbabwean cultures could be influencing people's perceptions, especially in the workplace:

I have worked with the Chinese for a long time. They are an interesting people and if you do not understand them, you will always clash with them. That is the problem we are having: people do not understand the Chinese, their way of doing things, and their culture, which is totally different from ours. So, the hostility or negative comments you hear about the Chinese are informed by that lack of understanding.

(Interview with MF1: Transcript Number 1)

7.6.4. Chinese aid being used to shrink democratic space in Zimbabwe

Another view common among participants from civil society, NGOs, and the political parties was that the government was using Chinese aid to shrink the democratic space in Zimbabwe. Participants expressed that the distribution of Chinese aid, which is done by the State, was benefiting politicians linked with the ruling party, with some participants arguing that the aid was being politicised, with intended beneficiaries belonging to the opposition being denied access to it:

China has partnered the devil incarnate because their aid is used to punish political opponents. ZANU PF MPs are given food donated by the Chinese to the poor in rural areas, and they selectively distribute it only to their supporters. And our people see the Chinese the same way [that] they see ZANU PF. The Chinese are not liked because they represent ZANU PF.

(Interview with MD1: Transcript Number 16)

Chinese aid in the security sector is used to buy police equipment, which is used to silence any dissenting voices and to subvert democracy. When we complain about these issues, China sides with the government. China does not have the motivation to stand with the people because they are just like this regime. There are no human rights in China, so to them the heavy-handedness of Mnangagwa is normal.

(Interview with MD3: Transcript Number 18)


These views differed from views displayed in the literature from other African countries, where Africans are generally found to be neutral and positive about their countries' relations with China (Nassanga and Makara, 2016). Citizens' perceptions are shaped more by the political and economic realities and the history of their country than the global context (Park, 2013). Zimbabwe has for the past two decades been

characterised by politics of polarisation and ambivalence, with the political landscape populated by antinomies (Gallagher, 2015). Those who are against the government tend to oppose most of the things associated with the government and all organisations and countries that support the government (Gallagher, 2015). China's soft diplomacy, which is interpreted to mean support for the ruling elite as well as a lack of transparency in the relationship, is the main cause of citizens' hostility (Vava, 2017, Matingwina, 2016). Whether these perceptions will change with time is not clear, but China has much to do to promote its image in Zimbabwe.

7.7 Overview of the emergent theoretical framework

This chapter ends by linking Chapter 6 to Chapter 7 to explain the Sino-Zimbabwean aid relationship. The emergent theory, depicted in Figure 7.4, proposes that Sino-Zimbabwean engagements can be grasped as an interaction between four main themes or variables: China's economic interests, China's political interests, Zimbabwe's interests, and the form of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. These variables are bound by two overarching themes: the drivers and the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe.

Figure 7.4: Emergent theoretical framework of Sino-Zimbabwean engagements



China's political interests	China's economic interests	Nature of the aid	Zimbabwe's situation
-Finding a voting ally at the UNSC	-Need for resources	-Form (concessional loans, zero-interest loans, grants, and donations)	-Need to spite the West
-Improving its global image	-Establishing markets for Chinese goods	-Conditionalities (entrenched, implicit, and diplomatic)	-Need for an ally at the UNSC
-Addressing its global legitimacy question	-Securing employment for Chinese nationals		-Need for a protector against international coercion
	-Marketing Chinese loans		-Need to suppress domestic opposition
			-Need to save a struggling healthcare and education system

The connections in this framework occur within the context of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations, which feed into China's relations with many other members of the global South. The framework proposes that the geopolitical and geoeconomics characteristics of the aid host nation create a conducive environment for China to pursue its own geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, and that it is those interests that shape the nature of assistance rendered to the host nation. The framework argues that China's aid approach in the global South is not predatory but, whilst China has self-interests, the extent to which the self-interests shape the allocation of aid depends on the host country's domestic and international strategies. This is to say that whilst China may target certain regions, such as Africa, the Middle East, or the South Pacific, it does not target individual countries.

Thus, the enabling theme (Zimbabwe's situation) identified in this study was placed at the bottom of the figure to demonstrate its enabling role. Zimbabwe's geoeconomic and geopolitical strategies provide an enabling framework that guides how Zimbabwe engages with foreign countries and how far the interests of those countries can be achieved in Zimbabwe; this, in turn, shapes the nature of the aid coming into Zimbabwe. There are also external variables that influence the nature of the aid: China's geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. The middle arrows pointing to these two variables represent the "impacting variables" construct. The framework proposes that China's geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies affect how China relates with the aid host nation.

The construct marked "China's economic interests" involves China's geopolitical strategies, which influence its going-out strategy. These include China's need to find voting allies at the UNSC, to improve its global image, and to address its global legitimacy, among other global issues. These issues can only be achieved if the host nation is a willing partner. There should be other domestic factors that should push the host nation to partner with China in advancing China's geopolitical interests; these push factors are the enabling factors.

Another impacting factor is the "China's economic interests" construct, which includes factors like China's need for natural resources, need to establish markets for Chinese goods, need to secure employment for Chinese nationals, and need to market Chinese loans. Just like the "China's political interests" construct, the "China's economic interests" construct is also facilitated by the enabling factors. Impacting themes' influence on the nature of Chinese aid rely on the needs and characteristics of the host nation. For example, China can easily market its loans in Zimbabwe

because Zimbabwe has limited access to international financing, making Chinese loans becomes attractive. This seemed to be the case when participants shared how China uses concessional and zero-interest loans to finance small projects in Zimbabwe, and subsequently win big tenders financed by non-concessional loans. China's giving of concessional loans is influenced by its economic and political interests (impacting variables), where China may want to use the loans to market its more rewarding non-concessional loans or to have access to resources in the host nation (economic interests); or to advance a political agenda of portraying China as a friend ready to assist another friend in need, or to cement relations that will culminate in voting together in international forums (political interests). However, this is only possible if the characteristics and policies of the host nation permit.

7.8. Chapter conclusion

This chapter conceptualised participants' views on the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and used literature and content analysis to explain these views. The chapter explained that Chinese aid to Zimbabwe comes in the form of grants and loans. Most of the aid is disbursed as either equipment or goods and services. Whilst some studies have claimed that Chinese aid does not have political conditions, in this chapter I established that there are both political and economic conditions attached to Chinese aid. The more pronounced economic conditions are such that Zimbabwe will have to buy from China, a Chinese company should be the contractor on all aid projects, the workforce must come from China, the aid projects are tied to each other such that in the case of a default, all projects underway will be suspended, and some loans are backed by mineral resources. The chapter explained Zimbabweans' perceptions of the Chinese aid. The perceptions are generally negative because of China's soft diplomacy and its lack of transparency in the conditions of the loans given

to Zimbabwe. The chapter concluded by presenting the theoretical framework that emerged from this study as well as the proposed interactions between constructs. The next chapter discusses the research findings highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7 in regard to the three research questions that guided this study and compares the results with existing findings from the international relations field.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION

8.1 Introduction

The focal thrust of this study was to develop a framework that could explain China's aid approach in the global South using the China-Zimbabwe context. The main research problem identified in Section 1.5 of this study is: "How does the degree of transparency in the distribution, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe affect citizens' capacity to view and participate in projects funded by Chinese aid?" To address this problem, the study employed qualitative research methods based on ideas from the Straussian grounded-theory school of thought to examine the Sino-Zimbabwe aid relationship. Analysis resulted in a framework explaining the role played by the characteristics or conditions in the host country (enabling variables) and China's political and economic interests (impacting variables) in shaping the nature of the aid extended and, in turn, the overall aid relations between the two countries. This chapter relates the components of the framework to the specific research questions that guided the study.

The chapter begins by discussing the findings and linking the components of the emergent theory to studies existing in the field of international relations. This discussion is arranged by the three research questions that guided this study:

1. What are the key drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?
2. What are the main features of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?
3. What are Zimbabweans perceptions regarding Chinese aid?

Table 8.1: Indicative summary of empirical findings and power quotes

Quote Transcript No.	What are the key drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	
	Indicative quotes from participants	Power quotes
8	China is a big country in need of resources to drive their industry. They want resources from us, and the aid is only for softening up negotiations. <i>(Interview with MT1)</i>	Resource-driven (Alden, 2009)
4	The Chinese are benefiting from our minerals, but I do not think they have a hidden agenda because before receiving aid we submit our request sheet to the Chinese embassy, and the aid we receive is in line with that request sheet. <i>(Interview with DO1)</i>	Win-win approach (Guijin, 2007)
9	Another thing is how we see the global politics evolving. You will realise that the Chinese will also want to have their sort of “own empire” characterised by their non-interference policy, so Zimbabwe provides a perfect platform to showcase the effectiveness of that policy as well as to be an ally that supports China in global politics. <i>(Interview with MD3)</i>	Pursuing a hegemonic status (Friedberg, 2011)
1	I may be wrong, but I think China is acting like a big brother looking after a brother in need. Well, China is benefiting through resources and other things, but we cannot rule out the fact that Zimbabwe needs external funding and has been begging China for help. So, China is just looking after a friend, and whether they benefit from it or not is another thing. <i>(Interview with MF1)</i>	Helping a friend in need (Fang et al., 2020)
Quote Transcript No.	What are the main features of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	
	Indicative quotes from participants	Power quotes
3	For Chinese aid, it's tied aid, if they are supporting us in agriculture, education, or health, or whatever sector that they would have identified, their support is tied. They want the project to be implemented by a Chinese agent. <i>(Interview with MF3)</i>	Tied aid (Sieber-Gasser, 2011)
5	The challenge I see with the loans is that we do not have the capacity to repay the loans. Our appetite for fresh funding is high but our capacity to repay is very low. China is always willing to extend the loans, and a time will come when we completely fail to repay. In fact, we have already started showing signs of struggling. <i>(Interview with DO2)</i>	Predatory behaviour (Rotberg, 2009)

4	The aid is disbursed as concessionary loans, zero-interest loans, donations, or grants. The type of the aid depends on what they need to achieve or our own requirements. At the start of the year they commit a certain amount and we then draw from that amount. So, we can request for a loan, and the money will come from what they will have set aside for us. And when we repay, we repay to that same fund, which may end up working like a revolving fund. <i>(Interview with DO1)</i>	Chinese aid gives Zimbabwe access to foreign funding (Manyeruke). Aid that is not rogue depends on the needs of the host country (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011)
8	Allocation of Chinese aid is multi-sectoral, although some sectors tend to get more attention. Sectors like defence, mining, energy, and government are prioritised because of their economic and political significance. <i>(Interview with MT 2)</i>	Multi-sectoral aid (Guillon and Mathonnat, 2020)
7	Chinese aid in the securities sector is being used by the government to suppress opposition. The teargas, guns, and other equipment being used by the police was donated by China. So, to me, China's aid is not benefiting ordinary citizens. <i>(Interview with MD1)</i>	Rogue behaviour (Brautigam, 2011)
What are Zimbabweans' perceptions regarding Chinese aid?		
Quote Transcript No.	Indicative quotes from participants	Power quotes
19	I will comment [on] people's views from an economic perspective: people feel that China is using aid in Zimbabwe to propagate a neo-colonial agenda where we are exporting cheap raw materials and importing expensive finished goods from China. <i>(Interview with LZ3)</i>	An act of neo-colonialism (Karlsson, 2020)
17	The Chinese know how to grease the hands of decision-makers. Their projects do not go to tender, and sometimes not even to parliament. The projects are given a State Security Status because money changes hands at the top there. Even when people complain about the conduct of the Chinese, the politicians will see no evil and hear no evil because they received brown envelopes. <i>(Interview with LZ1)</i>	Promoting corruption (Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018)
1	I have worked with the Chinese for a long time. They are an interesting people, and if you do not understand them, you will always clash with them. That is the problem we are having: people do not understand the Chinese, their way of doing things, and their culture, which is totally different from ours. So, the hostility or negative comments you hear about the Chinese are informed by that lack of understanding. <i>(Interview with MF1)</i>	A victim of cultural differences (Anedo, 2012)

8.2. Research Question #1: What are the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?

The main research problem that steered this study explored the pull and push factors that drive Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Participants accounts imparted insight into two main push factors: China's economic interests (Section 6.2) and its political interests (Section 6.3), with Zimbabwe's economic and political situation (Section 6.4) and strategies being the main pull factors of China's aid to Zimbabwe. In brief, the participants stressed that China is giving aid to Zimbabwe in pursuit of its economic interests, which involve extracting Zimbabwe's natural resources, creating employment for Chinese nationals, marketing its loans, and promoting its exports. Zimbabwe's political interests involve maintaining and strengthening historical ties, benefiting from having a voting ally in international forums like the UNSC, and improving China's global image by portraying China as an ally of the downtrodden. Participants also argued that the other main drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe are Zimbabwe's interests: having access to foreign funding, having an ally that provides vetoes against Western "machinations", and providing national-security assistance, as well as the need to improve its global image, particularly with regards to the country's human-rights record (Section 6.4).

Consistent with this study's theory (Figure 7.4), previous researchers have explained the drivers of Chinese aid to Africa; some of their results mirror the results of this study, which argues that the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship is strategic in the mold of the Sino-African model, where the relationship is win-win: China benefits through acquiring resources (Alao, 2014), gaining markets for its exports (Alden et al., 2008), having access to employment opportunities for its workforce (Gill and Reilly, 2007; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010), and gaining political legitimacy by having allies in the international fora like the United Nations Security Council (Gilley, 2008). Zimbabwe

gains from having access to loans (concessional and zero-interest loans) and donations (cash, goods, and services), including technical assistance (Hodzi et al., 2012b). Zimbabwe also gains by having a friend that protects it from pressure from Western countries like the US, Germany, and the UK (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013).

8.2.1. China in Pursuit of Zimbabwe's natural resources

It is all about resources, China wants minerals, and the current regime is not hesitant when it comes to parceling out freebies, that is why we have the Chinese in every corner where there are minerals.

(Interview with MD1: Transcript number 14)

Findings from this project suggest that part of China's economic interests in Zimbabwe is the extraction of natural resources (Section 6.2.1). Zimbabwe is endowed with mineral resources such as gold, diamonds, platinum, copper, coal, and lithium, among other mineral deposits (Jourdan, 2015).

The argument that China is providing aid to Zimbabwe in pursuit of Zimbabwe's natural resources is supported by Karkkainen (2016), who is of the view that China's main goal in Zimbabwe is to access natural resources. Karkkainen (2016) indicated that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Export-Import Bank of China have been pressuring the government of Zimbabwe to offer resources as collateral for Chinese loans. The diamond fields in Chiadzwa have been estimated to hold one third of the world's known deposits, and the *Herald* (2011b) reported that whether the loan used for accessing Chiadzwa diamond fields was concessional or commercial is not known, but that China offered US\$102 million to Zimbabwe in addition to the funding for the construction of the Defense College in Harare. In return, China obtained access to the diamonds through companies like Anjin, Marange, and Mbada Diamonds

(Farineau, 2013b). However, Chipaike (2019) stressed that Zimbabwe's agency in resource-related engagement with China has been constrained. Zimbabwe is facing a lack of effective regulatory mechanisms and the inability to effectively monitor mining activities; therefore, the extent of China's benefit from the Zimbabwean resource sector is understated (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013).

Illegal mining involving Chinese nationals is taking place at several mines around Zimbabwe, which has resulted in reduced output in terms of mineral volume reported by the government (Spiegel, 2014). It is, however, difficult to attribute these illegal activities to the Chinese government, although results of this study show that all Chinese nationals and companies that come to invest in Zimbabwe come through the Chinese embassy, and that the embassy is very instrumental in negotiating deals for even private Chinese companies. It is also important to understand that 80% of Chinese investors in the mining and agricultural sector in Zimbabwe, are in partnership with Zimbabwean companies and the military (Vassiliou, 2020); thus whatever the Chinese are doing in Zimbabwe has the blessing of powerful and high-ranking authorities in the country. This is consistent with the theory emerging in this study that China does not impose itself on Zimbabwe; rather, Zimbabwe creates an enabling environment that allows China to achieve its interests.

8.2.2. China creating export markets in Zimbabwe

I think China is advertising their products and technology. The way the aid is extended, where there are no cash disbursements but just equipment and services, makes the Zimbabwean market to become familiar with Chinese products. And in the end, China creates a market for their products in Zimbabwe.

(Interview with Zep1: Transcript Number 11)

The study shows that part of China's economic interests in Zimbabwe, as argued in Section 6.2.3, is to promote Chinese exports, along with the argument that China is seen to contribute to the sapping of Zimbabwe's manufacturing potential (Mlambo et al., 2016). Exports are a substantial driver of Chinese economic growth (Das, 2012), placing increasing exports at the centre of China's economic strategy. The nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, where project loans are disbursed in the form of equipment and/or services, supports the participants' views that China seeks to market its exports in Zimbabwe using aid. The views are also supported by evidence from literature: in 2005, China extended a \$50 million loan to Zimbabwe, and the loan was disbursed as agricultural equipment. In 2007 Zimbabwe procured farm machinery from China worth \$200 million under the Farm Mechanisation Programme (Obi, 2010). The Zimbabwean government disbursed a further \$3 billion in the form of Chinese equipment and agricultural inputs by the Zimbabwean government under the Command Agriculture Programme of 2017 (Mazwi et al., 2019). While it is difficult to directly link the 2005 Chinese \$50 million loan to the acquiring of equipment under the Farm Mechanisation Programme and the Command Agriculture Programme equipment bought by the Zimbabwean government, there is evidence that the Chinese government benefited from the transactions, and the Zimbabwean government may earlier have developed faith in Chinese equipment, having received the same equipment as aid in 2005.

In the energy sector, the Chinese have financed several energy-generation projects, such as the Kariba South extension, the Hwange extension, and the Gwanda power plant. These projects required the use of Chinese companies, equipment, and technology, and by participating in these projects, China was promoting its exports. Chinese aid in the telecommunications sector has opened doors for NetOne,

Zimbabwe's largest network provider by subscriptions, to partner with Huawei as part of a deal involving NetOne distributing Huawei products in Zimbabwe (Zinyama, 2014). It is interesting to note that several Huawei projects in Zimbabwe are funded by the Chinese government (Cave et al., 2019), signaling China's intent to advance its geoeconomics strategy in Zimbabwe.

8.2.3. Employment creation for Chinese nationals in Zimbabwe

Findings from the current study, as discussed in Section 6.2.4, suggest that China is using its aid to Zimbabwe to create employment for Chinese employees in Zimbabwe. This view by the participants may have been based on the increasing presence of Chinese traders in Zimbabwean towns and cities (Gukurume, 2019). To promote China's aid program in Zimbabwe, Chinese companies involved in aid projects have been exporting labour, especially skilled labour, to Zimbabwe as part of the conditions attached to some of the aid deals (Hodzi et al., 2012b). After the completion of these projects, or when the projects are suspended for one reason or another, some of these Chinese workers do not go back to China; instead, they set up small business even in sectors reserved for locals, such as vending, operating restaurants and pubs, and in some cases engaging in illegal activities such as selling drugs and managing brothels (Gukurume, 2019).

As part of the bilateral relations between the two countries, the government of Zimbabwe has given more than 51 Chinese companies business permits to operate in the country (Chipaike and Marufu, 2020). Chipaike and Marufu (2020) stressed that the most contentious issue regarding Chinese firms in Zimbabwe is that of labour rights. This emanates from the dynamics of the Chinese labour-market remuneration, where an average construction worker earns as little as US\$3 per day (Chan and Selden, 2019). Corkin et al. (2008) reported that more than 100 million undocumented

Chinese nationals from rural areas are employed in the construction sector in China. In Zimbabwe, an unskilled construction worker is paid US\$1.63 per hour (Chipaike and Marufu, 2020). This comes into play when the Chinese are negotiating project deals with Zimbabwe: they impose a condition that specialised labour should come from China because they regard Zimbabwean labour to be expensive, and they also argue that an average Zimbabwean worker does not have the same work ethic and technical ability as an average Chinese worker.

The argument that China is using aid to Zimbabwe to create employment for Chinese nationals, as participants pointed out (Section 6.2.4), does not match data from the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA) that shows that China has created more than 200,000 local jobs in Zimbabwe, but just 9,000 jobs for Chinese nationals. The ZIA reports show that Zimbabwean employees are given priority whenever Chinese companies are employing. The figure of 9,000 Chinese nationals employed in Zimbabwe supports the participants' accounts to some extent, given that the 9,000 Chinese nationals are employed by only 51 Chinese companies, which implies that on average a Chinese company operating in Zimbabwe creates 176 jobs for Chinese nationals and 4,000 jobs for locals. The number of local jobs being created is, however, not particularly impressive given that Zimbabwe has an unemployment rate that averages 85% (Rusvingo, 2015). Participants also raised concerns about the treatment of those employees, with 70% of the participants arguing that the Chinese employers do not follow Zimbabwe's labour laws (Section 7.5.3); this is consistent with the emerging theory that the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe enables China to advance its interests.

8.2.4. Zimbabwe's situation

If you allow the Chinese to come and rape you and take all they want simply because you need their money, then the whole country will suffer – remark by Siphon Ndlovu CEO of Exxaro Resources (Stanislous, 2019).

The theory developed in this study depicts the Zimbabwean economic, social, and political situation as the enabling variable that allows China to advance its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Zimbabwe. Participants' accounts revealed that the Zimbabwe situation acts as a pull factor that attracts China to Zimbabwe (Section 6.4).

The study participants' assertions that Zimbabwe policy-makers are unwilling and unable to demand enough from their Chinese counterparts when negotiating for deals is based on Zimbabwe's position in global geoeconomics and geopolitics. Zimbabwe has been battling for legitimacy domestically and internationally, as well as experiencing international isolation and ridicule due to allegations of human-rights abuses and economic mismanagement (Magaisa, 2019). Zimbabwe has thus turned to China for international support as an ally against the West, and for domestic support against opposition politics and citizen unrest. Zimbabwe regards China as a friend that is ready to assist any time, especially on the international stage, where the United Nations has become the centre of intense activities regarding Zimbabwe: Western permanent members seek to sanction Zimbabwe, and China uses its global influence to defend it (Alao, 2014). Thus, Zimbabwean policymakers try to avoid offending China in a desperate bid to maintain the relationship. Zimbabwe's desperation to be on China's good side enables China to advance whatever economic or political interests it may have in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's efforts to foster a relationship with China have included, in some cases, exempting Chinese companies from paying taxes and observing regulations and licensing requirements. The behaviour of Zimbabwe's

policymakers is shaped mainly by Zimbabwe's geopolitical strategy towards China, which is driven by Zimbabwe's desire to mend its broken global political image.

Zimbabwe's political image on the international stage since the early 2000s is that of a small country desperate to shake off external influence by disengaging with the global Western superpowers. The disengagement has created antagonism between Zimbabwe and Western powers, which has led to a significant drop in Western investments to Zimbabwe, abolition of state-to-state financial assistance, and an imposition of sanctions and global isolation Zimbabwe (Chipaike and Bischoff, 2019). Faced with this difficult situation, Zimbabwe has sought for a strong ally with the capacity to provide a shield from economic pressure, and the willingness to engage with the Western powers head on. It is in this spirit that Zimbabwe adopted the Look East Policy in the early 2000s as a deliberate attempt to attract China (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013). China has become Zimbabwe's protector from what Zimbabwe calls international bullies in the UN Security Council by repeatedly calling for the removal of West-imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. Thus China has effectively replaced the West, and the state media in Zimbabwe portrays China as a political all-weather friend that is always ready to extend a helping hand in times of need (Chipaike and Bischoff, 2019).

Some studies argue that the Zimbabwean government did not craft the Look East Policy only to attract China, but also to spite the West by proving that Zimbabwe had the capacity to attract and establish relations with strong countries other than those in the West (Mudavanhu, 2014; Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013). The result of this move by Zimbabwe has been that China's support has opened political and economic opportunities for China and helped the Zimbabwean government to shrink local democratic space. This was summed up by Morgan Tsvangirai, Zimbabwe's

former prime minister and opposition leader, who argued that by dumping the West and engaging China, Zimbabwe was trying to avoid scrutiny and was getting in bed with an ally who hears no evil and sees no evil, and that as a consequence, the people of Zimbabwe were the losers.

Scholars like Manyeruke (2011) have applauded Zimbabwe's engagement with China, arguing that Zimbabwe had no option after the falling out with the West, and that China had established itself as a superpower and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Manyeruke (2011) underscored that the Sino-Zimbabwe relations laid the foundation for the Chinese veto of the United Nations Security Council resolution of sanctions against Zimbabwe in July 2008. China has been the only non-African country to endorse the outcome of Zimbabwean elections since 2002 (Tendi, 2011; Tendi, 2016; Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020). China has constantly used its non-interference policy to maintain that Zimbabwe must have its sovereignty respected, and that the international community should not interfere with Zimbabwe's domestic issues but should rather assume a supportive role (Zheng, 2016).

Thus, academic commentary is split, with some scholars depicting the Zimbabwean government as desperate policymakers driven not by strategy when they crafted the Look East Policy, but by desperation. Others portray the Zimbabwean government as programmatic policy-makers who change strategies when faced with difficult situations (Chipaike and Bischoff, 2019). Whether the Look East Policy was driven by strategy or desperation is up for debate, but what is indisputable is that there was a deliberate attempt to attract China, that the growth of the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship is in line with Zimbabwe's geopolitical strategy, and that this has created an environment conducive for China to advance its own interests in Zimbabwe.

.8.2.4.1 A strategic partnership of enemies of the West

Zimbabwe and China both express antipathy toward the Western countries, particularly the US (Landes, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The two countries regard themselves as all-weather friends in need and in deed (Alao, 2014). However, evidence from this research shows that claims that Zimbabwe is better off as a friend of China than of the West is not backed by data. Zimbabwe still receives more aid from Western countries than from China (Table 7.2). The Sino-Zimbabwean relationship is different from China's relationship with other African countries in the sense that Zimbabwe's economic policy (the Look East Policy) was tailored to attract China (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018, Youde, 2007), and simultaneously to take a dig at the West, as then-President Mugabe said to a crowd at a political gathering to celebrate Zimbabwe's 25th independence anniversary: "We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets" (Chun, 2014).

This policy approach by Zimbabwe distinguishes the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship from the overall Sino-African relationship because, unlike in other African countries such as South Africa and Angola, where China was initially attracted by their resources (Power and Cristina, 2012), Zimbabwe made the first move to attract China (Chun, 2014). After Zimbabwe's falling out with the West, China became the only superpower willing to openly support Zimbabwe and to shield it from international pressure (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008). China could fill the void that was left by the Western superpowers when their relationship with Harare deteriorated. The Sino-Zimbabwean relationship has successfully constructed a formidable diplomatic alliance, with both countries defending each other vehemently on the international stage, such as at the UNSC, as they both face political legitimacy challenges (Guse, 2017).

8.3. Research Question #2: What are the main features of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?

The Sino-Zimbabwean relationship is characterised by enmeshed interactions between the governments of Zimbabwe and China, and between the government of China and Zimbabwe's private sector (Chun, 2014). The relationship includes projects and loan negotiations, aid, and donations to Zimbabwe. The nature of Sino-Zimbabwean relations is shaped by three main determinates, which constitute the key pillars of the theory developed in this study. As discussed in Section 7.6, China's political and economic interests inform China's geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies towards Zimbabwe, and these impacting variables will in turn shape the nature of the aid that China gives to Zimbabwe. The main features of the aid are designed to align with Zimbabwe's situation (the enabling variable). This section discusses the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe within the context of China's geopolitical and geoeconomics strategy towards Zimbabwe and draws parallels between this relationship and a typical North-South aid relationship.

8.3.1. China's geoeconomics strategy towards Zimbabwe

The literature portrays China's going-out strategy as being always in pursuit of economic gains in the host countries (Wang, 2016a, Kitissou, 2007). Naidu and Davis (2016) argued that China is using Africa's natural resources to fuel its riches; thus, the government of China always aims to ensure that Chinese companies and individuals have direct access to resource deposits (Naidu and Davies, 2006; Reilly, 2013). The documents consulted for this study show that China-Zimbabwe loan deals have in some instances used mineral resources as security or collateral for loans; and in some cases, deals have broken down after China has demanded unrealistic mineral deposits as collateral. In addition, the fact that two Chinese state-owned banks – China's Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China – are involved in

financing Chinese companies that take up projects in Zimbabwe, and are involved in the negotiation of deals that involve Zimbabwe's minerals as collateral, is evidence that there is a strategy to acquire Zimbabwean minerals by the Chinese government.

These banks are wholly state-owned regardless of their commercial inclinations; thus, they have a role to play in advancing China's economic strategy (Moss and Rose, 2006). Zimbabwe's struggles with repaying Chinese loans (Acker et al., 2020) and a lack of alternative international sources of financial support (Kärkkäinen, 2016) have given China the upper hand when negotiating for loans with Zimbabwe, particularly in convincing Zimbabwe to use minerals as collateral for further funding.

This study agrees with studies that have established that China has a geoeconomic strategy for Africa (Carmody and Taylor, 2009; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Mattlin and Wigell, 2016). Narrowing the debate to Sino-Zimbabwean engagements, the study argues that whilst China may have a specific geoeconomic strategy in Zimbabwe, the implementation of the strategy is hindered by Zimbabwe's lack of consistency in its geoeconomic policy. Geoeconomics refers to the deliberate use of a country's economic policy to gain economic benefits in foreign countries (Kärkkäinen, 2016). The question of whether the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship continues to be informed by a geoeconomics strategy from either side has not been answered by previous research. Zimbabwe adopted its Look East Policy in the early 2000s (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018), which was a clear geoeconomics strategy targeted at attracting the interest of China and other Eastern countries (Mudavanhu, 2014). The policy has since been discarded after Zimbabwe launched the Zimbabwe is Open for Business Policy that sought to reintegrate Zimbabwe with the rest of the world (Doré, 2018). Whether this was a geoeconomics strategy or just a mantra is up

for debate, but China remained a close ally of Zimbabwe regardless of Zimbabwe's efforts to engage with China's enemies (Ndimande and Moyo, 2018). This implies that whilst Zimbabwe might not have a clear geoeconomics strategy, China does, and it seems to be working for China.

8.3.2. China's geopolitical strategy towards Zimbabwe

China has used aid to advance some of its policies, such as the One China Policy. Scholars have argued that whilst on paper Chinese aid seems to be unconditional, the Eastern giant has one output condition – adherence to the One China Policy as the precondition for a country to receive aid from China (McCormick, 2008; Wang et al., 2014). The Zimbabwean government is fully aware of this condition and has not hidden its support for the policy, which seeks to have Taiwan regarded as a part of mainland China (Alao, 2014). During celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship in 2012, the then-Zimbabwe Ambassador to China stated, “ Zimbabwe has consistently supported the One China Policy and China's other interests globally” (Chun, 2014). The sentiments were also echoed by Zimbabwe's former Vice President Teurairopa J. Mujuru after a technical agreement worth US\$180 million with the Chinese embassy had been signed: “For a long period of time, the CPC, the Chinese government and people have rendered Zimbabwe selfless assistance and help. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has always adhered to the One China Policy” (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013).

The Zimbabwean government's stance shows that China has benefited politically from Sino-Zimbabwean relations. To then suggest that China is providing aid to Zimbabwe solely based on Zimbabwe's stance towards the One China Policy

may be inaccurate, because even though the Western countries, especially the US, have a low-key relationship with Taiwan, they subscribe to the One China Policy (Chun, 2014). Thus, Zimbabwe's public support of the policy alone cannot be the driving force behind Sino-Zimbabwean relations.

However, in addition to being a staunch public proponent of the One China Policy, Zimbabwe has always been a supporter of China on the global stage. For example, in 1989, Zimbabwe used the Sovereignty Principle to support China when China faced a global backlash after the Tiananmen Square massacre of protesters (Thompson, 2005). Defending China's Tiananmen Square killings, Mugabe said, "Any reforms in China must take place only based on China's own tradition and characteristics" (Chun, 2014).

Zimbabwe's attitude towards China is informed by Zimbabwe's ideological viewpoint of national sovereignty: it does not appreciate international interference into Zimbabwe's domestic issues. Mugabe, reiterating Zimbabwe's stance on international interference at the World Earth Summit in 2002, bellowed, "So, [then-UK Prime Minister Tony] Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

In this regard, Zimbabwe feels that China should be given space to deal with its domestic challenges without the international world interfering. China also feels that there developing countries need to join hands to fight Western interference. Xi Jinping expressed this upon arriving in Harare in 2015:

We need to enhance our collaboration in international arena and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. China values the important contribution to the solidarity and development of Africa that

Zimbabwe has made after assuming the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (The Herald, 30 November 2015)

Whilst there seems to be mutual love between Beijing and Harare, sceptics see China's move into Zimbabwe to be a neo-colonial ploy meant to exploit a desperate and poor but resource-endowed country (Maru and Jinping, 2019; Vava, 2017). This view has been informed by widespread reports of corruption, bribery, and illicit deals associated with China's deals with the Zimbabwe (Hodzi et al., 2012b). In what seems to be a provocation of the West, China seems to seek engagement with areas shunned by the West (Alden et al., 2008; Breslin and Taylor, 2008; Taylor, 2007). The general feeling is that China is prepared to advance its geopolitical strategy of being a global hegemony at all costs and is not in Zimbabwe by accident; rather, that seems to be part of its plan for China to spread its influence worldwide. This was emphasised by the President of China addressing delegates when he visited Zimbabwe in 2015: "Despite the constant profound and complex changes in the international landscape, it remains a cornerstone of China's foreign policy to consolidate China's relations with Zimbabwe and other African nations" (The Herald, 30 November 2015).

8.3.3. Same aid game, but different rules

China has become the most talked-about donor in Zimbabwe, receiving many accolades from government authorities and criticisms from the civil society and from opposition politicians (Ramani, 2016). Comparisons are frequently drawn between Chinese and Western aid (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Sørensen, 2010) in an attempt to explore why countries like Zimbabwe, that still receive much of their aid from Western development partners like the Paris Club and the Bretton Woods institutions, appreciate Chinese aid more even if it does not come in large quantities.

The Zimbabwean government seems to have become more inclined to the Chinese aid approach relative to the quantity of the aid provided. China's non-interference and non-conditionality principles are friendly to the Zimbabwean government as they safeguard the politicians' egos. Prior to engaging with China, Zimbabwe had joined other African countries in pressing the Western donor community to revisit their conditionality stance when providing aid (Koeberle, 2004). The Zimbabwean government, like most African administrations, does not want to reform, and views conditionalities imposed on Western aid to be driven by a regime-change agenda; thus, they prefer China's model.

It is important to highlight the main differences between the delivery of Western and Chinese aid in Zimbabwe: the West attempts to use aid to promote democracy, human rights, and transparency, whereas China advances a non-interference and a non-conditionality approach. Participants in the study argued that China's non-conditionality principle is only on paper and not in principle, as there are conditions attached to the aid such as adherence to the One China Policy, the "buying China" condition, and the need to make a deposit before a loan is disbursed. The conditions attached to Chinese aid are not as pronounced as compared to Western conditions. This brings to question whether the Zimbabwean government is genuinely against conditions as such, or against the fundamental nature of Western aid. China's approach is one of influence without interference in the domestic affairs of the host nation, whereas Western conditions involve intervention and sanctions (Qian and Wu, 2007). The Zimbabwean government is not worried about influence, since China does not threaten their grip on power. It is, however, concerned about interference, as it endangers their stay in power; this may explain why they prefer China's influence to Western interference (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010).

The aid-distribution channels used by the Chinese in Zimbabwe differ from those used by the West. Chinese aid is distributed through government channels, which gives the government the liberty to direct the aid where it will help achieve government objectives, whereas the West seeks to be in control of the aid from the moment it is disbursed until it reaches its intended beneficiaries, and requires transparency regarding how the aid is distributed and used (Hodzi et al., 2012b). Western aid is distributed through non-governmental organisations, circumventing the government's direct control; the government of Zimbabwe is on record as criticising this approach, accusing the West, and particularly the US and UK, of interfering with, and thus undermining, Zimbabwe's sovereignty (Mamdani, 2009). The Zimbabwean government strongly opposes the West's persistent criticism of human-rights violations in Zimbabwe (Tendi, 2011), and prefers China's soft-diplomacy approach (Mano, 2016). The government has used this to justify its Look East Policy after its falling out with the West in 2000. Former President Mugabe said, "We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets," (The Guardian, 19 April 2005).

The Chinese President, upon his visit to Zimbabwe in 2015, also asserted that China and Zimbabwe have a common interest:

"We need to continue to understand and support each other on issues involving our core interests and major concerns. China firmly supports Zimbabwe's efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests and its choice of the development path that suits its national conditions" (The Herald, 30 November 2015).

Both China and Zimbabwe seem not to be comfortable with direct confrontation on the international stage. For example, the West demands good governance, transparency, human rights, and strong institutions, whereas the Chinese are only concerned with the economic aspect of the relationship. Thus, a government always facing international backlash for human-rights will obviously prefer China's approach, because it does not demand any checks and balances.

Another difference is in the disbursements of the aid, because of the conditions attached to Western aid. For example, in the case of projects, the West will demand that the project go to tender, whereas the Chinese will provide a contractor; this results in Chinese aid being disbursed more quickly. Chinese projects do not go to tender because one of the conditions attached to Chinese project aid is that the project contractor must be a Chinese company (Foster et al., 2009). This is a noticeable difference, given the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, which is guided by consensus within the Chinese government and concentrates mainly on infrastructure building (Wang and Ozanne, 2000). Western aid, in contrast, is guided by consensus within the US government (McKinnon, 2010), and requires recipients to comply with values that include democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law (Kaya and Reay, 2019). Consensus within the Chinese government is concerned with safeguarding China's economic interests (McKinnon, 2010). One of this study's participants said:

The money is transferred from the China Exim bank for example into the account of the contractor and it does not come to the coffers of the Ministry of Finance in Zimbabwe. It changes hands there in Beijing so if there are transfers that need to take place when the company finally comes here, they open their own account in Zimbabwe then the money is transferred directly into their account. Therefore, they do not make noise about corruption because the money does not reach our government.

(Interview with DO1: Transcript number 4)

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness stressed that aid should ensure accountability, ownership, alignment, and harmonisation (Bräutigam, 2011a). Chinese aid is guided by the eight principles of equality, sovereignty, self-reliance, quick results, cheap loans, use of quality equipment, technology transfer, and having Chinese experts living at local experts' standard (Zhou, 1964). Both the Chinese aid guidelines and the Paris Declaration standards emphasise ownership and results of the aid being extended (Bräutigam, 2011a). Overall, the major difference between the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and China relates to the content of assistance. Whilst the Development Assistance Committee has shifted to providing aid to social sectors, the Chinese continue to focus on infrastructure development and scholarships for university education (Bräutigam, 2011a).

Another pertinent difference is how the West and China view aid as a development tool. The West see aid as an important tool to spearhead development in poor countries, while China sees infrastructure investment as the best development catalyst, probably drawing on its own experience (Masina, 2008). China's success story is not attributed to outside aid, and thus China does not view aid as a development instrument. This was accentuated in 2008 by China's then-ambassador to Malawi, who stressed that an economy can only be developed by locals (Bräutigam, 2011a). Therefore, China's engagements with Zimbabwe are not necessarily about providing aid but about identifying instruments of economic and diplomatic cooperation. They are experimenting – as Deng Xiaoping said, “crossing the ocean by feeling the stones” (Keo, 2020).

8.4. Research Question #3: What are Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid?

Participants in this study expressed negative perceptions towards Sino-Zimbabwean relations, arguing that these relations are promoting high-level corruption, enabling China to enact neo-colonial tendencies, and targeting Zimbabwean resources. As discussed in Section 7.5.2, participants' assertion that Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is promoting high-level corruption is refuted by government officials and politicians through speeches and through the state-controlled media, which depicts China-Zimbabwean aid relations as beneficial to the citizenry in line with the official narrative that China is Zimbabwe's "all-weather friend" (Musanga, 2017). However, the average sentiment among citizens as depicted in lyrics of some songs by Zimbabwean musicians describes the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship as a partnership devoid of loyalty and trust (Musanga, 2017). A good example is a song by Zimbabwean musician Winky D, titled "Made in China":

Hushamwari hwenyu uhu hunenge made in China, haugare.
Your Chinese made friendship, does not last.
Tikasava liner havaudzane
If we do not warn them, they will not be open to each other.
Tinoda ma friends ari genuine
We need genuine friends.

Winky D's lyrics contend that China and Zimbabwe pretend to be sincere companions, but in secret they stalk each other for their own benefit. The song goes on to imply that China's deception can only fool the ruling elite, and not the citizens, who are aware of China's machinations. Similarly, some of this study's participants argued that the current nature of the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship is not sustainable, as it is based on convenience, with Zimbabwe allowing China to pursue its interests in Zimbabwe for as long as Zimbabwe's interests are also achieved. Some participants also argued that there is an influx of substandard Chinese products on the

Zimbabwean market. Zimbabweans do not regard Chinese products highly, considering them to be of poor quality compared to Western products (Musanga, 2017). Thus, the song's title, 'Made in China,' refers to the feelings of ordinary Zimbabweans when they look at China-Zimbabwe cooperation.

The musician also seemed to be making a distinction between the government – “them” – and the citizens – “we”, with “your” being used to refer to both the Zimbabwean authorities and China. This implies that there is no citizen collective participation in Sino-Zimbabwean relations. Similarly, the participants in this study argued that Sino-Zimbabwean engagement is an elitist relationship that does not address the interests of the ordinary citizens. Ojakorotu et al. (2018) argued that the Zimbabwean elite have vested interests in Sino-Zimbabwean relations at the expense of ordinary citizens. They also criticised Chinese investments in Zimbabwe, stressing that the investments are detrimental to citizens' interests. The vested interests of the political elite is blamed for the failure by the Zimbabwean government to negotiate deals that are in Zimbabwe's interests when engaging with the Chinese (Chipaike et al., 2019). This supports the theory emergent in this research that Zimbabwe enables China to advance China's interests in Zimbabwe.

Some of this study's participants felt that China has a big-brother mentality and is driving a neo-colonialist agenda in Zimbabwe, and that China's ambitions went beyond befriending Zimbabwe; instead, China was aiming to control Zimbabwe's economy and politics. China has vehemently denied this notion, with the Chinese embassy consistently reiterating that China and Zimbabwe are all-weather friends (Fang et al., 2020). The participants' views could have been shaped by the attitudes of Chinese nationals who come to Zimbabwe, especially those who employ Zimbabweans, that Zimbabweans are inferior (Bayo, 2011). Perceptions of imbalance

between the Chinese nationals and locals fuel the widely held view that China has a neo-colonialist attitude. It should be noted that whilst the debate on whether China has a neo-colonialist agenda towards Zimbabwe or Africa in general continues, one thing that has been established through literature is that, in contrast to 19th-century colonialism, Zimbabwe is a willing partner in Sino-Zimbabwean engagements and sometimes makes the first move to lure China into deals.

The study participants' generally negative perceptions of Sino-Zimbabwean relations are relevant to the research problem identified in Section 1.5. The citizens' perceptions are shaped by the lack of adequate information on what China is doing in Zimbabwe and the widening gap between narratives by state-controlled media and what is reported through social media, leaving citizens to build their perceptions from their own experiences of the Chinese with whom they are directly involved through their peers' accounts.

Chinese aid to Zimbabwe can be described as what Winston Churchill referred to as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma" (Murphy, 2017). The data is seldom publicly published, and even when it is made available, it is extremely difficult to understand. China considers its data as a state secret and thus is not made readily available for public scrutiny (Murphy, 2017). The opaqueness of the data coupled with the lack of transparency in Zimbabwe, as by law most government projects evade parliamentary scrutiny (Doro and Kufakurinani, 2018), leaves citizens relying on their own experiences and the experiences of their peers when analysing the Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations. However, their experiences with individual Chinese nationals may not be a true representation of China's overall strategy and interests in Zimbabwe.

In addition, citizens are reluctant to participate in Chinese-funded projects, as they have negative perceptions about China in general and China-Zimbabwe relations. This can be attributed to the opaqueness of the aid deals, as discussed above, as well as the lack of local capacity in the implementation of the projects. Local capacity is focal to the success of the aid projects, and China needs to transform from being just an aid provider to also being a capacity-builder. The current implementation of Sino-Zimbabwean engagements treats locals as “pawns” (passive players), who are not engaged or consulted, and the government and China as “knights” (great altruists), who make the critical decisions. This tactic limits community capacities as well as local take-up of the projects. Locals are the intended beneficiaries of most of the aid and their buy-in of the projects is necessary to avoid having the projects ending up as white elephants. In this regard, there is a need to provide adequate information to citizens and civil society to increase their awareness, willingness, and capacity to take part in the projects.


8.5. Research findings and the research problem

The three research questions that guided this study sought to address the research problem identified in Section 1.5: “How does the degree of transparency in the distribution, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe affect citizens’ capacity to participate in projects funded by Chinese aid?” In answering the third research question on the perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding Chinese aid, the results of this study confirm that there is lack of transparency in the distribution and quantity of Chinese aid extended to Zimbabwe, and that citizens have negative perceptions about the aid engagements. As clearly stipulated in the research problem, the negative perceptions shape citizens’ attitude towards Chinese-funded projects. As long as citizens feel that the aid is only beneficial to a few with access to power, their

participation in the projects is minimal and the chances of the projects meeting their intended goals are very low.

The findings in this study address this problem in three ways. (i) The results presented in Chapter 6 inform readers about the motives of both China and Zimbabwe in Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements. This information helps citizens understand the conduct of the Chinese in Zimbabwe as well as the reaction of the Zimbabwean authorities. It provides evidence-based data on the reasons why China is giving aid to Zimbabwe and information on why some information is hidden from the public domain. (ii). The results presented in the first section of Chapter 7 address the transparency aspect of the problem by quantifying the aid and unpacking the areas it targets, as well as identifying specific projects in which China is engaging. The results also show the form and types of the aid given. (ii) The findings presented particularly in the last section of Chapter 8 address why citizens may not participate in Chinese-funded projects, based on their perceptions of Chinese aid. The onus is on the government of Zimbabwe to shape those perceptions in a positive way. The results therefore provide critical information to the aid-implementing agents, and who could use the results to improve their distribution of the aid. The implications of these results are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. The study also presented a theoretical framework in Section 7.6 the variables of which explained the role being played by both China and Zimbabwe in shaping Sino-Zimbabwean relations (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1: A depiction of the study's theoretical framework for Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations



The theoretical framework proposes that the geopolitical and geoeconomic characteristics of the aid host nation create a conducive environment for China to pursue its own geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, and it is those interests that shape the nature of assistance rendered to the host nation. The framework argues that China's aid approach in the global South shows elements of rogue and predatory behaviour, particularly when looking at the conditions attached to the aid as discussed in Chapter 7. However, whilst China has self-interest, the extent to which the self-interest shapes the allocation of aid depends on the host country's domestic and international strategies. In this regard, China should not be blamed for the challenges that face aid host nations, and the onus is on the authorities of the host nations to improve their institutions and boost their negotiation capacities. Recommendations on how to improve Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.

8.6. Theoretical underpinnings and the emergent theoretical framework

Section 2.12 discusses the theoretical underpinnings that guided this study. In this section I revisit those theories in line with the new data and in relation to Sino-Zimbabwean relations, comparing them to the emergent theoretical framework. In Section 2.12, I argued that realism is a convenient instrument to understand China's going-out strategy. The results of this study that reveal elements of rogue behaviour and predatory traits in China's dealings with Zimbabwe resonate with the propositions of realism, such as moral scepticism and self-serving aims. The result of this study shows that China is willing to realise its political interests in the same way that it is keen on realising its political goals by the inclusion of both implicit conditionalities (that seek to achieve economic gains) and diplomatic conditionalities (that seek to achieve political gains) in loan deals. This is in contrast with the assumptions of realism, which imply that China would prefer economic gains to political benefits.


The same argument can be forwarded against the theory of economic nationalism, which argues that economic power results in increased political power. In the case of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, the two countries seem to give equal importance to their political and economic interests, implying that both economic and political interests are subordinate to overarching national goals.

Both economic nationalism and realism neglect the role played by the host country when analysing countries' foreign-relations behaviours. Analysis using these theories explains China's behaviour through the lens of Beijing. This study looked at China from the lens of Zimbabwe, looking at the role being played by Zimbabwe to promote and encourage China's actions. This aspect is explained clearly by the emergent theory in this study that explains the complex relationship between

China and Zimbabwe, arguing that whilst China has clear interests, Zimbabwe is a willing participant that chooses to allow China to advance its interests.

Whilst results in this study show evidence of China’s quest to acquire and control natural resources and China’s ability to provide Zimbabwe with protection and financial stability, there is no evidence that China is advancing its military presence in Zimbabwe, which is one of the key assumptions of hegemony theory. In this regard, the result of this study shows that none of the existing theories can solely explain Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements. The emergent theory uses the new evidence in this study to explain this relationship. Figure 8.2 illustrates the theoretical underpinnings in relation to the results of this study.

Figure 8.2: Relationship between the theoretical underpinnings and the study results



The emergent theoretical framework attempts to analyse Sino-Zimbabwean relations from both China’s and Zimbabwe’s perspectives. The relationship can be

analysed from an individual, national, and global level. This will give insights to citizens who normally analyse the relationship at an individual level, overlooking the national and global levels of analysis. The government also tends to consider the national and global levels of analysis, neglecting the individual level. The emergent theoretical framework will thus inform both policymakers and citizens.

8.7. Conclusion

This study offers the first effort to build a theory of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations using ideas from Straussian grounded theory. The emergent theory proposes that the geopolitical strategy in the host country creates an environment conducive for China to advance its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. The theory argues that whether or not China's aid approach in the global South is rogue or predatory, the extent to which China's self-interest shapes the allocation of aid depends on the host country's domestic and international strategies.

This research expands on previous research in the field of international relations. It provides a research-based framework to explain how the conduct of host nations enables a donor country to advance its economic and political interests. It also provides evidence to evaluate some of the conceptualisations regarding China's behaviour in the global South. This chapter discussed the study results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 in the context of the two research questions that guided this study. The next chapter will conclude the study, discuss its theoretical and practical implications, and give recommendations.

CHAPTER NINE:


CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

9.1 Introduction

China and Zimbabwe have a close relationship that dates to the 1950s, when Zimbabwe was fighting for independence from British rule. The falling out between Zimbabwe and the West has seen Zimbabwe courting China to fill the void left by the Western superpowers who placed sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to the government's human-rights violations. To date the relationship has grown to the extent that Zimbabwean schools teach Mandarin and Zimbabwe has adopted the Chinese yuan as an official currency in Zimbabwe. The growth in engagement has attracted the attention of scholars, aid donors, and policymakers alike. Questions have been asked as to whether China is in Zimbabwe to assist or to advance its own interests. This line of questioning relates to issues such as the magnitude of China's involvement in Zimbabwe, the effect of the engagements, and whether China's conduct in Zimbabwe is the same as its conduct in other jurisdictions in the global South.

Having been involved in some of these discussions in my profession as an economist in Zimbabwe's Ministry of Finance, I pursued an interest in developing a theory that explains China's relations with its global South counterparts. I therefore employed a qualitative research methodology using triangulation of content analysis and semi-structured interviews and ideas from Straussian grounded theory to undertake this study. Figure 9.1 summarises the study and the emergent theory from the research.

Figure 9.1: A summary of the study



In this concluding chapter I present my reflections on the work undertaken in this study. The reflection covers the relationship between Sino-Zimbabwean engagements and China’s rising insistent diplomacy in Zimbabwe, explaining it using the lens of the theory emerging from this study. The study also provides scope for further research on Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations.

During my confirmation of Candidature Review in 2019 I was asked, “How significant was Zimbabwe in China’s going-out strategy?” The Sino-Zimbabwean aid relationship deserves academic scrutiny not because the volumes of aid from China to Zimbabwe are substantial, but because the engagement in general signals the shift of the aid nexus from the traditional North-South approach to the global-South approach. More specifically, the Sino-Zimbabwean aid relationship reveals

contradictions in China's aid policy. Regardless of China's aid policy being guided by China's non-interference principle, China's influence in Zimbabwe has been increasingly assertive, as evidenced by the Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe publicly requesting the Zimbabwean government to explain what China called the understating of aid figures in the Fiscal Policy Statement of 2020. This was contradictory in that whilst China advocates for supportive cooperation, they also practice confrontation. Does such direct confrontation affect Sino-Zimbabwean relations? Do the study results presented in Section 6.2 that China is giving aid to Zimbabwe to rebuild China's global image as a friendly partner still stand in the face of direct and public confrontations? The way the Zimbabwean authorities responded to China's outburst seems to have eased tensions, and the support from Zimbabwe suggests that the nation is willing to portray to China that it is an ally and ready to solve issues to China's satisfaction whenever there is a problem.

Finally, whilst Zimbabwe seems to be eager to attract Chinese aid at all costs, China appears to place other economic activities such as trade and investment ahead of aid, as more resources have been committed to investment initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative than to the country's budget for development assistance (Peña, 2021). However, China is likely to continue providing aid to Zimbabwe to keep benefiting from Zimbabwe's resources, markets, and much-needed diplomatic support on the international stage, among other things. Thus, for as long as the Zimbabwean situation continues to enable China to advance its geopolitical and geoeconomics strategies, China will continue to give aid to Zimbabwe.

9.2. Main conclusions

This study provided an initial attempt to develop a theory that explains the factors that characterise China's aid approach in the global South. The study used

Sino-Zimbabwean relations to examine the convergence of China’s and Zimbabwe’s respective interests. In developing the theoretical framework (Figure 7.4), the study investigated three distinct subjects: the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, the nature and magnitude of the aid, and Zimbabweans’ perceptions of the aid.

The first question answered by the study is: ***What are the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?*** Table 9.1 summarises the key answers to this question.

Table 9.1: A summary of the key answers to the first research question

First research question	Broad findings (themes)	Specific findings (themes)
What are the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	China is using aid to advance its geopolitical interests.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ China looking for a voting ally at the UNSC ❖ China maintaining historical ties ❖ China using aid to improve its global image ❖ China using aid to reward countries that adhere to the One China Policy
	China is using aid to pursue its economic goals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ China marketing its exports ❖ China seeking mineral resources ❖ China marketing its loans ❖ China creating employment for Chinese nationals
	Zimbabwe’s situation is pulling aid to Zimbabwe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Zimbabwe searching for external funding ❖ Zimbabwe in need of protection against international bullies ❖ Zimbabwe seeking support to fight and silence domestic opposition ❖ Zimbabwe seeking to save a struggling healthcare and educational system ❖ Zimbabwe seeking to alleviate poverty

As shown in Table 9.1, results from the study indicate that Chinese aid is driven to Zimbabwe by China’s political and economic interests together with Zimbabwe’s political ambitions, to a larger extent, and Zimbabwe’s economic and social needs, to a lesser extent. Participants shared that having access to natural resources, marketing loans, marketing exports, creating employment for Chinese nationals, maintaining historical links, having an ally in international forums, and improving its global image are the main motives driving China when giving aid to

Zimbabwe. China is also responding to Zimbabwe's economic, social, and political needs, which include access to external funding, the need for protection against Western superpowers at the UNGA, the need for support against domestic dissent, the need to spite the West by being seen to be able to attract strong allies, and the need to deal with increasing poverty as Zimbabwe rebuilds a struggling health-care system and education sector.

In other words, both China and Zimbabwe benefit from Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations. The extent to which they benefit depends on their individual strategies, but both governments claim that their relationship is premised on a win-win principle. In addition, Zimbabwe's interest in Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements does not have an immediate trickle-down impact on the lives of citizens, as these engagements are more inclined to the fulfilment of a political agenda. Lastly, Zimbabwe needs to restructure its geoeconomic strategy towards China to try to reap more economic and social rewards (such as increasing the production capacity of the manufacturing sector, having access to modern technology, and using aid to build institutions that benefit women and children) from the relationship with China.

The second research question answered by this study (Table 9.2) is: ***What is the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?***

The variables discussed above shape the nature of the aid that is provided to Zimbabwe: zero-interest loans, concessionary loans, grants, and donations (Table 9.2). The aid is distributed in the form of equipment, services, and expertise; this supports the position that China seeks to market its products, labour, and technology. The distribution of the aid is multi-sectorial, targeting the security, education, health, energy, tourism, agriculture, and water reticulation sectors. The targeting of the

security sector seems to be influenced by both countries' quest for diplomatic allies on the global stage, whereas the targeting of the health and education sectors and food security seem to be influenced by China's need to improve its global image and to be seen globally as an ally of the downtrodden. The targeting of other sectors, such as mining, agriculture, and energy, is influenced by China's economic interests in having access to mineral resources and raw materials, as well as in creating jobs for Chinese nationals.

Table 9.2: Summary of the main responses to the second research question

Second research question	Broad findings (themes)	Specific findings (themes)
What is the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	Form of the aid given	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Aid extended in the form of concessionary loans ❖ Aid given as zero-interest loans ❖ Aid comes in form of expertise and scholarships ❖ Aid comes as grants and donations
	Conditions attached to the aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Diplomatic conditionality ❖ Entrenched conditionality ❖ Implicit conditionality
	Sectors targeted by the aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Security and defence ❖ Health and education ❖ Transport and tourism ❖ Mining and agriculture ❖ Energy and water reticulation

Conclusions drawn from this section are that, although China asserts that it follows a non-interference and non-conditionality approach when providing aid, the three types of conditionalities identified in this study prove otherwise. The results in this section refute the notion that Chinese aid comes with no conditionalities. The diplomatic, entrenched, and implicit conditionalities presented in this study are indirect, but have lock-in effects that limit Zimbabwe's fiscal policy options in the same way that direct Western conditionalities do. The conditionalities also show China's predatory nature, especially where loans are attached to mineral deposits. Given Zimbabwe's

history with struggling to repay loans, the loans extended by China seem to have a covert agenda of targeting minerals by trapping Zimbabwe in debt.

The third question that was tackled by this study (Table 9.3) is: ***What are Zimbabweans’ perceptions of Zimbabweans regarding Chinese aid?***

Findings from this study reveal Zimbabweans’ strongly negative perceptions of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. Participants had reservations about Sino-Zimbabwean relations, with some expressing that China had a big-brother mentality, as shown by the attitude of Chinese employers who employ locals, and that China was advancing a neo-colonial agenda in Zimbabwe. Participants also felt that Chinese aid was associated with elite corruption and that aid from China was being used by the Zimbabwean government to silence opposition and shrink the democratic space.

Table 9.3: Summary of the main answers to the third research question

Third research question	Main findings (themes)
What are Zimbabweans’ perceptions of Chinese aid?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ China advancing a neo-colonial agenda ❖ Chinese employers abusing Zimbabwean employees ❖ Chinese aid promoting corruption ❖ Chinese aid being used to shrink democratic space

The participants’ view that Chinese aid is promoting corruption and being used to shrink democratic space in Zimbabwe by promoting dictatorship shows China’s rogue nature and distinguishes China’s approach from the Western approach, which seeks to improve democracy and strengthen institutions in host nations. Participants’ perceptions were shaped mainly by the lack of transparency in Sino-Zimbabwean relations, which relates to the research problem identified in this study: “How does the degree of transparency in the distribution, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe affect citizens’ capacity to participate in projects funded by Chinese aid?” The study addressed this research problem by measuring the quantity of the aid China

was giving to Zimbabwe, and by explaining the nature of the aid, its drivers, and the roles being playing by both countries in propelling the aid engagements. Understanding Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid and its impact on the socio-economic environment of Zimbabwe can improve the relationships between the two nations.

The results discussed above, particularly in question 3, validated the first part of this study's research problem: that due to the opaqueness of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations, citizens are not privy to the magnitude of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and may not be willing to participate in the aid projects. This problem was addressed by the results of questions 1 and 2, which gave insights into the nature of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations and the forms in which the aid is extended. The study also estimated the magnitude of the aid and gave recommendations for the government to engage citizens and encourage them to be active participants in the projects.

Table 9.4: A snapshot of the link among the research questions, study fundings, summary of previous research and Contributions to knowledge

Research Question	Previous Research	Specific Findings (themes)	Contribution to Knowledge
What are the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	<p>-Fuchs and Rudyak (2017) studied the motives of China's foreign aid and found out that China was using aid to create a favourable international environment for trade and advancing its global hegemony dream (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2017). They also found evidence to support China's claims that China provides aid to support poor countries. Fuchs and Rudyak showed that poor developing nations tend to receive more support from China compared to support coming from advanced nations. They also argued that China's motives differ from the west in that China explicitly emphasises on mutual benefit.</p> <p>-Yushi et al (2020) used 44 African countries to study the driving factors of Chinese aid allocation between 2003-2017. Their results shows that the allocation of Chinese aid in Africa is determined by the needs of the African countries as well as China's strategic commercial interests (Yushi et al, 2020).</p> <p>-Carter (2017) investigated Chinese aid in developing countries and found that Chinese aid is a tool used to advance China's foreign</p>	<p>China is using aid to advance its geopolitical interests</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China looking for a voting ally at the UNSC -China maintaining historical ties -China using aid to improve its global image -China using aid to reward countries that adhere to the One China Policy <p>China is using aid to pursue its economic goals</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China marketing its exports -China seeking mineral resources -China marketing its loans -China creating employment for Chinese nationals <p>Zimbabwe's situation is pulling aid to Zimbabwe.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Zimbabwe searching for external funding -Zimbabwe in need of protection against international bullies -Zimbabwe seeking support to fight and silence domestic opposition 	<p>Previous research looked at the drivers of Chinese aid from China's perspective concentrating on the factors that push China's aid to developing countries. This study contributed to knowledge by considering both the pull and push factors that drive Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. The study also used Zimbabwe's unique political and economic situation to explain why Chinese aid is more suitable for Zimbabwe and differed from previous researchers who treated host countries as pawns used to advance China's interests by arguing that Zimbabwe is an active and willing participant in the Sino-Zimbabwe aid relations.</p>


	policy and is driven by a mix of political, economic and moral objectives. They did not find evidence to suggest that China uses aid to access mineral resources.	-Zimbabwe seeking to save a struggling healthcare and educational system -Zimbabwe seeking to alleviate poverty.	
What is the nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe?	-Carter (2017) identified debt relief, emergency humanitarian aid, medical teams and volunteers, goods and materials as the main forms of Chinese aid in developing countries. They also found that China's aid strategy goes beyond official aid but also includes export buyer's credits, official lines of credit by private Chinese companies (Carter, 2017). -China enforces ownership as a condition in the instance the aid recipient country fails to repay loan (Welle, 2018). The aid targets regions where African leaders live as opposed to marginalised regions, thus the main condition to the aid are political interests (Welle, 2018).	Form of the aid given -Aid extended in the form of concessionary loans -Aid given as zero-interest loans -Aid comes in form of expertise and scholarships -Aid comes as grants and donations Conditions attached to the aid -Diplomatic conditionality -Entrenched conditionality -Implicit conditionality Sectors targeted by the aid -Security and defence -Health and education -Transport and tourism -Mining and agriculture -Energy and water reticulation	This study contributed to knowledge by explaining the nature of Chinese aid through exploring the implicit and explicit conditionalities attached to the aid and using the sectors targeted by the aid to review the hidden conditionalities. The study also argued that the form of the aid extended by China is determined by the sector targeted by the aid. Unlike previous research that concentrated on the nature of the aid in isolation, this study took a holistic approach by exploring the nature of the aid through exploring the sectors targeted and the conditionalities attached
What are Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid?	Nassanga and Makara (2015) used the reflection of African media to explore the perceptions of Africans on Chinese aid in Africa and found out that the African perceptions are neutral and positive. Most of their respondents believed that China's involvement in Uganda benefited the nation though complained about the lack of transparency on the part of China.	-China advancing a neo-colonial agenda -Chinese employers abusing Zimbabwean employees -Chinese aid promoting corruption -Chinese aid being used to shrink democratic space	This research contributed to knowledge by giving an African voice to the debate differing from previous research by taking the views of citizens who are directly affected by the aid.

The study results also addressed the three research objectives highlighted in Section 1.6: to explore the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, to explore the main features and nature of Chinese aid in Zimbabwe, and to unpack Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid. The first objective was achieved in Chapter 6; Chapter 7 covered the last two objectives. Analysis of these results culminated in achieving the aim of the study, which was to develop a theoretical framework for Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations.

The theoretical framework proposed in this study implies that Zimbabwe's ambitions – politically and, to some extent, economically – act as enabling variables that create a conducive environment for China to achieve its own geopolitical and geo-economic interests. In other words, China's entry into Zimbabwe was based on the prevailing economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe. This has also been the case

with China's entry to other global-South nations. It can be further asserted that China filled a vacuum left by the West, especially by aid donor nations. China's economic and political interests shape the nature of the aid that is extended to Zimbabwe. The theory suggests that although the Chinese aid approach is rogue and predatory (Green, 2019), host countries' institutions are active players in China's approach, and their conduct determines how China relates with them.

Figure 9.2: An illustration of the theoretical framework of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations



As shown in Figure 9.2, China's aid to Zimbabwe acts as the face of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, but behind it are China's political and economic interests. These interests, presented as impacting variables, shape the nature of the aid that is given to Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwean situation, which is characterised by Zimbabwe's social, political, and economic pursuits, is placed at the bottom of the figure to show its enabling role. The framework argues that China will seek to satisfy Zimbabwe's interests for as long as its own interests are being met along the way,

showing China's predatory nature. Similarly, for as long as Zimbabwean social, economic, and political interests are being met, Zimbabwe will not worry about how China is meeting its own interests, showing Zimbabwe's own rogue characteristics.

Following the arguments of this theory and reflecting on the research problem identified in this study, the onus is on the Zimbabwean authorities to improve Sino-Zimbabwean relations. Recommendations on how to improve the relations are discussed in greater detail in the recommendation section below.

9.3 Research implications

This study contributes to the subject of international relations through substantive content and methodological rigour. Methodologically, the research ensured its analytical validity by taking multiple measures adopted from Straussian grounded theory. The complexity of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe could not be analysed using a single data-collection method; thus, data triangulation was employed. The analysis was also double layered, looking at both China's and Zimbabwe's interests and analysing where those interests converge. This assists readers in understanding the role being played by host nations in advancing China's going-out strategy. In addition, participants were drawn from organisations with different interests, and their views were triangulated with the relevant literature and documentary evidence to maximise their reliability.

The study's substantive contribution emanates from the fact that little research has been done on the Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations. What research there is has failed to distinguish between trade and investments and has generally failed to take a closer look at aid which may be extended with ulterior motives other than the recipient's economic gain. This study thus fills an important gap in the existing

literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is a pioneering study that explains the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and explains why both government and private Chinese players find it beneficial to extend aid to Zimbabwe (Table 7.6). The research also contributes to literature on Sino-African relations, which tends to regard Africa as a whole, although it is a continent with 56 countries that have different characteristics and relate to donors independently and differently. This study narrows the analysis and concentrates only on Zimbabwe, providing more-specific results that can be used to enrich the debate. The study also interviewed experts who have first-hand experience working with Chinese aid distribution, which reduces the risk of analytical speculation that arises from the overuse of secondary data.

9.3.1 Theoretical implications

The study comes at a time when there are ranging theoretical debates on the impact of the rise of China as a super donor in the global South. As China is transmuting itself as a key player in the global economic and political architecture, this study uses foreign aid to illustrate China's motives and behaviour in aid host countries and to analyse the role of host countries in enabling China to achieve its interests. The theory developed in this study will enhance theoretical knowledge on China's foreign-relations mindset and position regarding cooperation with Africa. It will boost understanding as to whether China is going to complement or substitute for traditional donors. The thesis can also be used to analyse how China is able to adapt its foreign policy to suit the characteristics of the host nation. The study has explored the relationship between China's motives when providing aid and the nature of the aid it extends to recipient countries, as well as how characteristics of the host country help in shaping the nature of the aid provided. The analysis will have implications for the wider debate on aid motives and how donors can take advantage of situations in the

host country. In addition, the study contributes to international-relations theory by showing that a country can achieve its objectives in another country without spending much in the form of aid. China gives less aid to Zimbabwe than do other bilateral donors (Table 7.3), yet China receives the warmest reception from the Zimbabwean government and can advance its own interests in Zimbabwe.

Like other studies, such as Brautigam (2010), this study has considered aspects of China's geopolitics and geoeconomics (Chapter 8) to understand Sino-Zimbabwean engagements. However, the question of the geoeconomics and geopolitics of the host country has been overlooked by scholars. This study has considered Zimbabwe's geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies (although these are not well defined) such as pull factors and enabling variables of Sino-Zimbabwean aid relations in line with the theory that emerged in this study. This helps future scholars by taking a more critical position of the role played by host countries when analysing China's going-out strategy.

Another critical theoretical implication of this study is its total exclusion of the West. The literature tends to analyse China's approach through the lens of the Western developmental approach, which emphasises enhancing democracy and reducing poverty. This study aimed to narrow the study to Zimbabwe's idea of development (Chapter 4) and China's use of aid to influence Zimbabwe's domestic and international development (Chapter 2). The implication of this approach is that it helps future researchers to decentre the Western viewpoint from studies regarding China's approach in the global South. The decentring should be twofold: looking at China as the aid provider and looking at the recipient country, an approach that has been ignored by many studies, which have treated aid host countries as passive partners. In the context of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, this study has shown that

Zimbabwe is an active player in attracting China and in using China to advance its overall geopolitical goal of spiting the West. The postcolonial stance adopted in this study is critical in attaining a rounded image of Chinese aid engagements in the South.

9.3.2. Policy implications

Policy is classified as the methods adopted by governments when addressing public matters. Before I discuss the policy implications of this study, it is important to also highlight that China's going-out policy is still evolving, and whilst it is being practised particularly in the global South, it has not yet been publicised in the mould of the Western approach (Jiang, 2016). In this regard, China's approach can be regarded as a framework that has all that is needed, but is still in its experimental stage; host nations like Zimbabwe can take advantage of this and design their domestic policies in line with the evolving Chinese model. To achieve this, Zimbabwe needs to concentrate on its policy design as well as its policy control.

9.3.2.1. Policy design

Policy design encompasses the formulating of the main components of a policy framework, including the objectives of the policy and the plan for implementing it. In designing a China-Zimbabwe policy framework, Zimbabwe is faced with three challenges. The first is that China's interests in Zimbabwe are both political and economic (Sections 6.2 and 6.3), and there is no discussion beforehand regarding the commercial and political interests that China has in the aid projects that are extended to Zimbabwe. Coupled with this is the dominance of the Chinese in the management of the projects, with local participation in management being minimal. This and other reasons give rise to the research problem identified in this study (Section 1.7). An understanding of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe, articulated in Chapter 6, helps Zimbabwean policy-makers comprehend the dynamics of Sino-Zimbabwean

relations, and thereby come up with policies that have precise objectives in line with China's interests.

Another challenge encountered by policymakers when designing policies is the lack of specificity in policy planning. Although previous studies have provided guidelines on Sino-African relations (Asongu and Ssozi, 2016; Ubi, 2014), there is no specific formal or informal Sino-Zimbabwean plan, regardless of billions of dollars' worth of projects having been undertaken since 1980 (Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6). Both the Zimbabwe Transitional Stabilisation Programme document adopted in 2018 and the Look East Policy of 2003 are general when it comes to Zimbabwe's strategy towards China. The key contents of the documents are simplistic and fail to give clear direction on how Zimbabwe is going to benefit from Sino-Zimbabwean relations. Results from this research can help Zimbabwe craft a specific China policy that is informed by China's motives discussed through an analysis of the drivers of Chinese aid, as well as the conditionalities attached to the aid. The policy can also make use of Zimbabweans' perceptions regarding Chinese aid, as discussed in Section 7.5.

The last challenge encountered by policymakers when designing policies is the failure to consider the domestic environment. The discussion in Section 8.3 of Zimbabweans' perceptions reveals a people who are not happy with Sino-Zimbabwean engagements. The participants' responses indicate that this dissatisfaction stems from the facts that that the engagements benefit only the elite and that they fuel abuses of human rights abuse, particularly workers' rights, and cause environmental degradation in areas where the Chinese are involved in mining activities. Without a clear understanding of the nature of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, citizens will continue having negative perceptions, and thus fail to fully participate in and benefit from the aid deals. Results from this study can inform citizens about the

nature of the engagements and the quantity of the aid, as well as the motives of both China and Zimbabwe. Moreover, the results will inform policymakers on how citizens perceive Sino-Zimbabwean aid engagements, and will go a long way toward assisting policy-makers in being sensitive to the local environment when crafting policies relating to engaging China.

9.3.2.2. Policy control

A well-designed policy is only as good as the paper on which it is written unless there is effective policy control (Jiang, 2016). Policy control benefits from a close interaction and, ideally, some measure of agreement between policy implementers and the targeted groups. In the case of Sino-Zimbabwean aid projects, control is an issue due to a wide disparity between the interests of the governors and the governed. Specifically, while the government of Zimbabwe has a political goal to score using Sino-Zimbabwean relations (Chapter 6), the country's citizens are interested in improving their day-to-day lives.

This study's results help both the government and citizens view China-Zimbabwean relations through each other's lens. The study informs citizens about the government's motives in the relations and informs the government of citizens' perceptions and reactions. The government can use the results of the study to influence citizens' perceptions of Chinese aid.

The results of this study will also be useful to Chinese authorities. I discussed in Chapter 6 that one of the drivers of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe is China's quest to improve its global image. The discussion in Chapters 7 and chapter 8 on Zimbabweans' perceptions of Chinese aid shows that whilst China maybe using aid to try to improve its image, the opposite is true, especially from the perspective of

Zimbabwe's citizens. Thus, this study's findings can be used to improve China's approach.

9.4. Recommendations

Sino-Zimbabwean engagements have been widely publicised, with politicians from both countries taking turns to praise the relations, but citizens, who should be the biggest beneficiaries of the engagements, remain sceptical. Results from this research show that Zimbabwe has benefited from Sino-Zimbabwean relations more from a solidarity point of view, with economic benefits accruing sparingly and only when China also has a direct benefit. That said, the camaraderie and solidarity enjoyed to date can be used as a foundation for greater mutually beneficial economic connections.

Recommendation 1: Zimbabwe needs to rewrite its geoeconomic strategy with China to ensure that instead of simply exporting raw materials to China, Zimbabwe should receive value-addition before exporting the products. This is possible if Chinese aid is targeted towards sectors like manufacturing and includes technology transfer. The Zimbabwean economy being labour-intensive, the government should seek to improve manufacturing capacity to strategically position the country to enjoy China's export market share.

Recommendation 2: The current nature of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe encourages resource extraction, and the engagements are constrained in terms of both quality and quantity. To increase the quality and quantity of the engagements, the Zimbabwean government should consider including the private sector and civil society when negotiating for aid deals with China, and monitoring the implementation of the projects. This will help ensure a broad distribution of the aid, and the involvement of the private sector will open doors for further cooperation and collaboration between

the Zimbabwean and Chinese private sectors, which will have a ripple benefit to the economies of both countries.

Recommendation 3: There have been complains by some parliamentarians in Zimbabwe that parliament is not up to speed with the existing Sino-Zimbabwean deals, particularly loan deals (Doré, 2018). Zimbabwe may consider implementing a loan-review mechanism that involves parliament, civil society, and the private sector. This will ensure that citizens buy in into the projects funded by Chinese loans, leading to improved citizens' participation in the projects.

Recommendation 4: In addition, Zimbabwe needs to clearly identify its developmental needs before engaging with China. There is a strong need to reprioritise which sectors are targeted by the aid. More aid should go into sectors like health, energy, and education. With an ailing health-care system, where there are currently only 1.6 physicians and 7.2 nurses for every 10,000 Zimbabweans (Makoni, 2020), there is need to prioritise the sector, which has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic (Mackworth-Young et al., 2020).

Recommendation 5: Lastly, if China is to be a significant development partner for Zimbabwe, policymakers in Zimbabwe should drive the transformational agenda of job creation, increasing local production and capacity as well as the global competitiveness of Zimbabwean products. This is only possible if there is improvement in the negotiation of Chinese deals. The government should ensure transparency in negotiating and implementing deals that will improve the quality of the projects and their impact on local job creation and giving back to the communities involved in the projects.

9.5. Study limitations and scope for further research

The analysis adopted in this study has some limitations, regardless of my philosophical position on the methods used and the research questions that I answered. My status as an insider in the studied community posed the risk of researcher bias, stemming from both my and the participants' assumptions of a similarity of shared experiences (Corbin et al., 2007). From my end, the similarity assumption surfaced in the course of the pilot study, when I realised that the interview manual I had initially drafted was inspired by my prior experiences, and that during those pilot interviews, some participants assumed that I knew what they were talking about. They would start their statements with phrases like, "As you are aware..." or "You may recall...". These suppositions may have affected the quality of the primary data used in this study, as well as the analysis. However, I tried to minimise this risk through data triangulation, negative-case analysis, member checking, and memoing.

Data collection for this thesis focused on Zimbabwean data, with participants drawn from Zimbabwean organisations and documentary analysis based on Zimbabwean data. The quest to interview Chinese officials and obtain data from Chinese embassy officials in Zimbabwe was not successful. More interaction and direct engagement with Chinese stakeholders would deepen future study.

As most of the Chinese projects in Zimbabwe are still underway, a new analysis needs to be done in future to assess the impact of the projects on the economy of Zimbabwe and to analyse whether the perceptions of Zimbabweans will change after the projects are complete. Comparative research between Sino-Zimbabwean and Sino-African relations as a whole needs attention to test the argument of this study that China does not have a specific geoeconomic strategy towards Zimbabwe, but that Zimbabwe falls under the Sino-African geoeconomic strategy. The other question is

how China can partner with traditional donors in Zimbabwe to provide an all-encompassing aid model. Considering the future, will China continue to have a cordial relationship with Zimbabwe if there is a regime change in Zimbabwe? One study participant, a senior member of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance, reminded me:

China does not have permanent friends; they have permanent interests. Whatever happens and whoever is in power, for as long as their interests are being met, Beijing will continue to engage [with] Harare.

(Interview with MD2: Transcript Number 15)

This was supported by Zheng Bijian a Chinese government advisor who argued that in the long run, China's going-out strategy must concentrate on building "communities of interests" by broadening the current "convergence of interests" in the global South (Zheng, 2006). In the end, will the Sino-Zimbabwe aid relations improve, deteriorate, or remain the same? Only time will tell.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Letter of Approval to Conduct Interviews



Project Title: China's Aid Engagements in the South-South Cooperation: Towards Developing a New Theory of the Sino-Zimbabwe Aid Relations

Dear Sir/ Madam

Henry Munashe Jaji is a doctoral student at the Faculty of Business and Law, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia, studying Chinese aid engagements in the South-South Cooperation using Zimbabwe Data. The project aims to develop a theory that explains the Sino-Zimbabwe aid relations by examining the nature, magnitude, and impact of Chinese aid to Zimbabwe and strives to give insights and guidelines to policy makers, other donors, and the general populace.

The student seeks to conduct interviews, with your agreement, with members of your organization who are familiar with the subject. Please find attached the questionnaire he intends to use for the field work if permission is granted. Thank you for your cooperation and for further information please contact the undersigned. If you agree an email response is sufficient and following this, Mr Munashe Jaji will communicate with you to identify staff who may participate in the interviews. At the completion of the project, if preferred, we will forward a summary of the findings to you.

Thanking you in anticipation of support.

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Dr Chandana Hewege (Chief Investigator)
International Business- Discipline Leader
PO Box 218 Hawthorn, VIC 3122
Tel: +61 3 9224 8462
chewege@swin.edu.au

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Mr Henry Munashe Jaji (Student)
Faculty of Business and Law
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Appendix B - In-depth Interview Participant Information Statement



Project Title: China's Aid Engagements in the South-South Cooperation: Towards Developing a New Theory of the Sino-Zimbabwe Aid Relations

Investigator: Henry Munashe Jaji,
Faculty of Business and Law,
Swinburne University of Technology

Principal Investigator: Dr Chandana Hewege
Swinburne University of Technology

Co-investigators: Professor Christopher Selvarajah
Swinburne University of Technology

Introduction to Project and Invitation to Participate

In line with the title of this project, this study seeks to investigate the social, political, and economic influence of China's engagements in Zimbabwe. To this end, we invite you to participate in this research project, which also presents an opportunity to document your views in an academic paper.

1. About the Project

Traditionally foreign aid has been concentrated within the North-South dialogue, the emergency of the South-South dialogue and the rise of China as a global powerhouse has been a subject of debate. The foreign aid phenomenon is shifting from the North-South dialogue to South-South dialogue with China as the most important player. China's Official Development Assistance (ODA) impact on host countries is regularly being featured in the media but there is very few case-based research to investigate the changes taking place in the foreign aid space. This research will address this deficit by studying China's ODA in Zimbabwe

2. Project and Research Interests

This project is being undertaken to satisfy the requirements for the completion of a PhD qualification currently being undertaken by the Student Investigator, Henry Munashe Jaji, at Swinburne University of Technology.

3. Your Involvement in this Project

Participation in this study is through a sixty (60) minute in-depth interviews with Henry. The interview questions will focus on your views about China's aid involvement in Zimbabwe. With your voluntary consent, interviews will be audio-recorded using an electronic device (i.e., mobile phone) for easier and accurate transcribing. However, this is entirely voluntary,

and should you not want the interview to be audio-recorded, manual notes would be taken of the responses.

4. Participant Rights and Consent

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to avoid any question(s) you may not wish to answer, and you may withdraw from the study at any time. You will be asked to provide written, and oral, consent prior to the interview.

5. Privacy and Confidentiality

Privacy and confidentiality are a priority for this research team. The anonymity and confidentiality of names and data will be secured, and all collected data and information will be stored electronically, and password protected. Hard copies of consent forms, interview transcripts and audio recordings will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher's office at Swinburne University. Data will be kept for five years and then destroyed.

6. Research Outputs

Findings from your interview will be documented in a PhD thesis as well as in academic journal articles, and you will be provided with a summary of these findings once the study is completed. No interviewees will be identified in any of the research outputs. A summary of the findings from this study, in lay language, summarizing the results, conclusions and recommendations from the study will be made accessible to you, via an email attachment, at the end of this study.

7. Further Information

If you would like any further information about this project, please do not hesitate to contact Henry or Chandana

Henry Munashe Jaji - PhD Candidate, Faculty of Business and Law, Swinburne University of Technology, John Street, Hawthorn, Victoria, 3122.

Email: mjaji@swin.edu.au

Or

Dr Chandana Hewege: Faculty of Business and Law, Swinburne University of Technology, John Street, Hawthorn, Victoria, 3122.

Phone: 03 9214 8842

Email: chewege@swin.edu.au

8. Concerns/complaints - Who to Contact!

This project has been approved by or on behalf of Swinburne's Human Research Ethics Committee (SUHREC) in line with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research*. If you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of this project, you can contact:

Research Ethics Officer, Swinburne Research (H68),
Swinburne University of Technology, P O Box 218, HAWTHORN VIC 3122 Australia.
Tel (03) 9214 3845 or +61 3 9214 3845 or resethics@swin.edu.au

Appendix C: In-depth Interview Participant Consent Sheet



Project Title: China's Aid Engagements in the South-South Cooperation: Towards Developing a New Theory of the Sino-Zimbabwe Aid Relations

Student Investigator: Henry Munashe Jaji, PhD Candidate,
Faculty of Business and Law,
Swinburne University of Technology

Principal Investigator: Dr Chandana Hewege
Swinburne University of Technology

Co-investigators: Professor Christopher Selvarajah
Swinburne University of Technology

Conditions to Consent:

1. I consent to participate in the above-named project. I have been provided with a copy of the Project Information Statement to which this Consent form relates and any questions I have asked were answered to my satisfaction.
2. In relation to this project, please circle your response to the following.

• I agree to be interviewed by the researcher.	Yes	No
• I agree to allow the interview to be audio recorded by electronic devices	Yes	No
• I agree to make myself available for further information if required	Yes	No

I acknowledge that:

- (a) My participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time;
- (b) The Swinburne project is for research and not for profit,
- (c) Any identifiable personal information which is gathered during the interview will be; (i) retained for analysis for this project, and (ii) accessed and analysed by the researcher(s) for the purposes of conducting this project;
- (d) My anonymity will be preserved, and I will not be identified in any publications.

By signing this document, I agree to participate in this project

Name of Participant:

Signature & Date:

Appendix D: Interview Scheduling Email to Respondents



Dear Participant

Thank you for consenting to be a respondent in the research study titled,

“China’s Aid Engagements in the South-South Cooperation: Towards Developing a New Theory of the Sino-Zimbabwe Aid Relations”.

I would like to take this opportunity to schedule the interview as highlighted

in the previous correspondence and as per the Participant Information Sheet. Interviews will be conducted during a three-week period from 30 September to 25 October 2019 from 08:00 to 17:00. However, these times are indicative and there is room for some flexibility. May you kindly confirm a date and time you wish to conduct this interview, and if preferred, a venue convenient to you. Alternatively, kindly indicate a date and time that is convenient to you to conduct this interview via telephone or Skype call.

Warm regards

Henry Munashe Jaji | PhD Candidate
Faculty of Business & Law | Swinburne University of Technology
Email: mjaji@swin.edu.au